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Abstract

Civil Society and Donor Funded Democratisation: Sierra Leone Case Study
Simon Willans
This thesis evaluates donor funded efforts to utilise civil society as an agent of democracy
promotion within their overall development policies. Democracy promotion has risen to
the forefront of development aims and achieved prominence in the high politics of
national security. In parallel, donors have emphasised civil society as a necessary and
vital actor in this process. These dual pillars of donor policy have largely gone
unquestioned, and little critical analysis regarding their compatibility and effectiveness
has been conducted. The analysis was based on a case study from Sierra Leone, with the
actors from the domestic environmental movement used as the primary subjects. The
combination of qualitative and quantitative data was collected while working for a local
civil society actor, active in the environmental movement. Results indicated that civil
society has been ineffective in promoting democracy within Sierra Leone, and critically it
may merely perpetuate existing undemocratic political norms.
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Chapter I: Introduction
In the summer of 1989 Francis Fukuyama suggested in a controversial and often
misunderstood article that we may have reached the 'end of history', characterised by
"the end point of mankind's ideological evolution and the universalisation of Western
liberal democracy as the final form of human government."1 Concurrent to Fukuyama's
musings, the World Bank released a report entitled Sub-Saharan Africa: From Crisis to
Sustainable Growth which argued that poor governance was the primary factor hindering
Africa's economic growth. Seizing the momentum generated by the subsequent fall of
the Berlin Wall and the end of the Cold War, the development community, led by the
United States, combined these two ideas and elevated liberal democracy or good
governance promotion to the forefront of its policy agendas.3
The rapid spread of liberal democracy across Eastern Europe, Latin America and
parts of Sub-Saharan Africa in the late 1980s and early 1990s led to a massive body of
academic analysis regarding the critical conditions and processes required for a country
to make the transition from autocratic rule to full democratic consolidation.4 Many
theories and potential characteristics emerged, including catalysing elites, middle class
empowerment and minimal economic progress. However it was the idea of civil society
empowerment that captured the donors' imaginations. Focusing on the successful
examples of the Solidarity movement in Poland and the large scale civil society alliances
in South Africa, donors began emphasising civil society as a critical factor in their

1

Francis Fukuyama. End of History? (National Interest, Volume 16, Summer-1989), 1
World Bank. Sub-Saharan Africa: From Crisis to Sustainable Growth. (Washington: World Bank 1989)
3
A full review of this process is taken up in Chapter III.
4
See Larry Diamond, Developing Democracy: Towards Consolidation and Juan J. Linz and Alfred Stepan,
Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation: Southern Europe, South America, and PostCommunist Europe for through analysis of the subject.
2

1

democratisation policies.5 Civil society had began to emerge in donor thought prior to
this, offering an alternative to the perceived corrupt state as a partner in service delivery
and project implementation, however this was a new and untested role.
As Official Development Assistance (ODA) stagnated and ultimately dropped
throughout the 1990s, going from US$71 898 million in 1990 to US$67 961 million in
2000, ODA for governance and civil society assistance increased from US$1 733 million
to US$2 262 million in the same time period. Similarly, funding directed specifically at
non-governmental organisations (NGOs) grew from US$1 050 million to US$1 627
million.6 This trend continued with the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and
Development's (OECD) net ODA rising to US$102 287 million in 2006, with US$8 611
million targeting governance and civil society and US$1 965 million to support nongovernmental

organisations.7

The number of civil

society

organisations

also

mushroomed, with the number of non-governmental organisations registered with the
United Nations Economic and Social Council growing from 724 in 1992, to 1938 in 1999
and 3052 in 2007.8 Although still not representing a large percentage of total ODA flows,
it was clear that democracy promotion and civil society had obtained a long-term
foothold in donor policy and operations.
The ingrained post Cold War policies of the development community progressed
with little internal questioning, however the events of 9/11 forced a reanalysis, once again
led by the United States. The opening paragraph of the introduction to the 2002 National

5

Thomas Carothers, Aiding Democracy Abroad: The Learning Curve (Washington: Carnegie Endowment
for International Peace, 1999), 207
6
Data is extracted from the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development website, Dataset:
DAC1 Official and Private Flows. All values are net disbursements in US$ and in 2005 constant prices.
7
IBID
8
Economic and Social Council Website, www.un.org/esa/coordination/ngo/ (Viewed November 15, 2007)
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Security Strategy echoed the words of Fukuyama, "The great struggles of the twentieth
century between liberty and totalitarianism ended with a decisive victory for the forces of
freedom—and a single sustainable model for national success: freedom, democracy, and
free enterprise."9 Democracy promotion now moved to the forefront of security policy,
seen as a critical end goal, a necessity for economic development and vital in the effort to
combat rogue states, terrorism and the threats that they pose.10 Development policy
became part of national security interests and quickly aligned itself with the new
messianic belief in democracy.11 Other mechanisms such as the Millennium Challenge
Corporation (MCC) were set up that established minimum policy thresholds as a
prerequisite for funding, loosely bundled under the headings of ruling justly, encouraging
economic freedom and investing in people.12 These transformations served to further
elevate democracy promotion from a loose policy ideal at the end of the Cold War, to a
central tenet in the 90s and finally to not just a central facet of security and development
policy goals but a starting point and prerequisite characteristic.
Within Africa there seemed to be a genuine, growing acceptance in the centrality
of governance in development policy. At the governmental level, this was signified with
the establishment of the New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD) in 2001.13

George Bush. National Security Strategy Of The United States ofAmerica. (Washington: White House,
September, 2002), Introduction
10
Bush, 13-23
11
See the USAID policy documents, Policy Framework for Bilateral Aid and At Freedoms Frontier: A
Democracy and Governance Strategic Framework for specific policy. Sections will be analysed in Chapter
4.
12
Millennium Challenge Corporation: Annual Report 2006. (Washington: Millennium Challenge
Corporation, 2007), 32
13
NEPAD Framework Document. (Abuja: 2001) Available at www.nepad.org/2005/files/home.php
(Viewed November 20, 2007)
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This latest plan for African development

explicitly stated, "that development is

impossible in the absence of true democracy, respect for human rights and good
governance."15 What may differentiate NEPAD from previous programmes is that it
provides for a monitoring process through the African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM),
a voluntary instrument designed to allow African Union members to submit to peer
review on agreed upon standards of governance.16 The private sector has also become
active in the push for good governance, with one example being the launch of the Mo
Ibrahim Prize for Achievement in African Leadership, a cash prize awarded from the
former owner of the telecommunications company Celtel. This award is to be granted to
former leaders as a reward and enticement for good governance practices while in office,
with the initial prize being valued at US$5 million over ten years and US$200 000 per
year after that.17 It is clear that the notion of good governance as a necessity for economic
development has moved beyond western policy and has become an accepted facet of
Africa's own development ideas.
This essay will provide a review of the donor policy objective of democracy
promotion and the utilisation of civil society as an active agent in this process. The
argument will be made that the goal of democracy promotion and the current methods of
civil society empowerment and utilisation are often in direct opposition and are not
effective. Volumes have been written on the subject so it is critical to specifically
describe what is unique in this essay. The vast majority of literature has focused on
14

Ian Taylor. NEPAD: Toward Africa's Development or Another False Start, (London: Lynne Rienner
Publishers, 2005), 17. Provides an extensive list of the various plans that have emergedfromAfrica for
African economic development.
15
IBID, 17
16
African Peer Review Mechanism-Base Document. (2003) Available at http://www.nepad.org/aprm/
(Viewed November 20, 2007), 1
17
The Economist. A Politicians' Oscar. (October 27, 2007), 57

4

advocacy organisations and their role in democracy promotion and consolidation. Doing
this provides an isolated and skewed view of the overall impact of civil society in the
process and typically focuses solely on the outcomes of the actions of this small subsection of the civil society community. This essay will be based on a case study of the
environmental

civil

society

community

in Sierra Leone and evaluate

these

orgnanisations' overall impact on democracy promotion to allow for a more complete
understanding of the effects of civil society's actions. It will also allow for more detailed
comparison between the specific challenges facing Sierra Leone in its democratic
transition and general donor policy.
The essay will be split into a distinct theoretical and policy section and a case
study portion. This is intended to introduce the more generic aspects of theory and policy
as a necessary base for the specific analysis in the case study. The theoretical and policy
section will cover two extremely large themes, the first focusing on development theory
and the evolution it has taken and the second looking at the concept of democracy. These
are both extremely large fields of theory and only the relevant aspects of each will be
discussed. Specific policies and donor definitions will also be introduced in these sections
to provide comparison between theory and practice. The section on development theory
will trace the evolution of the various theoretical frameworks that have dominated the
sector. These theoretical evolutions have often been intimately linked with the policies of
the major multilateral and bilateral donors and the shifting geopolitical realities. Specific
focus will be given to United States of America (USA) and United Kingdom (UK)
policy, the former as they have been the lead in elevating democracy promotion and the
latter as they are the largest and most important donor to Sierra Leone. The democracy

5

theory section will be used to gain a more precise understanding of the term in both
theoretical and policy usage. This will be accomplished through an historical review of
the theory to understand its core tenets and major classifications and an examination of
donor definitions. It is critical to understand what donors envision by democracy as this is
directly relevant to their programming strategies and the potential role of civil society.
To introduce the topic the literature review will focus on the debates surrounding
civil society and its ability to act as a democratising agent. The debate will be divided
thematically, with the earlier debates focussing on theoretical and definitional aspects of
civil society and later debates focussing more on practical issues of project
implementation. Particular focus will be given to literature regarding African civil society
and specific issues related to inclusion and existing social structures. A working
definition of civil society developed from donor policy will also be established.
The case study section will focus on Sierra Leone and be divided into two
chapters. In the first section, an overview of the political history and current governance
status within Sierra Leone will be summarised. The argument will be made that Sierra
Leone's major challenges to democratic consolidation are based on the historical
evolution of the state and rooted largely in existing societal structures. This creates
unique challenges for donor programming as there is an immediate contradiction between
the typical institutional based programming models that are favoured and the specific
circumstances present in Sierra Leone. Additionally this complicates the utilisation of
civil society in the democratisation process as specific roles and intervention strategies
must be established. The second portion of the case study will be based on analysis of the
civil society community within the environmental movement of Sierra Leone with a

6

focus on a national NGO network, the Environmental Forum for Action (ENFORAC)
and one of its main member organisations, the Environmental Foundation for Africa
(EFA). This evaluation will be based on the theoretical role of civil society in the
democratisation process and be a mixture of both more measureable evaluations of
efficacy and abstract notions of norm creation and democratic culture. The environmental
community provides an excellent location for study as the acknowledged contribution
that environmental mismanagement played in the civil war elevates it to a critical level in
any effort at democratic consolidation.

7

Chapter II: Methodology
The research for this essay will follow a multi-strategy approach, focussing on a
case study analysis of the environmental movement in Sierra Leone. Sierra Leone
provides an interesting case study as it is slowly emerging from an eleven year civil war
that decimated the country and brought it to the brink of the notorious status of 'failed
state'. It also went through a presidential and parliamentary election in August and
September of 2007 that resulted in a peaceful change of government, creating a unique
environment for research. The focus on the environmental movement is extremely
relevant as the civil war was primarily funded through diamond wealth, elevating
1R

environmental management to a critical level in governance issues.

•

Concentrating

solely on the environmental movement allowed for a more thorough analysis of a specific
section of the development and civil society community. Data from a national survey of
civil society was utilised to provide a macro level comparison and increase the reliability
of the findings.
The initial portion of the research, intended to outline the current status of
governance and highlight the challenges to democratic consolidation, was based on
primary government documents and official donor policy documentation. At the
governmental level, the Constitution of Sierra Leone (1991), the National Environmental
Policy (1994), Environmental Protection Act (2000), the Local Government Act (2004)
and the various Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers are the most critical formal policy
documents regarding governance, the environment and development. From the donor
side, the United Kingdom and the United States are the two primary bilateral donors,
18

See David Keen, Conflict and Collusion in Sierra Leone for a through examination of the relationship
between diamond wealth and the civil war.

8

whereas the European Commission and the World Bank are the largest multilateral
donors.19 Of these the United Kingdom is most active in the governance sector and will
provide the majority of the formal policy documentation with the Improved Governance
and Accountability Pact (2006), Annual Review of DFID Support To The AntiCorruption Commission (2006) and the various Poverty Reduction Framework
Arrangement review documents being the most relevant. Additionally there is a large
amount of official development data available internationally from the World Bank,
OECD and domestically from the Development Assistance Coordination Office (DACO),
the primary monitoring and evaluation organisation within the Sierra Leone government.
These policy documents will be compared with each other and against the larger
theoretical framework of democracy to highlight the issues and contradictions posed in
their implementation.
The second portion of the case study is a combination of quantitative and
qualitative research conducted while working with EFA from April to October, 2007.
Additional data was generated through interactions with the various partner organisations
of ENFORAC, a consortium of environmental NGOs within Sierra Leone.
Qualitative data was generated through participant observation. The author's role
at EFA as a Project Officer, implementing photovoltaic electricity projects, allowed for
interactions with local and national government, domestic civil society actors and
international donors. These experiences facilitated the development of the questionnaire
and also increased the author's ability to understand the complicated dynamics that exist

Consortium Integration, Evaluation of the Commission's Support to Sierra Leone-Country Level
Evaluation-. (Frankfurt: Consortium Integration, 2006), 33

9

within civil society organisations and between civil society organisations, government
and donors.
Quantitative data was generated utilising two sets of

self-administered

questionnaires, one answered at the organisational level and the second completed by
employees or volunteers within the organisations. The organisational questionnaires were
rooted in Gordon White's theory

on the role of civil society in the democratisation

process with between six and ten specific questions being utilised as individual variables
for each of the four criteria. The final index which addresses the normative aspects of
civil society in the democratisation process was further broken up into five distinct
criteria based on Robert DahFs five distinguishing characteristics of a democratic
process; 1) effective participation, 2) voting equality at the decisive stage, 3) enlightened
understanding, 4) control of the agenda, and 5) an inclusive demos.

Each of these

criteria was evaluated using two questions. The answers were converted to a five point
scale with higher values representing a more democratic process. Generic data was also
collected on organisational size, structure, funding and focus.
The individual questionnaires were focused on the final aspect of White's theory
and the same five criteria offered by Dahl. These provide comparative data between the
organisational level and the individual and illuminate the extent that the normative aspect
of civil society has reached the individual level. As with the organisational data, each of
the criteria were evaluated using two questions each that were converted to a five point
scale with higher values representing a more democratic process. Additional
demographic data was collected to evaluate the various criticisms associated with NGOs,

20
21

White's four possible roles are covered in Chapter V.
Dahl's five characteristics are more thoroughly covered in Chapter IV.

10

regarding their lack of overall representation and an urban, ethnically homogenous,
middle class bias.
The combination of macro level analysis utilising donor and government policy
will provide the baseline for the goals and issues related to the governance initiatives in
Sierra Leone. This information will then be compared and contrasted with the specific
case study analysis to provide a clear picture of the actual contradictions and challenges
that are emerging due to the realities of the NGO community. The focus of this will be on
the discrepancies between the institutional basis of the donor policies and the normative
aspects of privately funded NGOs.

11

Chapter III: Development Theory and Policy
This chapter will trace the theoretical and practical evolution of international
development. Current development policy is a product of experience, critiques and
changing politics and to fully understand the current theory and policy goals it is
imperative to understand its history. The overview will cover the major theoretical
paradigms that have dominated the field and review some of the major donor policies that
have emerged. Major multilateral donors such as the World Bank and the UNDP have
been prominent in shaping development theory and are discussed in the general
overview. Policies of the United States and United Kingdom are used as examples of
bilateral donors and discussed in a separate section to provide more focused analysis.
To begin to untangle the development web it is first necessary to understand how
people use the term.

Thomas provides three standard ways in which the term

development is used: as a vision, description or measure of a desirable society, as a
process of social change and transformation and deliberate efforts aimed at improvement
by various agencies.22 These three broad concepts allow for more focussed areas of
comparison and contrast for the following analysis.
Historical Development Thought
Although ideas surrounding development have existed since the Enlightenment
period, the modern phase of development is often traced back to Harry Truman's
inaugural address in 1949.

In this speech, many of the ideals expounded by the current

USA administration are present, including the belief in the link between democracy,

22

Allan Thomas. "Meanings and Views of Development", in Poverty and Development into the 21s'
Century, ed. Tim Allen and Allan Thomas (Milton Keynes: Oxford University Press, 2000), 29
23
Ted Lewellen, The Anthropology of Globalization: Cultural Anthropology Enters the 21s' Century
(Westport: Bergin & Garvey, 2002), 62-63
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freedom, economic gains and security. Truman spoke of four major courses of action as
part of the United States' programme for peace and freedom with the fourth focusing on
development and the US role in this mission.
Fourth, we must embark on a bold new programme for making the
benefits of our scientific advances and industrial progress available for the
improvement and growth of underdeveloped areas. More than half the
people of the world are living in conditions approaching misery. Their
food is inadequate. They are victims of disease. Their economic life is
primitive and stagnant. Their poverty is a handicap and a threat both to
them and to more prosperous areas...Our aim should be to help the free
peoples of the world, through their own efforts, to produce more food,
more clothing, more materials for housing, and more mechanical power to
lighten their burdens...Such new economic developments must be devised
and controlled to the benefit of the peoples of the areas in which they are
established. Guarantees to the investor must be balanced by guarantees in
the interest of the people whose resources and whose labour go into these
developments.
Not only did Truman usher in the modern idea of development, he established themes
that would become dominant in the period and are still prevalent today. Specifically, the
ideas of an underdeveloped and developed world, distinguished by economic wealth and
the role of technology in propelling the underdeveloped along the path of development
were introduced.
Modernisation theory emerged as the dominant paradigm of the 1960s and 1970s
and echoed many of the sentiments outlined by Truman. W.W. Rostow is generally
accepted as the theoretical founder of modernisation theory and his 1960 book, The
Stages of Economic Growth, as its core text. Rostow outlines five stages of economic
growth, the traditional society, the preconditions for take-off, the take-off, the drive to
maturity, and the age of mass-consumption that societies inevitably follow in their path

Harry Truman, Inauguration Speech, Washington D.C., January 20 , 1949. Available online at
http://www.trumanlibrarv.org/calendar/viewpapers,php?pid=1030. (Accessed December 16th, 2006)
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towards modernisation.

Throughout Rostow's work the interplay between politics,

society and economics is emphasised as well as the important role of technology in this
evolution. A critical distinction is made in this relationship, as Rostow states, "economic
change is, itself, viewed here as the consequence of political and social as well as
narrowly economic forces."26 A final important emphasis from Rostow was the role of
external forces in establishing the required conditions for take-off. Remembering that
this work was published during and directly following an intense period of
decolonisation, Rostow described a 'reactive nationalism' as critical to creating the
internal social and political requirements. These changes were driven by the emergence
of a new elite that would uproot traditional society because of its failure to "protect them
from humiliation by foreigners."27

From a theoretical framework, modernisation is

measured in limited economic terms but is seen as a transformational process with
political and social factors as the primary catalysts. Additionally and most importantly
for later comparison with current development thought, external influence is seen as vital,
as is the transformation or more aptly the overcoming of a failed traditional society.
Practical modernisation theory, although borrowing heavily from Rostow,
diverged significantly in that it placed economics at the forefront, driving political and
social change. This divergence was a result of Cold-War politics that saw both sides
seeking to create client states in the less developed world, as part of overall national
security interests. The west and the USA in particular, saw development assistance as a
way to promote economic growth that would serve as an outlet for nationalism, creating
social progress and effective political leadership, ultimately resulting in secure
25

W.W. Rostow, The Stages of Economic Growth (London: Cambridge University Press, 1960), 4
Rostow, 2
27
Rostow, 26-27

26
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democracies.

The USA-launched Alliance for Progress represents an excellent example

of the practical application of modernisation theory.
The Kennedy Administration was responsible for a number of critical
formulations of development policy, including the passing of the Foreign Assistance Act
of 1961, an increase in foreign aid of 33% and the creation of the United States Agency
for International Development (USAID). However, the Alliance for Progress was their
most bold initiative.29 This policy evolved from the Act of Bogota and the creation of the
Inter-American Development Bank under the previous Eisenhower administration and
was an attempt to promote economic and ultimately democratic development in Latin
America.30

The plan was formally announced in a speech to the Latin American

diplomatic corps and is interesting for the link it creates between economics and politics,
emphasising the perceived relationship in U.S. policy-making circles. In grand rhetoric,
Kennedy discusses the common struggle of the Americas to overcome colonial powers
and to "demonstrate to the entire world that man's unsatisfied aspiration for economic
progress and social justice can best be achieved by free men working within a framework
of democratic institutions."31 The formal charter, signed in Punta del Este in April 1961,
established the alliance and is a more defined declaration of economic targets. Specific
goals are presented including income growth, industrialisation, economic diversification

Joan E Spero, Jeffrey A Hart, The Politics OfInternational Economic Relations (Belmont: Wadsworth /
Thomson Learning, 2003), 193-195
29
Thomas Carothers, Aiding Democracy Abroad: The Learning Curve (Washington: Carnegie Endowment
for International Peace, 1999), 23.
30
Robert H. Holden and Eric Zolov, eds., Latin America and the United States: A Documentary History
(New York: Oxford University Press, 2000), 226
31
John F. Kennedy, Address at a White House Reception for Members of Congress and for the Diplomatic
Corps of the Latin American Republics, Washington, DC, 13 March 1961. in Robert H. Holden and Eric
Zolov, eds., Latin America and the United States: A Documentary History (New York: Oxford University
Press, 2000), 227
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and agrarian reform and increased productivity, all of which are part of the necessary
conditions for 'take-off to occur.
Although closely linked to the theoretical version of modernisation theory,
practical policy varied in that the measure of development was expanded beyond merely
economic terms to focus on democratic governance. Also, the interplay between social,
political and economic factors emphasised by Rostow is simplified to the point where
economic development is seen as causal to political change. The inability of the Alliance
for Progress to meet either its economic goals or its grander goals of democracy
promotion led to the emergence of strong critiques of both policy and theory. These
critiques were heavily influenced by Marxist thought, with dependency theory emerging
as the most accepted.
The Marxist conceptualisation of development shares some transformational
similarities but has radical departures from the modernisation concept.

Marxism

understands history as a class struggle with its latest battle being waged between the
modern bourgeoisie society and the proletariat masses, over what is defined as the means
of production.

Development is conceptualised as a process that transforms the

bourgeois, the proletariat and society at large. This political change is driven directly by
economics, specifically who controls the means of production. The end goal, or desirable
society, is reached when "class distinctions have disappeared, and all production has been
concentrated in the hands of the vast association of the whole nation... In place of the old
bourgeois society, with its classes and class antagonism, we shall have an association, in
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which the free development of each is the condition for the free development of all."
This is in stark contrast to modernisation's final evolution of a mass-consumption society
but there are noteworthy similarities. Firstly, the concept of development still remains
firmly lodged in a radical transformation of society, from traditional to modern and from
a bourgeois-proletariat conflict to communist harmony. Secondly, economics stays at the
core of this transformation rather than some other goal such as enlightenment,
environmental sustainability or a less violent society.

The goal of the economic

transformation is different, maximisation versus equalised distribution, but raw
economics does not lose its core role.
Dependency theory has it roots in Marxist thought and also maintains coherence
with the ideas of radical societal transformation and economics that modernisation and
Marxism share. On a fundamental level, dependency diverges from Marxism in that the
inevitability of capitalist development is not assumed to exist in the developing world. It
also has a fundamental difference from modernisation theory, in that traditional society is
not seen as the starting point but an underdeveloped society, itself a creation of the
western dominated capitalist society.

This underdeveloped society is believed to be

caused by factors exogenous to the state and is part of the same process that created the
developed, capitalist world.
Raul Prebisch laid the theoretical groundwork for the various streams of
dependency theory that would emerge. His study, The Economic Development Of Latin
America and its principal problems, argued that the existing "out-dated schema of the
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international division of labour"

was at the root of Latin America's comparative

underdevelopment to the United States. This division of labour relegated regions such as
Latin America to the periphery and limited their engagement in the global system to mere
suppliers of food and raw materials for the industrialised core.37 Although theory
predicted that productivity increases in the core would lead to improved terms of trade for
the periphery, benefiting all parties, Prebisch illustrated the exact opposite had occurred.
He argued that income levels had risen more than productivity in the core while the
opposite had occurred in the periphery, resulting in a real decrease in price ratios between
primary and manufactured goods.38 This decrease was a function of the trading system
and would only continue to increase the gap in economic development between the core
and periphery. Prebisch proposed a number of specific macroeconomic policies to
address the growing economic imbalance and the issues it created. Central to this was the
need for industrialisation and a change in the composition of imports. Taken to its
furthest extreme was the possibility of intentionally sacrificing exports to allow for an
increase in industrial production as a substitute for imports. Prebisch's work represented
a radical challenge to the existing trading system and spawned numerous subsequent
theorists and policy makers.
Radical dependency theorists such as Andre Gunder Frank proposed a complete
economic delinking from the developed, capitalist world as the only possible path to
overcoming this underdeveloped state of being.

Milder forms of development theory
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did not propose a radical break from the capitalist system nor did they root the manifest
issues of underdevelopment solely in the core.

This school instead argued that

development was possible with the current system but it would be unequal development
both globally and nationally.41 Cardoso and Faletto eloquently express their version of
dependency theory in Dependency and Development in Latin America. In an extremely
nuanced set of explanations, the authors expand on the basic dependency theory and
argue that dependency and underdevelopment are a result of historical, societal forces
both within the nation and at the international level that created and reinforce existing
power structures.

Based on this, development is seen as a social process that will lead

to economic development. However, the structure of society and therefore the conflicting
parties in this social process are "deduced principally from the pattern of income
distribution and the structure of employment."43 Overall development is conceptualised
once again as a radical, societal transformation that alters internal and external
relationships and power structures.

If this is achieved, then and only then could

economic development occur, defined as "less dependency and self-sustained growth
based on the local capital accumulation and on the dynamism of the industrial sector."44
As with modernisation and strict Marxist theory there is a clear vision of the developed
society.
Modernisation theory and the Marxist based dependency theory represent the two
dominant conceptualisations of post World War II development. Both sets of theories
demand radical changes to society, whether it is a linear transformation from traditional
41

Andres Velasco. Dependency Theory (Foreign Policy, Nov-Dec, 2002, No. 133), 45
Fernando Henrique Cardosa and Enzo Faletto, Dependency and Development in Latin America
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1979), xvi-xx
43
IBID, 10
44
IBID, 10. Pages 1-28 of the book all contribute to the main theoretical basis of the author's arguments.
42

19

to modern or a complete overhaul of the existing power structures and organisation of
society at large. Additionally, both provide a clear vision of what this developed society
would entail, although with polar views on consumption and the organisation of
production. Finally, they all maintain economics as the ultimate measure of their vision
of a developed society and despite the disagreement between consumption and
distribution, economics and wealth are still at the core.
Current Theories of Development
Emerging from modernisation theory and Marxist critiques such as dependency
theory were neoliberalism and human development, which have dominated recent
development thought and provided distinct conceptualisations. Neoliberalism and its
practical offshoot, 'the new orthodoxy', maintain continuity with previous thought,
emphasising societal transformation, although with an altered focus, and giving primacy
to economics. Human development is less radical in its transformational nature, not
asserting a discrete vision of society or rigid methods to promote transformation but
moves dramatically away from a narrow economic definition of development, instead
focussing on a broad set of societal measures. This section will go beyond the generally
descriptive nature of the previous section and focus on highlighting the strengths and
weaknesses of the two development paradigms.
The first of the two paradigms to be analysed is neoliberalism or the Washington
Consensus, which has dominated development thought for the last twenty-five years.
According to Dani Rodrik, the Washington Consensus (WC) was based on ten core
principles, broadly lumped under three categories of stabilise, privatise and liberalise.
These principles were fiscal discipline, reorientation of public expenditures, tax reform,
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financial liberalisation, unified and competitive exchange rates, trade liberalisation,
openness to foreign direct investment, privatisation, deregulation and secure property
rights.45 In 1979, Senegal received its first structural adjustment loan from the World
Bank and earned the honour of being the first African country to take this leap.46 During
the period 1980-1989, thirty-six sub-Saharan African countries received 241 different
loans from the World Bank or International Monetary Fund (IMF) and eleven of those
countries received ten or more loans.47 This was the high point of the application of the
Washington Consensus (WC) in the development world, although it has been merely
repackaged for today's consumption.
The one-size-fits-all models proposed by the International Financial Institutions
(IFI) quickly drew massive critiques focused on the social devastation caused by their
reforms. The IFIs and supporters of the neoliberal regime attempted to defend their
policies, arguing that partial reform or political issues were the reason for the policies'
failures.48

The WC represented a dramatic shift in thinking about development that

essentially removed people from the picture. Gone was the notion of a human-centred
societal change that was present in both modernisation and dependency theories and in its
place was a set of institutional norms that would create the framework for economic
development.

Additionally, economics, important in past concepts of development

thought, became the only objective and Gross Domestic Product growth became the only
valid measure of development. Emerging from this was what Rodrik describes as the
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'Augmented Washington Consensus' which added ten new principles to the existing list,
corporate governance, anticorruption, flexible labour markets, WTO agreements,
financial codes and standards, "prudent" capital-account opening, nonintermediate
exchange rate regimes, independent central banks/inflation targeting, social safety nets
and targeted poverty reduction.49 This augmented WC has become the new standard in
institutional development thought and has led to what some have described as the 'new
orthodoxy'.
Academics have described this 'new orthodoxy' as primarily the confluence of
economic development, still largely along neoliberal lines, and democracy promotion,
often labelled as good governance. Leftwich argued that the 'new orthodoxy' was a
result of four dominant factors, "the experience of structural adjustment lending, the
resurgence of neo-liberalism in the West, the collapse of official communist regimes and
the rise of pro-democracy movements in the developing world and elsewhere".50 Within
the institutional arena, this new orthodoxy was introduced by the World Bank in a report
on sub-Saharan Africa in 1989. This report highlighted the role of the government as an
enabler of economic development and the hindrance that ineffective governance had
played in Africa's poor economic performance.51 As a result of the factors listed a new
thinking about democracy emerged and was formalised, a new thinking that forms the
backbone of current mandates and policies. Although the policies have converged the
debates surrounding their effectiveness have remained active. What was seen as unique
in the institutional new orthodoxy was the order of operations. Contrary to modernisation
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theory, which saw democracy as the outgrowth of the linear progression of economic
development, the 'new orthodoxy' argued democracy was a requirement for or a parallel
development alongside economic development.52 Although far less of a radical societal
transformation than previous models, the direct linking of democracy with modern
society created a more clear process and path and expanded the measures beyond mere
economics.
The other current dominant paradigm of human development is a people-centred
approach to development and is closely linked to the idea of human security proposed by
the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP). Although a more recent
development paradigm its theoretical foundations emerged from the 1950s, 1960s and
1970s with the works of scholars and practitioners such as Sir Arthur Lewis, Dudley
Seers and Mahbub ul Haq.
Lewis is regarded as a pioneer of development economics and has had a lasting
impact on the field. His most influential work, in which he formulated the 'dual
economy' model, first appeared in the 1954 article, Economic Development with
Unlimited Supplies of Labour.53 This model theorised two distinct sectors in the
economy, the capitalist and subsistence, often equated with industrial and agricultural
respectively. Labour is assumed to be in an infinite supply in the subsistence sector and
therefore transfers to the capitalist sector at a rate dependent on the availability of capital.
As labour transfers to the capitalist sector at roughly the subsistence wage, increased
capital accumulation occurs in the capitalist sector perpetuating the cycle until the supply
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of labour is exhausted.

This model provides a potential explanation for how growth may

occur without a parallel increase in wages. Lewis was also one of the first to expand upon
the notion of development as growth, arguing that not just economic activity but also
increasing knowledge and human capital were vital in the process.55 Often overlooked is
Lewis's contribution to the notion of democracy within the development process. Going
against the in vogue one-party rule in Africa during the 1960s, Lewis argued that multiparty democracy was essential due to the social pluralism of African countries. He
proposed three key features of a pluralist democracy: proportional representation, a
constitutionally guaranteed coalition government, and federalism

or provincial

devolution.56 As a testament to Lewis's work, he became the first person born outside
Europe or North America to be awarded the Nobel Prize in Economics in 1979.57
Dudley Seers was vital in bridging the gap between Lewis's expansion of the
concept of how development occurred with the current people-centred approach of what
constitutes development. He was critical of using growth as a proxy for development,
even in the economic sense, as it aggregated all forms of economic wealth regardless of
equality and type.

Seers argued that unemployment, equality and poverty needed to be

included to truly evaluate development, rather than just per capita income.59 By
challenging the 'growth as development' idea, Seers also questioned the primacy given to
54
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capital investment as a spur of growth, suggesting that both correct policies and human
capabilities were equally as important.60 Development theory had evolved from a narrow
focus on national-level growth based on classical economic factors to a broad concept
based on measures of equality and reliant upon political and societal factors.
Ul Haq built on the available critical analysis of development policy and
augmented it with his own experiences as an economist in the Pakistani government and
the World Bank. His 1976 book, The Poverty Curtain: Choices for the Third World,
argued that GNP growth may actually be counterproductive to economic development as
this indicator may mask reductions in social standards and increased income inequality.61
To counter this, he suggested a new development strategy that "should be such as to build
development around people rather than people around development."

The core of the

strategy was to target poverty reduction by focusing on human needs and increasing the
productivity of the poor.

He also called for a redefinition of development policy

measures away from GNP and towards a reduction in the worst forms of poverty such as
malnutrition, disease, illiteracy, unemployment, squalor and inequalities.64 Although an
accepted part of current development theory and policy ul Haq's work was a radical
break from the existing paradigms and elevated people to the centre of the development.
The people-centred development concept was formalised in 1990 by ul Haq in the
first Human Development Report from the UNDP, which stated the objective of
development "is to create an enabling environment in which people can enjoy long,
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healthy and creative lives."

The UNDP has established a number of formal statistical

indicators to evaluate the level of human development within a country. The Human
Development Index (HDI) is the most established and is a combination of three sub-sets
of measures. The first measure is a long and healthy life, which consists of a value for life
expectancy at birth. The second is knowledge, consisting of adult literacy rate and gross
enrolment rate. The third, a decent standard of living is measured by GNP per capita
adjusted for purchasing power parity.66 In addition to producing the annual HDI surveys,
the UNDP is the main agency responsible for promoting the Millennium Development
Goals (MDG), a set of eight goals and targets for 2015: eradicate extreme poverty and
hunger, achieve universal primary education, promote gender equality and empower
women, reduce child mortality, improve maternal health, combat HIV/AIDS, malaria and
other diseases, ensure environmental sustainability and develop a global partnership for
development. Within each of these larger goals are specific measures that are related to
either the HDI or other indicators.67 This conceptualisation of development is a radical
departure from any of the previously surveyed theories. Despite this, the MDGs have
become the focal point of the vast majority of current development programmes.
Although progress towards meeting them is inconsistent, the MDGs have served to create
a common set of goals despite widespread debate regarding which strategies are most
suitable to achieve them.
Human development takes the idea of development directly to the individual and
creates an image of a standard of life that involves a much broader measure than merely
65
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economics. By focusing specifically on items such as gender and child mortality, this
concept also attempts to address discrepancies that can be hidden within aggregates that
the other models rely upon. Although it does not specifically lay out a particular political
or social structure, it establishes minimum standards that any society must maintain to be
considered developed. A major weakness of this conceptualisation is that it does not
provide a transformative path to achieve this vision unlike the pre-determined nature of
the other models. This does not allow it to address structural, political or societal
impediments to achieving the development vision. However, this can also be seen as a
strength as it allows individuals and societies to decide their own paths, suitable to their
own specific realities. Brilliant and visionary thinkers such as Amartya Sen and Aung
San Suu Kyi have taken this freedom to decide and proposed truly alternative ways of
thinking about development.
Sen has expressed his ideas in Development as Freedom, where development is
judged to be the expansion of substantive freedoms. Freedom is critical to the
development process for two distinctive reasons. Progress is measured based on whether
the freedoms that people have are expanded and that the achievement of development is
dependent on the freedoms that people have and express.

Although it is impossible to

summarise this complex and rich concept in such a small space, the critical aspect is that
it allows small incremental increases in freedom such as access to education to be judged
as development, rather than part of a process that can lead to development, generally
measured in terms of increased enrolment or eventually economic wealth.
Suu Kyi provides an even more radical view of development, going so far as to
suggest that economic development or more specifically increased aggregate wealth may
68
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actually be a negligible part of development or even counterproductive to the concept
entirely. Drawing heavily on her Buddhist beliefs and the traditional importance of
Buddhism in Burmese culture, she argues that a political and social revival along those
very lines is required for economic wealth to be advantageous for the people. Suu Kyi
uses the Burmese terms of hsinye, or an insufficiency of material goods and also physical
distress and discomfort of mind and chantha, its opposite, to challenge the western notion
of poverty and to illustrate how merely addressing economics or even less fundamentally
materialist items such as maternal health or environmental sustainability is not sufficient
to address this alternate conceptualisation of poverty.69
Both the Sen and Suu Kyi conceptualisations of development move outside the
traditional institutional and academic models and truly challenge the concepts. Neither
proposes a specific vision or path to development, which takes them both beyond the
capacities of most policy makers. However, both offer critical insights as the focus shifts
directly to the individual and the type of life they want and are empowered to lead. By
introducing these departures it forces the development world to constantly reassess its
methods, motives and goals based on local realities and individual needs that may be
beyond mere material measures.
Jeffrey Sachs is the most well known of the current development economists and
his book, The End of Poverty: Economic Possibilities For Our Time, includes a foreword
by Bono indicating the level of mainstream acceptance his views have generated. Sachs
describes poverty as a trap and development as a ladder or a series of steps. To gain
access to this ladder he argues that the poor need to given access to six major kinds of
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capital: human capital, business capital, infrastructure, natural capital, public institutional
capital, and knowledge capital.70 He is extremely vocal in his belief that large increases in
ODA are vital to build the necessary capital accumulations to allow for sustained poverty
reduction. Sachs is critical of the structural adjustment era of development economics,
stating "In some ways development economics is like eighteenth century medicine, when
doctors used leaches to draw blood from their patients, often killing them in the
process."71 To remedy these past issues he proposes a system dubbed clinical economics
79

which views each case as a unique patient with a unique set of policy requirements.
Sachs provides a blend of development theory, stressing the need to build the capacities
and opportunities of individuals but ultimately relying on economic growth as the
primary indicator of development. Although not revolutionary his views have become
widely accepted in the policy world.
Policy Section : United States and United Kingdom
The major multilateral development agencies, the World Bank and the UNDP,
have been extremely influential in shaping development theory and have utilised these
approaches in their policies and programmes. Bilateral donor policy has been more
diverse, as domestic political and national security factors have led to more pragmatic
programming. Despite this there are common theoretical foundations and policy
objectives.
The United States is the largest donor and has always been influential in overall
policy. Not apologetically, the US has justified its funding not solely on recipient needs
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but as a function of its own foreign policy objectives, which increasingly are seen as
linked to democracy promotion.

In Aiding Democracy, Thomas Carothers provides an

excellent summary of the history of 'democracy assistance' based on the experiences of
the United States. Throughout the Cold War period aid had been used as a tool of foreign
policy and linked through economic development indirectly to democracy, as a
counterweight to communist expansion. Executive and popular support for this theory
was cyclical throughout the 60's 70's and 80's and it wasn't until the end of the Cold
War that democracy assistance became a core priority in USA aid allocation.7 Carothers
argues that the upsurge in democracy aid was the result of a confluence of three related
factors: the global trend toward democracy, the end of the Cold War and most critically, a
"new thinking about development"75 which sought to expand the scope of development
beyond merely economic and social measures and directly include the form of
governance.
The rethinking of security policy that occurred post-9/11 would hasten and focus
this 'new thinking' on the role of governance. In the decentralised USA system, foreign
aid is delivered by twenty six different departments and agencies. Of these, Defence and
USAID with 21.7% and 38.8% of the overall budget respectively are the two main actors,
with the latter still being the primary organisation.77 USAID is a coordinated branch of
the USA government, working directly with the National Security Council and receiving

Development Assistance Committee Peer Review. Peer Review of the United States. (Paris: OECD,
2006), 10
74
Thomas Carothers. Aiding Democracy. (Washington: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace,
1999), 40.
75
Carothers, 44.
76
Carothers, 46.
77
DAC Peer Review, 20-21

30

foreign policy guidance from the Secretary Of State.

The starting point for USAID

policies is the National Security Strategy (NSS), as it creates the overall framework for
international engagement. Within this document, democracy promotion is an overriding
theme, seen as a core foundation in preventing terrorism and rogue states, promoting
economic development and as an end goal.79 Development is also elevated, touted as the
third pillar of national security alongside defence and diplomacy.80 The 2002 USAID
report, Foreign Aid in the National Interest: Promoting Freedom, Security and
Opportunity, built on the themes of the 2002 NSS, stressing the role of development in
national security and the essential role of democracy and good governance in both
national security and development objectives. In relation to national security,
development is portrayed as a countermeasure to the root causes of threats, in contrast to
diplomacy and defence which deal with their consequences or manifestations.81
Development is portrayed as the ultimate form of pre-emptive strike against security
threats such as terrorism and rogue states. Within the development process, democratic
good governance is deemed mandatory, as the report argues "greater public resources,
better physical infrastructure, and stronger public health and education are essential for
development. But they are not enough, and they are not the most crucial factor. No
amount of resources transferred or infrastructure built can compensate for —or survive—
bad governance."

The immediate post 9/11 period led to a dramatic shift in USA
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development policy, elevating democratic good governance, deemed an imperative for
development, to a core facet of national security policy.
The latest USAID official policy document, issued in January 2006, maintains
policy continuity with the National Security Strategy and previous USAID reports,
outlining the specific role of USAID in achieving the core foreign policy goals of the
National Security Strategy. Titled Implementing Transformational Diplomacy Through
Development, the policy document focuses on five broad-based goals: promoting
transformational development, strengthening fragile states, supporting strategic states,
providing humanitarian relief and addressing global issues and other self standing
concerns.83 The document outlines sets of results and graduation criteria that can be used
to formulate country-specific policy and ensure coherence with other agencies and
partners. It portrays development as a series of progressions that countries must pass
through in their transformation toward the ultimate goal of no longer needing foreign aid.
Although lacking the transformational vision of some of the historical theories, the idea
of development as a transformative process is still a dominant aspect.
The latest document released by USAID maintains the same policy alignment
with security policy as previous policy documents and reports. Entitled Strategic Plan
Fiscal Years 2007-2012: Transformational Diplomacy, governance is once again
prioritised "as a matter of principle; as a contribution to U.S. national security; and as a
cornerstone of our broader development agenda." Under the banner of ruling justly and
democratically, four strategic priorities are identified: rule of law and human rights, good
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governance, political competition and consensus building, and civil society.

Specific

programmes for each of these priorities are determined by the assigned category
definition of each country and are further elaborated on the foreign assistance framework
matrix. This represents a continuation of the transformation notion of development and
places specific governance criteria for progression. Although more of a continuation of
previous policy and lacking any substantial changes it is noteworthy that it is a combined
State Department and USAID document. This is a clear indication that as development
becomes more accepted as part of overall security policy its core institution will also shift
towards closer integration, a reduction in policy that will be interesting to follow.
USA development policy differs from the major multilateral donors in that it is
directly associated with the high politics of national interest and security. These gaps
have become more acute in the realignment that has occurred post-9/11. Although
retaining aspects of theoretical ideals these are more a pragmatic means to an overall
ends. At its core, USA policy promotes a transformative process with the ultimate goal of
a democratically run, economically viable state.
According to recent Development Assistance Committee (DAC) statistics, the
United Kingdom became the second largest bilateral donor in 2006, with an 11.7%
increase to US$12 034 million.86 Additionally the UK is the largest bilateral donor to
Sierra Leone and has an influential presence in the country, stemming from colonial links
and its prominent role in ending the civil war. The UK's development infrastructure is
dramatically different from the USA model and is centralised through DFID, which had
direct control of 84% of total disbursements according to a 2006 DAC peer review
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document.

Adding to the autonomy that fiscal control provides, politically DFID is

directly represented in Cabinet by the Secretary of State for International Development
and in the House of Commons by three Parliamentary Under Secretaries of State.

The

2002 International Development Act is the primary governance document for the UK's
development infrastructure and provides general functional guidelines and specific
responsibilities for the Secretary of State. Poverty reduction is listed as the sole goal of
development assistance and activities are eligible, at the discretion of the Secretary of
State, for any action that can contribute to that goal. Development assistance is further
defined as "assistance provided for the purpose of - a) furthering sustainable
development in one or more countries outside the United Kingdom, or b) improving the
welfare of the population of one or more such countries."89 More functional policy
guidance is provided by organisational White Papers with the last three providing insight
into the shifts that have occurred.
The first White Paper released in 1997 was built around sustainable development,
a concept that became established in global environmental politics a decade earlier with
the World Commission on Environment and Development report, Our Common
Futures?0 Sustainable development received considerable criticism as an overly vague
concept and one that was not well developed in practice.9 DFID's approach was to
promote environmental considerations throughout their programme lines, stating
"Conservation and sustainable management of the environment is a cornerstone of our
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approach to international development."

The environment, including the issue of

climate change, is also given specific attention as an independent programme line,
indicating the importance of environmental concerns in the development community at
the time. Another notable inclusion in the 1997 White Paper was the apparent rejection of
the Washington Consensus, as the minimalist state and reliance on the all-powerful
market it encouraged were put forth as dominant flaws in previous development policy.
Governance does not feature predominantly in this document, although it is stated that
"Raising standards of governance is central to the elimination of poverty"94, little formal
policy is dedicated to specific programmes and goals. DFID's original policy was rooted
in the concept of sustainable development and the balance between poverty reduction and
environmental maintenance.
The 2000 White Paper represented a significant shift in policy as the concept of
sustainable development was cast aside in favour of policies intended to maximise the
benefits of globalisation in reducing poverty. Environmental sustainability still
maintained a position in programme lines but it was framed in relation to global
environmental problems rather than as an overriding theme for development.95 Reform in
the aid system was also a prominent theme, arguing all donors should be "focusing more
aid on the poorest, particularly on those developing countries that are pursuing good
policies and where there are large numbers of poor people."

Governance also emerged

as an important facet of poverty reduction strategy. Three commitments were made by
DFID regarding their governance programme: "1) Help developing countries build the
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effective government systems needed to reform their economic management, make
markets work better for poor people and meet the challenges of globalisation, 2) Work to
reduce corruption, and ensure respect for human rights and a greater voice for poor
people, 3) Work with others to reduce violent conflict, including through tighter control
over the arms trade." Within its governance platform, DFID stressed the critical role of
governance in allowing for efficient markets and specifically targeted corruption as a
hindrance to investment and a burden on the poor.

By 2000, DFID had moved away

from its sustainable development philosophy and focused on policies intended to allow
countries to benefit from the globalised economy. Governance also became a more
relevant programme line due to its perceived role in facilitating market access and
maximisation.
The Gleneagles Summit in 2005 resulted in significant promises on the part of the
G8 members to increase and improve aid to Africa. The UK committed to increase ODA
to 0.7% of Gross National Income by 2013 and double spending in Africa between
2003/2004 and 2007/2008." Following up on the Gleneagles commitments, DFID
released its latest White Paper in 2006 entitled, eliminating world poverty: making
governance work for the poor. This document clearly promotes governance to the
foreground of its policies, bluntly stating that "First and foremost, the fight against
poverty cannot be won without good governance. We need to help governments and
citizens make politics work for the poor. And we need to make global governance better,
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because the international economy affects what happens in each country."

Good

governance is deemed essential not just for fighting poverty but enhancing stability and
responding to calamities. Similar to the USAID country classifications, the DFID
document outlines various programme options that will be pursued based on a 'quality of
governance' assessment.101
Interestingly, the DFID policy moves beyond the domestic level in its governance
initiatives and also looks at the international system. It urges for the implementation of
international agreements on core issues such as corruption and natural resource extraction
as tools to eliminate the complicity of international actors in issues that hinder domestic
stability and growth.

The elevation of good governance to the forefront of donor policy

is becoming the standard, however the push for both domestic and international change is
unique to DFID policy.
Bilateral donor policy is a product of the domestic politics of the country it
emerges from and inevitably is linked to national interests. US policy takes this to the
extreme, locating development as a core tenant of the high politics of security.
Democracy promotion is seen as vital to achieving development and thus enhancing
national security and is the dominant post 9/11 theme in its policies. The UK model has
retained separation between security and development policy, allowing DFID to maintain
its primacy in the development arena. Democracy promotion is still a priority as it is
deemed a necessary domestic characteristic to reducing poverty. A critical point of
departure between the two is that democracy is seen as an end goal in US policy, in
contrast to its supporting role in DFID policy, a reflection of the missionary zeal that the
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US approaches its democratising agenda. Having gained an understanding of how
development theory and policy has evolved and the preeminent role of democracy in this
evolution it is necessary to understand how theory and policy define and understand
democracy. This will allow us to know what they are trying to promote, a vital step in
evaluating their efforts.
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Chapter IV: Democracy Theory and Policy
In order to evaluate a country or a government's democratic credentials and
potential for consolidation it is necessary to determine what is meant by democracy.
Often the term is merely stated and a certain common sense definition is assumed,
however this masks the tremendous variety in the term and the forms of governance that
it encapsulates. Work by Paul Collier and Levitsky highlights this mistake as they have
coded 550 forms of democracy.103 This opening section will provide a brief overview of
democratic thought beginning with the pure Greek form and progressing to current
conceptualisations. From this overview specific characteristics will be presented that
have retained continuity with modern ideas. Using these themes, donor definitions and
policies will be reviewed to gain a greater understanding of what donors truly mean by
democracy. This is particularly relevant to the subsequent chapters focusing on Sierra
Leone, as the form of democracy envisioned by donors is problematic to both the specific
national context and the ability of civil society to fulfil its role in the democratising
process.

Classical Democratic Thought
Any overview of democratic theory has to start with the Athenian system and the
thoughts of Plato and his successor Aristotle. The term democracy comes from the Greek
demos, meaning 'the people as a whole' and kratia, meaning 'rule of or more literally
strength or power in the hands of and the Athenian model of governance may be the
closest to a pure democracy that has or will ever exist.104 In Athens, the masses were the
ultimate sovereign and the assembly, of which every full citizen could participate in the
ultimate ruling body. In addition to the assembly, there was a council of 500 members,
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drawn from the 139 territorial units of Athens that met daily and handled the coordination of other public bodies and the foreign relations of the city-state.105 Beyond the
representative institutional model, democracy was a way of life, "a way of living together
in political freedom, which ennobled the characters and refined the sensibilities of an
entire community."106 This noble ideal was not without its detractors and the belief in
liberty and freedom were targets of some of the most severe criticism.
Plato (c. 427-347 BC) argued that timarchy, oligarchy, democracy and tyranny
represented four stages of digression from an 'ideal society' and represented different
versions of an 'imperfect society'.107 According to Plato, democracy evolves from
oligarchy and "originates when the poor win, kill or exile their opponents and give the
rest equal civil rights and opportunities of office."108 It was exactly the rule of the masses
that Athenian democracy was based upon that Plato so adamantly opposed. He described
three groups in a democratic society, with the largest and therefore supreme group being
the "mass of people who earn their own living, take little interest in politics and aren't
very well off."109 Plato felt this group was entirely unfit to rule and outlined the need for
the Philosopher King, a group of rulers that combined philosophy and political power as
necessary for the ideal society to flourish.110 In a common link between the Athenian
model and today's understanding of democracy, Plato agreed that liberty was its highest
ideal but felt that rather than this being its greatest asset, it would ultimately lead to its
demise into tyranny.111
Aristotle (c. 384-322 BC) did not share the radical model of the ideal society
proposed by Plato or the necessity or even desirability of the Philosopher King, however
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he did share a disdain for democracy as a form of governance. Rather than a single form
of ideal government or society, Aristotle suggested three, depending on whether the civic
body or sovereign consisted of the one, the few or the masses.112 He described the
corresponding right constitutions as those that serve the common interest and defined
those as Kingship, Aristocracy and 'Constitutional Government'. Additionally, he
provided three matching perversions, or wrong types of society, that occur when the
•I -I T

constitution does not benefit the common interest, Tyranny, Oligarchy and Democracy.
Similar to Plato, Aristotle felt that liberty, along with equality were the defining
characteristics of a democratic society,114 and it was exactly this equality, that led to its
perversion, the rule of the poor in the interests of the poor and not the common interest.115
Although dramatically different, in many aspects Plato and Aristotle saw common
dangers in the Athenian model of democracy. Both felt that liberty, which has become
one of the defining aspects of modern democratic ideals, would ultimately lead to the
uncontrolled rule by the poor masses, many of whom were unfit for governance. It was
exactly this liberty that would be the undoing of an ideal or right form of governance.
The direct-rule, assembly model of Athens is not feasible today for our state system,
although it does still exist in individual communities across the globe.116 To adapt to the
shift from the city state to the state system, democracy has evolved, although the core
values of liberty and equality that Plato and Aristotle discussed still remain salient.
A brief analysis of some of the central writings from the period that Dunn has
dubbed 'democracy's second coming'

provides an excellent bridge between the
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classical works of Plato and Aristotle and the most recent theoretical discussions
surrounding democracy. To achieve this, a thematic discussion of selected works from
John Locke (c. 1632-1704), Jean-Jacques Rousseau (c. 1712-1778), John Stuart Mill (c.
1806-1873) and Alexis de Tocqueville (c. 1805-1859) will be utilised. Although far from
an all-encapsulating summary of the period's thought, it is sufficient for the purpose of
this essay and is effective in highlighting the major themes of the period and links
between the classic thought and today's conceptualisations of democracy.
Despite being written over a two century timeframe and addressing differing
national contexts and themes, there are select concepts that appear in all these works and
provide the required continuity of thought. Rather than focussing on the specific
institutions of governance, such as executive and legislative structures, the commonalities
to be explored deal with the intrinsic meaning of democracy and governance, specifically
the concepts of: liberty, majority rule and concerns with majority tyranny, which are at
the core of democratic ideals and dilemmas.
Mill most eloquently expresses the idea of liberty and pushes it to its most
extreme limits, arguing that individual liberty should not be restrained up to the point that
it does harm to others, regardless of the consequences to the individual.118 Locke outlines
a similar perspective regarding liberty but makes a clear distinction between liberty in
what he describes as the 'state of nature' and man living in a society. He argues that in
the state of nature man has almost limitless liberty, restricted only by the law of nature
that prevents man from destroying himself, the creatures under his ownership beyond
necessity and from harming "another in his life, health, liberty, or possessions".119 This is
compared to liberty in society which expands the potential restrictions to include
legislative power and the laws that they create, with the disclaimer that the legislature
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must be created with consent and the laws created by the legislature.

Rousseau is more

opaque than Mill or Locke in his definition of liberty, although similar to Locke he links
it to the nature of man and the state of nature, suggesting that liberty is the responsibility
to see to his own maintenance and decide the proper means of ensuring this
maintenance.

Contrary to Locke or the typical Hobbesian' understanding of the state of

nature, Rousseau sees man as most pure outside of society but that despite this it is
necessary for man to form cooperative units to avoid ultimately perishing.

The remedy

he proposes is a 'social contract', where the individual and all of his rights and liberties
are given in totality to the community. Because this total alienation is voluntary and
universal, each individual retains his autonomy and liberty within the security of the
supreme sovereign.123
De Tocqueville provides a more specific, descriptive analysis of the concept of
liberty in the American context, often portraying a contrasting view of the liberties
available to the average citizen. In his historical analysis of the early roots of American
democracy, a two-fold liberty is apparent which De Tocqueville attributes to the
Puritanical roots of the citizenry. Political liberty was nearly absolute, with direct,
democratic governance and extremely malleable and responsive political institutions.
However, morally and socially, liberties were extremely restricted. Whereas Mill and to a
lesser extent Locke argued that personal liberty should be extended to the limits of harm
to others, the early American society placed severe restrictions imposed by the "covenant
between God and man".124 De Toqueville's analysis of then contemporary American
liberalism showed a great expansion of the ideal. Here De Tocqueville describes an
almost unrestrained liberty both in the political and social arenas. Politically "every
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individual has an equal share of power and participates equally in the government of the
state".

Socially the covenant with God is still apparent but has been transformed from a

repressive, formal social control to a personal relationship. This transformation massively
expanded the social liberties of the citizenry to encompass any actions, "unless they are
prejudicial to the common weal or unless the common weal demands his help".126 Liberty
in this sense has been expanded to correspond closely with the ideas of Mill. This
expansion essentially pushes liberty to the limits of societal harm.
An understanding of the conceptualisation of liberty and its justifiable limits is an
important preliminary but is insufficient unless it is related to democratic governance.
The next portion of the essay will attempt to bring the core understanding of democratic
governance to the surface as provided by the four authors. This builds on the idea of
liberty but focuses on the core aspect of majority rule.
Once again, Mill provides the premier starting point for this discussion as he not
only provides the clearest explanation but also is the most vocal proponent of the benefits
and necessity of liberty in the democratic process. Mill appears to have a love-hate
relationship with democracy or what he more pragmatically describes as representative
government. On many occasions, he argues that the near-limitless liberty he expounds,
especially as it relates to the civil or social realm, are requirements for the correct
functioning of any form of governance. An excellent example of this comes from his
arguments regarding the relationship between liberty of thought and discussions and
government. Here, he makes a number of interesting arguments, however it is his
discussion on 'false opinion' that is most well developed. Without specifying a form of
governance he argues that its primary duty is obtaining the "truest opinions they
can...and never impose them upon others unless they are quite sure of being right".
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Mill argues that liberty of thought is required for this based on four possible scenarios:
opposing opinion may be true; although the opposing opinion may be false it may have a
portion of truth and allow the whole truth to emerge; defending a prevailing opinion
voids it of perceived prejudice; and, even if accepted, if not challenged it may become
enfeebled and lose its vital effects.128
In Considerations On Representative Government, Mill builds on his discussions
of liberty and government and applies them directly to representative government, which
he describes as "democracy as commonly conceived and hitherto practised".129 He
provides a definition of representative government that highlights the control of the
people, stating that
the meaning of representative government is, that the whole people, or
some numerous portion of them, exercise through deputies periodically
elected by themselves, the ultimate controlling power, which, in every
constitution must reside somewhere. This ultimate power they must
possess in all its completeness. They must be masters, whenever they
please, of all the operations of government...The power of final control is
essentially single, in a mixed and balanced government, as in a pure
monarchy or democracy.130
This definition effectively links the pure form of democracy as expressed by Plato and
Aristotle to a more modern and realistic form of governance, by illustrating that the core
value of control by the demos, acting as a single entity remains intact.
This concept of control by the people is explicitly expressed by De Tocqueville
under the term sovereignty of the people, almost affectionately waxing, "the people reign
in the American political world as the Deity does in the universe. They are the cause and
the aim of all things; everything comes from them and everything is absorbed in
them".131 Although recognising that the representative style of governance is not pure, the
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representative nature keeps to the meaning of the system and retains its continuity with
democracy's ideals. Locke portrays a very limited role for the state and its role in relation
to liberty, focussing on the requirement of escaping from a state of nature but specifically
on the main priority of security one's property. With this end goal in mind, he describes a
perfect democracy as one that encapsulates the entire power of the community within the
majority and that all the power for making and executing laws be the sole privilege of
officers selected by the majority.

Rousseau offers a similar definition of democracy,

stating that it occurs when the people that make the laws also execute the laws, or a
unification of the legislative and executive powers.133 He further adds to this definition by
distinguishing who the sovereign or the members of the social contract entrusts with
government, claiming that this is either the majority or the entire people in a
democracy.134
Beyond the mere definitions of liberty and democracy as generally understood as
rule by the majority, the various authors listed concerns that this combination of liberty
and rule by the people created. To effectively link the discussion with the ideas and
critiques of Plato and Aristotle, the idea of the 'tyranny of the majority' will be the focus.
De Tocqueville was the most vocal of the writers regarding the potential evils of
majority rule and saw it as the predominant threat to the American system. Interestingly
the roots of this supposed tyranny spring from the same well as the supposed benefits of
the American system, the Deity-like power of the people. De Tocqueville argues that the
unquestioned correctness of the majority rule concept comes from the twofold idea that
there is more wisdom in the collective than the individual and that group interests are
preferable to those of the individual.135 He manages, through a very intricate argument, to
illustrate how these two pillars combine to limit the recourse of those who do not belong
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to the majority, as social and legislative power become one voice.

An excellent quote

summarises his views on the subject: "in my opinion, the main evil of the present
democratic institutions of the United States does not arise.. .from their weakness but from
their irresistible strength. I am not so much alarmed at the excessive liberty which reigns
in that country as at the inadequate securities which one finds there against tyranny".
De Tocqueville was also very critical of the quality of legislator that arises from the
American system, claiming it was a lower quality than that of an aristocratic system.138
This combination of unlimited liberty, without checks on tyranny and the tendency
toward poor legislators echoes many of the fears and criticisms of Plato and Aristotle
who both argued that democracy led to rule by the poor majority who were typically unfit
to rule at the expense of the general good of the citizenry.
Mill expressed many of the same fears and specifically focussed on two 'positive
evils and dangers' of representative government: general ignorance and incompetence of
the controlling body and the danger of it not acting in the interests of the general welfare
of the community.

Although the discussion on these two evils is linked, the more

relevant section deals with the dangers of majority tyranny. Unlike the classic thought of
Plato and Aristotle, Mill does not limit this potential division to rich and poor but to any
sectional or class interest that may emerge.140 He argues that this tendency toward
tyranny is natural when a man gains power and the focus of his interests' moves from
those of the common good to those of his immediate need.141 Although not stated in his
argument it follows that with the extreme liberty that Mill suggests, this tendency toward
tyranny may be exacerbated, as once in power it may not be a distant trip to move from a
'do no harm liberty' toward excess.
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This review has brought us from the Athenian model of direct governance to the
early days of representative, democratic governance. Although the mode of governance
changed considerably there is a clear connection in the core values of democracy and
representative government, the highest and most critical of these being liberty. Plato and
Aristotle both saw liberty as the root of democracy and also its main liability as it would
ultimately result in the rule by those unfit to rule. Similarly the later authors surveyed
maintained this belief in liberty as the highest ideal and combined it with majority rule as
expressed through representatives of the people. This combination of liberty and majority
rule also drew concern from these authors as expressed in the tyranny of the majority.
The next section will look at recent democracy theory and will ultimately lead to a
working definition which will be used to analyse the specifics of the Sierra Leone
situation.
Modern Democratic Thought
The Portuguese military coup of April 25, 1974 signified the beginning of a
global transition to democracy, described by Samuel Huntington as the 'Third Wave of
Democratisation'.142 Huntington would proceed to define a wave of democratisation as "a
group of transitions from nondemocratic to democratic regimes that occur within a
specified period of time and that significantly outnumber transitions in the opposite
direction during that period".143 More significant than the definition of a wave is how
democracy is defined. The previous review argued the core fundamentals of a democratic
society, liberty and rule by the majority, have remained consistent since the Athenian
period, however is this consistent with Huntington and other theorists of today. This next
section will analyse the recent discussions regarding democratic thought and provide a
working definition for the remainder of the essay.
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Huntington utilises a procedural definition for his study, defining a political
system as democratic "to the extent that its most powerful collective decision makers are
selected through fair, honest, and periodic elections in which candidates freely compete
for votes and in which virtually all the adult population is eligible to vote."144 This is an
altogether unsatisfactory definition that may provide for ease of classification and policy
making but ultimately robs the term of any depth and meaning, entirely disconnecting the
term with traditional theory and practice. Larry Diamond provides a more expansive
classification system for democracy that effectively categorises the numerous definitional
strands, proposing a four-fold typology: Electoral democracy, Liberal democracy,
Midrange conceptions and Pseudodemocracies and nondemocracies.145 Within this
typology, the first two classifications require further investigation and analysis.
Defining democracy solely along electoral lines is the most minimalist of
conceptualisations but often the most salient to policy makers and some academics. Often
this definition is related back to Joseph Schumpeter, who specifically challenged the
liberal definitions expounded by authors such as De Tocqueville, inverting the
importance of the power of the people and the legislature. Schumpeter argued that the
traditional definition of democracy made the selection of representatives secondary to the
primary purpose of maintaining power in the electorate.146 He proposed inverting this
relationship and elevated the election process to the pinnacle of democratic values and
minimised the importance of electoral control. In doing so, he produced a definition of
democracy as "that institutional arrangement for arriving at political decisions in which
individuals acquire the power to decide by means of a competitive struggle for the
people's vote".147 Przeworski et al proposed a similarly narrow definition of democracy,
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defining it as, "all regimes that hold elections in which the opposition has some chance of
winning and taking office".

There are two major issues related to the minimalist

approach to democracy; firstly it ignores the essence of democracy as a form of societal
being or a way of life which is most explicit in the dominance of liberty as an overriding
theme in previous thought and secondly it allows many regimes or political systems to be
legitimised under the cloak of democracy without achieving or even aspiring to any of the
requirements or benefits of democracy. Diamond offers similar criticisms, drawing upon
the work of Terry Karl and what he dubbed the "fallacy of electoralism".149 He argues
that elections mask societal power imbalances, leaving many disenfranchised, more
classically described as the tyranny of the majority. He further criticises this minimalist
approach as ignoring freedoms or liberty which are necessary characteristics of
democracy, using examples of electoral democracies that exhibit overt minority
repression such as Russia.150
Although a practical and accessible definition of democracy, this minimalist,
electoral definition proves unsatisfactory. It loses its vital link with traditional
conceptualisations and the essence of liberty and majority rule, lowering the acceptable
standard to a point of irrelevance. A closer look at liberal democracy is required to
attempt to expand the concept and regain the traditional links.
Not necessarily in opposition to the minimalist view, liberal democracy entails a
much more extensive set of criteria. Diamond suggests three broad criteria that take
liberal democracy beyond the electoral definition: absence of reserves of power
unaccountable to the electorate, accountability of officeholders to one another or, more
accurately, checks on the power of the executive; and extensive political and civic
freedoms that allow for the expression of interests and values outside of the election
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process.

Building on this, Diamond outlines a specific set of components for a liberal

democracy that fulfil the broad criteria: control of the state lies with elected officials,
executive power is constrained by other government institutions, electoral outcomes are
uncertain and no group is excluded from forming a party, cultural, ethnic, religious and
other minority groups are not excluded from the political process and maintain cultural
liberty, formal avenues exist beyond elections for groups to express opinion and that
represent their interests, alternative sources of information beyond the government,
substantial social liberties including freedom of belief, opinion, discussion, speech,
assembly, demonstration and petition, political equality under the law, individual and
group liberties are protected by an independent judiciary and rule of law protects citizens
from gross violations of the state such as torture and undue interference.152 This set of
criteria effectively blends the institutional requirements of democracy such as restraints
on executive power and inclusive political parties which are necessary to protect against
devolution to aristocracy or tyranny with traditional notions of individual and political
liberty so prevalent in the works of Mill.
Robert Dahl provides a similar description of the democratic ideal and also what
he determines to be the maximising approximation, what he calls polyarchy. In
comparison to Diamond, Dahl provides a more theoretically driven set of criteria and
focuses on the meaning of the democratic character, rather than the definitive institutional
requirements. He provides a set of five distinguishing features of a democratic process:
effective participation which provides each citizen with the opportunity for expressing
their preferences for outcomes in binding decision making, voting equality at the decisive
stage among and between the entire citizenry, enlightened understanding which allows
each citizen to have equal and adequate opportunity to evaluate the choice that would
best serve their interests, control of the agenda regarding what matters are to be decided
151
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through the democratic process, and a demos inclusive of the total adult population
subject to the binding decisions of the association.153 This definition of democracy
exhibits a clear and concise linkage with the traditional thinkers and effectively expresses
the democratic norms and ideals that liberal democracy entails. However, Dahl admitted
that these lofty ideals have not been achieved and due to issues of scale are not probable,
formulating the concept of polyarchy as the functional, institutional display of
democracy.
Dahl continues with a description of the institutions required to classify a regime
as a polyarchy: elected officials with constitutionally guaranteed policy control, free and
fair elections void of coercion, inclusive adult suffrage, right to run for office, although
there may be discrepancies between who can run and who can vote, freedom of
expression regarding political matters, without the danger of severe punishment,
alternative information offered under the protection of law and associated autonomy
which allows for the creation of interest groups and political parties.154 Dahl is clear that
he understands polyarchy as a political order and that it requires specific institutions to
meet this classification. However, in contrast to his earlier definition of the term he
expands the idea and correlates the institutions with the democratic ideals listed above. In
doing so, whether intentionally or not, Dahl reinforces the idea that democracy is a way
of living, and reduces the institutions themselves to mere observation and facilitating
agents, in effect performing the opposite reversal that Schumpeter executed in pushing
his minimalist view.
Policy Section
This section of the review will establish the working definition of the term
democracy within donor policy. Volumes have been written on definitions of democracy
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and its outgrowth good governance and it is difficult to limit the review and establish a
suitable definition for future analysis. The United Nations Development Programme,
World Bank, United States Agency for International Development and the Department
for International Development have been chosen as they highlight many of the
convergent themes but also some of the critical divergences in policy circles.
The United Nations Millennium Development Goals (MDG) are the starting point
for the formal development community and the United Nations (UN) concept of
democracy and good governance serves as a logical baseline. Interestingly, despite being
the lead organisation for the development community, the United Nations lacks an
available precise definition of democracy or good governance, with the following being
the most suitable:
Governance is the system of values, policies and institutions by which a
society manages its economic, political and social affairs through
interactions within and among the state, civil society and private sector. It
is the way a society organises itself to make and implement decisions —
achieving mutual understanding, agreement and action. It comprises the
mechanisms and processes for citizens and groups to articulate their
interests, mediate their differences and exercise their legal rights and
obligations. It is the rules, institutions and practices that set limits and
provide incentives for individuals, organisations and firms. Governance,
including its social, political and economic dimensions, operates at every
level of human enterprise, be it the household, village, municipality,
nation, region or globe.155

Within the UN, the United Nations Development Programme has the primary
responsibility for the promotion of democratic good governance and views the
establishment of good governance as a prerequisite for achieving the MDGs. Within the
UNDP, the Democratic Governance Group is the lead group responsible for this
initiative, receiving US$1,395 billion or 47% of the UNDP's operating budget in 2005
UNDP. Governance Indicators: A User's Guide. (Available at www.undp.org/governance/docs/policyguide-IndicatorsUserGuide.pdf). Viewed January 2, 2008
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and utilising seven service lines in its operation: policy support for democratic
governance, parliamentary development, electoral systems and processes, justice and
human rights, e-governance and access to information, decentralisation, local governance
and urban/rural development, and public administration reform and anti-corruption.156
The UNDP definition and service lines represent an all-inclusive governance package
with a focus on institutional-based reforms.
The World Bank, the other multilateral organisation of the group, has a similar
definition of governance to the UN, defining governance "as the traditions and
institutions by which authority in a country is exercised for the common good. This
includes (i) the process by which those in authority are selected, monitored and replaced,
(ii) the capacity of the government to effectively manage its resources and implement
sound policies, and (iii) the respect of citizens and the state for the institutions that govern
economic and social interactions among them."157 Similar to the UN, the World Bank
sees improved governance and specifically reducing corruption, as critical foundations
for achieving the MDGs and in 2005 lent US$4.6 billion to programmes intended to build
good governance and the rule of law.158 Diverging from the UN, they have a more
formalised quantification structure for evaluating good governance. This evaluation
system is created using thirty-one separate data sources from twenty-five organisations
and utilises six discrete indices: voice and accountability, political stability and absence
of violence, government effectiveness, regulatory quality, rule of law and control of
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corruption.

Although sharing a similar all-inclusive definition, the World Bank

narrows it significantly through its quantification process, allowing a slight expansion
beyond the narrow institutional UN view.
The first bilateral institution to review is USAID which as we have seen places an
extremely high level of importance on democracy promotion. An important support
document for the bilateral policy, A Democracy and Governance Strategic Framework,
provides the specific programme methodology for democratic good governance
promotion. Although neither democracy or good governance are defined in this
document, a definition for democracy and governance programmes is provided as
"technical assistance and other support to strengthen capacity of reform-minded
governments, nongovernmental actors, and/or citizens in order to develop and support
democratic states and institutions that are responsive and accountable to citizens."160 Four
pillars of democracy are emphasised as critical: rule of law, institutions of democratic and
accountable governance, political freedom and competition, and citizen participation and
advocacy.161 This definition moves beyond the strictly institution based models to include
ideas of freedom and citizen participation, deepening the process, reflective of the liberal
strain of democracy favoured in the United States.
The final organisation for comparison is DFID who describe good governance as
"not just about government. It is also about political parties, parliament, the judiciary, the
media, and civil society. It is about how citizens, leaders and public institutions relate to
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each other in order to make change happen."

The concept is expanded to include three

core characteristics: state capability, responsiveness, and accountability

each with a

broad set of specific examples. The DFID definition exhibits a large amount of overlap
with the other three definitions and does little to add to a clear definition.
Returning to the theoretical considerations Dahl's definition of polyarchy is the
most effective description of democracy and is generally accepted as its most suitable
substitute for analysis. None of the donor definitions are suitably accurate and the World
Bank index is merely an amalgamation of other existing measures. The lack of a finite
definition and accurate measures is in itself problematic as there is not a direct
measurement of the efficacy of donor programmes. Using common measures such as the
Polity IV or Freedom House rankings is an indirect measure of a specific liberal
democratic model similar to the United States version but also fails to align with typical
donor policies. The donor definitions are also flawed in that they are largely institutionbased which creates a similar issue to that of representation mentioned in the civil society
discussion, that of a density of programmes in the capital city. Although decentralisation
drives are attempting to alleviate that issue it is only a cursory attempt to address the most
critical issues hindering democratic consolidation, often rooted in rural communities and
involving societal power imbalances rather than simple institutional weakness. The next
chapter will analyse the rise of democracy promotion within development policy and civil
society's specific role in this objective. Many of the critical debates surrounding civil
society will be highlighted, to provide a theoretical background for the case study
analysis.
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Chapter V: Civil Society and Developing Democracy
To understand how civil society became elevated to its current primary role in
democracy promotion it is critical to understand the debate surrounding foreign aid and
democracy promotion. Within this debate the overwhelming focus of the literature has
been at the state level, analysing the effect of bilateral and multilateral aid to
governments of host nations. There are analysts from academia and the development
world who believe that foreign aid has been an effective tool in promoting democracy, as
aid has allowed governments to use ex-ante governance targets to catalyse positive
changes. Critics argue it has been a negative force, propping up despots and corrupt
regimes while doing nothing to lead to a movement away from autocratic rule. There is a
considerable amount of literature on this subject and a small representative sample is
reviewed in depth rather than providing a cursory review of a larger set of studies with
overlapping results.

Foreign Aid and Democracy Promotion
The overriding theme of the literature argues that aid has been negatively
associated with democratic good governance, that foreign aid has provided the funding
for existing, authoritarian governments to remain in power and avoid necessary reforms.
Nicolas Van de Walle provides the most thorough analysis of this theory, tracing the
evolution of African governance practices and highlighting the role of the international
aid community in this process. He argues that post-colonial African governments were
generally institutionally weak and enjoyed limited popular legitimacy which led to a
reliance on intricate patronage networks and the control of elite based economic rent
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seeking mechanisms to maintain order and stability.

This description shares many

similarities with what Max Weber described as patrimonialism in his analysis of
legitimate, traditional ruling structures. Weber described this type of rule as one that
"tends to arise whenever traditional domination develops an administration and a military
force which are purely personal instruments of the master."165 In their work on
democratic transitions, Juan J. Linz and Alfred Stepan prefer to utilise the term
sultanism,166 what Weber described as the extreme case of patrimonialism, where
authority operates primarily on the basis of personal discretion.167 Van de Walle argues
that the strict Weberian definition does not adequately capture existing political systems
and uses the term 'neopatrimoniaP

to describe this form of governance, providing four

defining characteristics: clientalism, often based on ethnic or clan politics, access to state
resources controlled by patron-client networks, the centralisation of power based in the
capital and focussed on the president and hybrid regimes that combine the facade of the
modern state with the background levers of neopatrimonial control.169 Through structural
adjustment programmes, implemented in the 1980s and 1990s by the major multilateral
aid organisations that advocated a reduction in government spending and overall size,
two patterns emerged. First, there was a tendency toward an increase in executive control,
through a strengthening of the patron-client networks inherent in the strong institution of
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presidentialism

. Second, there was a reduction in overall state operations as many

development tasks were effectively privatised to independent non-governmental
171

organisations.

Rather than a movement towards democratic good governance, foreign

aid served to empower specific aspects of the neopatrimonial rule and reduce government
accountability to the periphery.
The World Bank has been the leader in research that has attempted to provide a
more quantitative explanation for the relationship between foreign aid and democracy
and has focussed on the patron-client networks within the neopatrimonial governance
model. Interestingly, the relationship between foreign aid and democracy has similar
patterns to that of oil wealth and democracy.

Studies have shown that oligarchy

controlled resource wealth and oil wealth in particular show strong negative correlations
to democracy.172

This is presumed to be as a result of the resistance from elites,

themselves a function of patron-client relationships, to the redistribution of wealth
1 T\

expected in an expanded democracy.
A study by Stephen Knack of the World Bank, conducted in 2001, thoroughly
investigated the aid-democracy relationship.

The study used value changes on the

International Country Risk Guide174 (between 1995 and either 1982 or 1984) as the
dependent variable and the average value for ODA as a percentage of Gross National
Product (GNP) as one of the core independent variables. Results showed a negative,
170
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highly statistically significant correlation between the two variables and that aid
explained a substantial portion of the variation in the model, as R values decreased from
55% to 45% when it was omitted. To confirm the robustness of the findings, the author
repeated the analysis with a series of focussed data sets. Most interestingly, the sets
involving only those countries with initial per capita incomes below $2000 and SubSaharan African countries reveal similar negative coefficients as the overall data set with
all results being statistically significant.

Similar studies have supported these findings

and have attempted to more specifically quantify rent seeking behaviour.
A study by Djankow, Montalvo and Reynal-Querol confirmed the negative
correlation between ODA as a percentage of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) and
democracy, although with negligible coefficients, indicating a limited causal relationship.
They used a 10-point democracy scale taken from the Polity IV paper and concluded that
a 0.6-1.0 point reduction occurred if a case appears in the top 75% of the sample over a
five year period.176 To quantify rent-seeking behaviour, the authors used government
consumption as a proxy variable and compared this to investment. The data reveals a
positive, statistically significant correlation between ODA/GDP and government
consumption and a negative correlation between

ODA/GDP and

investment.

Additionally there is a negative, statistically significant correlation between consumption
and economic growth and a positive, statistically significant correlation between
investment and economic growth. The authors argue this data indicates foreign aid is
used for immediate government consumption and maintains the rent-seeking behaviour of
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the patrimonial government system.

The utilisation of the proxy variable of

government spending for rent-seeking is dubious as are the conclusions drawn from the
positive correlation between aid and government consumption. Focussing on the subSaharan African context, the governments of these nations operate with minimal
budgetary leeway and an effective and expected utilisation of foreign aid would be to
increase spending to basic services such as education and health care.

This would

increase the level of government consumption relative to Gross Domestic Product (GDP)
in the smaller economies of the region and would not have an effect on the immediate
level of investment. It is not possible to conclude from this aggregate data that rentseeking is increased by foreign aid. This would require a more specific study that
analysed how the aid was actually spent.
These studies capture the overall trend in the literature and have specific common
weaknesses that require highlighting. Most critically, the time period is a major issue as
the intent of foreign aid has changed so dramatically during the period studied. During
the Cold War period, the intent of aid was often to bolster friendly governments,
regardless of the form of governance and little aid was directed at building democratic
good governance within these nations. This issue is even more exacerbated within the
sub-Saharan African context as the initial rise of democratic reforms in the region only
emerged in the early 1990s. Specifically with the Djankov et al. study, this would create
a skew in the data toward a negative correlation between aid and democratic good
governance as the overall aid period is significantly longer than the period of democracy
assistance or any form of democratic rule in the region. A final criticism of the research
in this field is the narrow focus on state level aid and specifically Official Development
177
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Assistance. ODA represents a small amount of the total state level financial flows to the
developing world,178 with multilateral loans and private loans representing the largest
portion, all of which present opportunities for rent-seeking. Using ODA fails to capture
the full magnitude of state level financial flows and focuses on the most politically
dependent portion of the financing, increasing the issues related to the politics involved in
the timeframe of data.

Additionally, and most critical for this essay, it ignores the

injection point of the aid into the state apparatus and ignores aid that bypasses the state
altogether, including funds distributed through civil society agents and private charities or
foundations.179
Despite the majority of the research regarding the relationship between foreign
aid and democracy indicating a negative correlation, more focussed research has emerged
that counters some of these claims. Knack published an updated study in 2004 that
included focussed and inclusive time period analysis and also analysed additional
measures of democracy. The two measures used were the Freedom House Rankings,
which creates a combined index from political freedoms and civil liberty indices and the
Polity IV index used in the Djankov et al study. This study concludes that there is no
quantitative relationship between ODA and democracy as none of these comparisons
were statistically significant. Even reducing the time period to the post Cold War era did
not produce statistically significant results and there was negligible variation in the
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coefficients between the post Cold War time period and the overall period of analysis
from 1975 to 2000.180
Additional studies that specifically analysed sub-Saharan Africa and the Cold War
and post-Cold War periods provide an opposing view to the previous studies. A 2001
study by Goldsmith utilised a similar time period to the 2004 Knack study but focussed
on Sub-Saharan Africa and used different dependent variables, focussing on ethnicity,
form of law and per capita GDP.

The results for relationship between ODA and

democracy were statistically significant and positive, although the magnitude of the
coefficient was small. An interesting addition to the literature provided by Goldsmith
was to introduce a time lag analysis for ODA to attempt to evaluate the direction of the
democracy measure related to ODA.181 These values remained statistically significant
and positive, with a positive relationship between the magnitude and time lags. Although
far from a clear endorsement of the utility of ODA in democracy building this study did
counter the largely negative previous work and create an Africa specific analysis with a
limited time period focus.
Utilising the same data set, the analysis was continued and improved upon in
2004 by Dunning, with an additional Cold War focus. In addition to splitting the analysis
into two time periods, 1975-1986 and 1987-1997, Dunning introduced a dummy variable
for former Soviet client states. This not only provided a clear demarcation of the pre and
post Cold War periods, but specifically gave focus to states emerging from Soviet
influence, highlighting the effect of Cold War client relationships. The time period
analysis resulted in highly statistically significant, positive results in the post-Cold War
180
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period compared to results that were not statistically significant in the Cold War era.
This clearly indicates that the overall relationship witnessed from the Goldsmith study is
reliant upon the later time period. Interestingly the Soviet client variable resulted in
statistically significant correlations in both periods with negative coefficients in the Cold
War period and positive coefficients in the post Cold War period.182 This indicates that
aid was most effective in promoting democracy in states that were emerging from Soviet
client status and highlights the potential of democracy promotion, as its effects would be
most acute in these post-Soviet examples. These studies effectively counter the previous
criticism regarding the elongated timeframe and its distorting effects but don't offer any
insight into the reasons for the limited relationship between aid and democracy promotion
nor the issues surrounding measures of foreign aid.
Ellen Hauser has provided an incisive analysis of donors' efforts at democracy
promotion, focusing on Uganda in her case study analysis.

The article presented a

number of potential reasons for the limited success of democracy promotion within
Uganda and potential explanations that can be generalised to other states. The article was
very explicit that it was analysing bilateral foreign aid and political conditionality rather
than specific democracy building programmes supported by foreign aid, which is typical
of the previous studies.

Hauser arrived at three critical conclusions regarding the

utilisation of political conditionality: that donors still retain political interests in the
region and this affects their prioritisation of democratic reform, the level of aid
dependence is not the most critical factor in whether it is subject to conditionality and
that a state's economic reform and performance affects whether donors push for political
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reform.

Although providing keen insights into some of the factors influencing donors,

there is still a considerable void in a clear understanding of the causal links between aid
and democracy. This study highlighted that even in the post-Cold War era there are still
significant political calculations involved in the relationship.
Ritva Reinikka and Jakob Svensson of the World Bank have been leaders in
attempting to provide a more reliable, quantitative account of issues related to corruption
and rent-seeking behaviour through focussed sector analysis. Their most well known
research was conducted between 1991 and 1995 and studied the amount of leakage that
existed within the education system in Uganda. This is extremely relevant to the foreign
aid debate as it provided a detailed account of the form and magnitude of rent-seeking
that existed within the government. From their research they found that on average
12.6% of the funds transferred from the central government to the district level were
actually disbursed to the schools. Rather than being utilised for its intended purposes, the
money was expropriated by the local government managers to maintain their local system
of patronage networks. The authors argued that direct cash transfers, used rather uniquely
in the education programme, provided access to funds and chances for rent-seeking that
other in kind programmes did not provide.

Interestingly the study also found that

average income levels were statistically significant and positively correlated to the level
of local capture, indicating that the most economically disadvantaged were least likely to
receive the appropriate funds.
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This study is extremely important for two reasons. Firstly, the cash transfer
method provides a parallel to foreign aid injection methods and confirms the existence of
and quantifies the magnitude of rent-seeking and corruption that can occur. Secondly,
the macro research and the neopatrimonial theory of governance focuses on the executive
and the top levels of the state and assumes that aid introduced at that level creates or
contributes to the consolidation of this form of governance. Additionally the macro
research and much of the current thinking in the foreign aid community sees NGO
channelled community based aid injection methods as a cure for this issue. The research
by Reinikka and Svensson highlights some potential issues with this thinking as the
neopatrimonial networks present at the state level are alive and well at the local level,
indicating the same issues of rent-seeking and corruption could still persist despite the
modified injection point and channel. This is particularly relevant to Sierra Leone where
corruption at the chiefdom level as been a constant feature of local politics.
This overview of the literature surrounding foreign aid and democracy promotion
highlights the perceived lack of efficacy of these efforts. The majority of the critical
literature argues that aid has provided access for rent-seeking behaviour which allowed
corrupt and ineffective governments to maintain power through patron-client networks.
From this analysis the idea of utilising civil society as an implementing partner emerged,
providing an injection route that delivered services while avoiding the bloated and
corrupt state apparatus.

Civil Society and Democracy Promotion

The role of the Chiefs in Sierra Leone politics will be discussed thoroughly in Chapter V.
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The next section of the literature review covers the theme of civil society and its
role in promoting democratic good governance. As mentioned, utilising NGOs, often
directly equated with civil society within the development community, has become the
latest trend to combat rent-seeking behaviour and promote democracy from within.
Despite the unquestioned endorsements from the aid institutions the effectiveness of civil
society as a catalyst for promoting democracy has been subject to massive scrutiny from
within the academic community over the last decade. The literature can be split into two
broad themes. The first is focussed on definitional debates surrounding the terminology
of civil society and its implications and the second deals with more pragmatic concerns
regarding what civil society can reasonably be expected to accomplish.
Prior to delving into the academic critiques and debates regarding the terminology
of civil society it is necessary to understand how donors define civil society. To
immediately narrow the scope of the review and provide a suitable basis for a practical
analysis of the development sector, it is critical to look at the concept as it exists within
the institutionalised development field.

The United Nations (UN), the World Bank,

United States Agency for International Development (USAID), Department for
International Development (DFID), World Vision and The World Conservation Union
(IUCN) have been chosen as they provide a representative cross-section of the major
multilateral, bilateral and NGO donors within Sierra Leone.
The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) has a specific mandate to
work in conjunction with civil society which it deems as critical to achieving its
sustainable human development goals.186 On an institutional scale the UN adopts a broad

186

United Nations Development Programme. UNDP and Civil Society Organisations: A Policy Note On
Engagement. (New York, 2006), 1

67

description of civil society without providing an explicit definition.

However,

summarising the description, the UN includes a vast array of organisations that are not
part of the state or a business. They need to be engaged in promoting citizens' rights,
interests or demands or providing direct services and are either mutually or publicly
beneficial.

The UN provides four classifications for civil society organisations:

community based organisations, peoples' organisations or mass organisations, indigenous
peoples' organisations and non-governmental organisations.187 It is noteworthy that the
UN definition includes NGOs as a separate category within the overall realm of civil
society.
The World Bank, the other multilateral organisation of the group, has a more clear
definition of civil society than the UN but there is significant overlap between the
institutions. The World Bank defines civil society as the
wide array of non-governmental and not-for-profit organisations that have
a presence in public life, expressing the interests and values of their
members or others, based on ethical, cultural, political, scientific, religious
or philanthropic considerations. Civil Society Organisations (CSO)
therefore refers to a wide of array of organisations: community groups,
non-governmental organisations (NGOs), labour unions, indigenous
groups, charitable organisations, faith-based organisations, professional
associations, and foundations.188
This definition is broad based and extremely similar to the descriptive definition provided
by the UN.
The first bilateral institution to review is USAID which is a coordinated branch of
the US government, working directly with the National Security Council and receiving
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1 RO

foreign policy guidance from the Secretary of State.

Civil society is simply defined as

"the independent, non-government realm of citizen activity."190 Despite this broad
definition, the policy directives of USAID narrow the operational definition to include
only those organisations that are politically active, what they define as advocacy civil
society organisations.191 It is these types of organisations that have been the primary
target for democracy and governance programming and for studies regarding the role of
civil society in the democratisation process.
DFID defines civil society as, "the multitude of associations, movements and
groups where citizens organise to pursue shared objectives or common interests. These
organisations function beyond the individual or household level, but below the state."
Further explaining the concept, civil society organisations are defined as
All Civic Organisations, associations and networks which occupy the
"Social space" between the family and the State who come together to
advocate their common interests through collective action. It includes
volunteer and charity groups, parents and teachers associations, senior
citizens groups, sports clubs, arts and culture groups, faith-based groups,
workers clubs and trade unions, non-profit think-tanks and "issue based"
.

.

103

activist groups.
This is an inclusive definition but one that is clear in its bounds regarding what is and
what is not included. The idea of understanding civil society as a space is also an
important characteristic. This dual definition of civil society as both a set of organisations
and a space for activity features prominently in theoretical and academic debates.
189
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World Vision is a Christian humanitarian organisation with an operational focus
on poor and vulnerable people.194 It has grown to become a major source of international
aid with 2005 project expenditures in Sub-Saharan Africa reaching US$575.9 million, a
value only exceeded by ten bilateral donors.195 Although the organisation does not
conduct projects with a focus on governance they operate primarily with local
communities and community groups making their funding directly salient to civil society
organisations and their operations.196 Despite this focus none of the major documents
from the organisation provide a definition of civil society, community groups or any
related organisation.
The IUCN is also included as an NGO example as it has been extremely
influential in contributing to and drafting multinational environmental agreements (MEA)
and is a primary donor to the Environmental Foundation for Africa, the case study
organisation in this work. Bringing together 749 national NGOs, 108 government
agencies, 84 State members, 82 international NGOs and 33 affiliate members, the IUCN
describes itself as "the world's largest and most important conservation network."197 At
the programme level, in 2006 the IUCN provided SF 25 385 000 (US$ 24 929 754) of
funding for Sub-Saharan Africa and SF 8 248 000(US$8 099 595) in the West Africa
region.

However, as with the World Vision example, the IUCN does not provide a

detailed definition of civil society or even NGO, an often used term in its documentation.
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The membership application form does ask for a more detailed choice of organisational
structure but does not provide any clear definitions.199
The definition of civil society shares wide agreement within the development
community with the critical defining features being that it is outside the state and
represents some form of citizen action or grouping. The USAID definition is unique in
that it explicitly focuses on politically active groups, a narrow definition often utilised in
academic study of the aid community. However for the purpose of this essay, the DFID
definition will be utilised as it is a much more inclusive definition, allowing for
development or service provision groups to be included, providing a more realistic
encapsulation of the actual civil society environment. Additionally, it includes aspects of
both the more practical definitions that focus on sets of institutions and more abstract
versions that focus on ideas of social space and normative aspects. It is these two often
conflicting perspectives on civil society that form the bulk of the definitional debates that
dominated the early literature.
The first area of debate stems from the necessity of operationalising civil society
in the donor community. This puts an onus on more practical definitions, or what Van
Rooy described as 'civil society as a collective noun'200 and is centred on debates of
which groups are included and excluded. The most immediate effect of this is a
restrictive definition regarding the types of organisations that are included and their
representative capacity. Marina Ottaway makes the distinction between traditional civil
society, which tends to be more informal and based on existing patterns and networks,
compared to modern civil society that is associated with the formal NGO model of the
199
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donor community.

The level of formality is a critical distinction between the two as it

helps define the boundaries of the institutions. Modern civil society has rigid boundaries
that separate it from the state and the family and also from society at large. Traditional
civil society has no clear bounds and blurs into both the family and the state, often
9fl9

performing tasks typically assumed to be the responsibility of the state.

This distinction

is more acute in the African context as the majority of traditional civil society
organisations are founded on ethnic, kinship or geographical ties and lack the formal
structure required by donor policies.

Additionally, the NGOs favoured by donors tend

to be concentrated in national capitals and staffed by middle-class elites.204 In primarily
rural societies with limited transport and communication options, modern civil society
will be problematic in its ability to truly represent the masses. It is argued these groups
and individuals will have limited ties to the people they claim to represent, operating
more akin to trustees.

In its most severe manifestation, epitomised by the USAID focus

on advocacy NGOs, this can reduce civil society to "as few as one or two dozen people
who happen to have close relations with the donors and are thus characterised as deciding
and acting for the entire civil society of the country."

This narrow focus on formal

NGOs within the donor community creates a number of issues of inclusion and exclusion,
issues that will be expanded upon when considering civil society in more abstract terms.
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The second major set of definitional debates overlaps with formal issues of
inclusion and exclusion but is concerned with the notion of civil society as, or occupying
a social space. This space is often portrayed as an enabling environment where
organisations are allowed to operate with limited constraints207 and has taken its place
alongside what one author described as the "conceptual trinity of market, state and civil
society."

When donor definitions are combined, civil society is neatly packaged as one

of four spheres, separate from the state, the family and the market. Larry Diamond
eloquently outlines this fourfold typology describing civil society,
As distinct from 'society' in general in that it involves citizens acting
collectively in a public sphere...an intermediary phenomenon, standing
between the private sphere and the state. Thus it excludes parochial
society: individual and family life and inward-looking group activities and
it excludes economic society: the profit making enterprise of individual
business firms...Similarly, civil society is distinct from political society,
which encompass all those organised actors whose primary goal is to win
control of the state or at least some position for themselves within it.209
On a general level, this orderly division has a number of problems. These spheres are
often discussed as equal and distinct or with minor overlap, a vision that does not exist in
reality.210 Also it does not take into account power inequalities that exist between and
within these spheres.
Relations between the state and civil society highlight these issues in a more
specific context. From a functional perspective, the notion of separation is primarily
challenged on two levels, direct ownership and more indirect political control of civil
society activities. Examples abound in the literature of NGOs being established or co207
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opted by key actors in government or opposition, greatly hindering their ability to act
independently

and

challenging

their

credibility.211

Limited

domestic

funding

opportunities often leads to a reliance on funding from foreign governments which can
have similar issues related to agenda setting and legitimacy as domestic political
control.212 Kasfir discusses the issue of legitimacy regarding the USAID preferred mode
of using advocacy NGOs. Not only are they faced with previously discussed
representation issues but they are often advocating for reforms that do not have a
domestic social base.

The lack of popular support creates an obvious challenge when

the ultimate ideal is democracy promotion. Political control can also occur through
government legislation that aims to limit the space for civil society to act or to access
their sources of funding.214
More covert methods can be used to tie NGO activity into the same
neopatrimonial governance practices that they are intended to be addressing, through
what Beatrice Hibou refers to as the "privatisation of power".215 Hibou uses the example
of Mozambique, where a large portion of traditional state functions were being
administered by NGOs or private organisations. Although the services were being
provided outside the formal state apparatus, the same patterns of "rentier political
economy" still existed that strengthened the positions of local ruling elites, only now
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through private channels.

Hibou argues this was a result of "lax attitudes" by the
•
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donors, although it may be a pragmatic reaction to the reality of service provision.
A final definitional discussion that is beginning to emerge from the separation of
state and civil society is the role of political parties and funding for these groups.
Recalling the definitions of civil society from the donors, political parties will fall outside
of this sphere, despite the obviously critical role they play in democracy promotion and
increasingly within democracy assistance. Carothers discusses many of the issues with
'Party Aid', such as the perception of internal corruption and concerns with becoming
91R

engaged in partisan politics.

The notion of a separate sphere of the state and civil

society is problematic, not just in the ability to make finite distinctions but also in
excluding groups that may be vital to the democratisation process.
Separation of family and civil society represents a different set of issues for
donors. As previously discussed regarding the narrow NGO model preferred by donors,
traditional civil society often blurs into the family, eliminating many existing groups.
Diamond argues there should be a divide, that "civil society should be distinguished from
the more clearly democracy-enhancing phenomenon of civic community."

He argues

this is necessary stating, "if civil society is to be a theoretically useful construct for
studying democratic development, it is important to avoid tautology that equates it with
990

everything that is democratic, noble, decent and good."

Diamond's concern is with
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civil society scholars and practitioners focusing only on the positive organisations within
civil society and civic community, rather than the totality of those that fit into standard
definitions of civil society.221 This is problematic from a theoretical perspective in that it
manufactures a sphere of existence for civil society that does not exist and is founded on
the false assumption that an existing civic community will have the prerequisite structure
to fulfil its promise of democratic enhancement. From an operational and practical
perspective it is problematic as this narrow civil society definition can serve to actually
marginalise and squeeze out existing groups.222 There is also the potential for this type of
definition to build up already strong areas of society at the expense of marginalised
groups.223 Defining civil society as separate from the family is both practically and
theoretically problematic and has the potential to make a self-fulfilling prophecy of the
notion of a separate civil society sphere.
The final set of spheres to discuss is the separation of civil society and the market.
This distinction is part of a common sense definition of civil society and is built explicitly
into definitions expressed by donors such as the World Bank and the UNDP. Once again
this distinction creates exclusions that are challenging from an operational perspective.
By finitely separating civil society from the market, both business groups and unions224
must be omitted. In a study by Bratton and van de Walle, they concluded that political
protests were a critical factor in democratic transitions in Africa. Furthermore they
determined that the number of trade unions and business associations "were positively
221
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and very strongly correlated with the frequency of protest."

By insisting upon this

separation of civil society and the market, critical actors in democratic transition can be
left out. This problem may become more problematic as scholar/practioners such as
William Easterly and donors such as the World Bank look to directly introduce market
mechanisms into development assistance with existing civil society organisations as one
of many potential actors.
The definitional conundrums surrounding civil society dominated the early
literature regarding civil society and democratisation. These debates have served to
narrow the scope of who is included in the analysis, to a specific set of formal NGO
model organisations. This is often seen as a necessity to facilitate theoretical and
operational issues. However, it has dramatic implications when considering what civil
society is intended to contribute to the overall democratisation process. It is these issues
that will occupy the remainder of the literature review, starting with more general and
theoretical debates and finishing with a more in-depth review of focussed imminent
reviews that are beginning to emerge.
James Ferguson provides an outstanding, general critique of the current paradigm
surrounding civil society and democratisation. Recalling the historical view of the
African state as a nation-building struggle between the modern state apparatus,
attempting to overcome the traditional, 'primordial' structure, the irony of the new
paradigm becomes apparent. The nation-building exercise hasn't changed but the roles
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have reversed and now it is the 'dynamic' civil society attempting to overcome the
stagnant and bloated state.227
Gordon White provides an overview of the expectations for civil society in
democratisation. He cities four specific and linked roles for civil society: it can play a
balancing role to the state and provide a check on its overall power, it can increase the
accountability of the state by enforcing standards of public morality, it can assist in
communicating the interests and demands of the citizenry to the state and it can redefine
political rules along democratic lines, in essence constructing a new set of political
norms.

These are many of the same themes that appear in the institutional policies of

the development community and will be used as headings to explore the functional
debates. They will also be utilised in the case study portion of the essay to evaluate the
role of environmental civil society actors in the democratisation process in Sierra Leone.
Civil Society as a Balancing Agent
This concept has wide acceptance within the academic and policy literature
although its precise utility remains ambiguous. The essential theory is that democracy
cannot develop and consolidate without an opposing balancing force emanating from
99Q

civil society, a role Van Rooy rather cynically refers to as 'an antidote to the state'.
Diamond echoes these sentiments in quoting Huntington, stating "The first and most
basic democratic function of civil society is to provide the basis for the limitation of state
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power, hence the control of the state by society, and hence for democratic political
institutions as the most effective means of exercising that control."
Hearn and Robinson suggest two ways that donors seek to promote or perhaps
more accurately create civil society opposition. The first method is "about opening up the
public space in which policy debate takes place to encompass previously excluded nonstate actors."

This can take a myriad of forms in donor practice. The World Bank has

increasingly integrated civil society in its operational protocol, primarily at the
consultation level rather than as a direct operating partner. The Annual Report notes that
civil society was consulted on 72% of the new loan approvals during 2006 and they have
become an active partner in the creation of national level poverty reduction plans.232
Another practice, pursued by the IUCN, is to conduct international NGO conferences and
support national NGO forums as a way to increase the collective strength of actors in the
environmental field.
The second method of promoting civil society is by "funding the programmes and
strengthening the capacity of individual organisations."234 Foreign funding arrives into
civil society from a variety or sources and can fund programmes that have no basis in
democracy promotion. However, within the narrow world of democracy aid, programme
and capacity building is primarily limited to technical assistance and direct organisational
funding. Technical assistance may include such activities as, "training, advice, and
information about organisational development and management, advocacy methods, fund
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raising, issue analysis and media relations."

Direct funding is also provided to cover

operational costs and for the provision of equipment such as vehicles and other capital
expenditures.236 This type of funding is typically low unless linked directly to ongoing
project work and can hinder the ability of organisations to conduct effective long term
planning and programming.
In addition to the previously mentioned issues associated with the definitional
dilemma of civil society, there are other potential concerns regarding these civil society
strengthening policies. Pearce and Howell provide an interesting critique of programmes
that attempt to increase space for civil society. They argue that "donor attempts to
operationalise the concept in the form of civil society strengthening programmes threaten
to reduce the concept of civil society to a technical tool and so depoliticise it in a way that
paradoxically could lead to a constriction of intellectual and political space."237 If donors
reduce civil society to merely purveyors of western ideas, the actual domestic space is
reduced. Ottaway warns that much of African civil society is regional based and aligned
through ethnic or religious lines. Therefore it has limited utility as a mass movement and
also has the possibility of being a destabilising agent if politically motivated.

Diamond

adds to the mix suggesting that an extremely aggressive civil society could actually
overwhelm a weak state through unachievable demands. It is imperative that "The state
itself must have sufficient autonomy, legitimacy, capacity and support to mediate among
the various interest groups, to implement policies and to allocate resources in ways that
235
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balance the claims of competing groups against one another and against the interests of
society as a whole."239 This is akin to what has been touted as the paradox of civil
society, "only a democratic state can create a democratic civil society; only a democratic
civil society can sustain a democratic state."240
Civil society is perceived to have the greatest potential to make positive
contributions to democracy development through its ability to act as a balance to state
power. However, the literature suggests that this notion is certainly not without concerns
and must be part of an overall process of state capacity building to maintain the fragile
balance of power between the two spheres.
Increasing State Accountability
The ability of civil society to increase state accountability is a specific duty of an
empowered civil society and is closely linked to its ability to act as a balancing agent.
Within this role, groups such as media, law societies, human rights groups and similar
social justice organisations are seen as critical actors. These types of groups serve to
monitor government activity and act to illuminate and challenge state wrongdoing.241
Diamond argues this role is even more critical in fragile new democracies with a legacy
949

of authoritarian rule as the state itself lacks the capacity to self-regulate.
DFID expands this role beyond monitoring and reactive action to include "direct
or indirect participation of ordinary citizens or civil society organisations in the policy
programme or political cycle."

They provide four phases and specific activities for
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potential action: influencing standard setting, carrying out investigations, demanding
answers from the state and applying sanctions where the state is found to be lacking.244
DFID is explicit in stating these activities should be a compliment to formal state
procedures, an indicator they are aware of the delicate balance of civil society and state
power.
Communicating the Interests and Demands of the Citizenry
Civil society is often portrayed as a critical bridge between the state and the
citizenry. Carothers uses the term 'transmission belt' to describe the active role of civil
society in articulating the interests of the general populace.245 Many of the issues
surrounding representation have been covered in the definitional overview and do not
need repeating. Despite these weaknesses, others point to the inclusionary benefits that
civil society has provided. Gyimah-Boadi touts the role that advocacy and development
NGOs have played in bringing formally marginalised groups into the political process.246
Women's empowerment programming is an often stated goal of donor policy and is an
example of specific donor policy to target marginalised groups. As an example, the
UNDP has implemented specific projects aimed at increasing women's political
participation, adding to the high importance they place on women's empowerment in
their overall development programming.247
Pluralism appears as a recurring theme throughout the literature and is central to
the ability of civil society to convey interests. Once again returning to Diamond, he
argues pluralism is an essential component of a democratic civil society. The ability for
244
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multiple groups to compete for representation enhances their abilities and also ensures
that the extinction of one individual group does not end the organised representation of
that group or set of interests.

Kasfir utilises many of the same arguments but also

asserts that pluralism allows groups to become more focused and more capable of
affecting

government

opinion

and policy.249

Both

warn

of the

danger

of

overspecialisation as this has the potential to allow unequal representation to specific
interests but the overall assertion is that the representative benefits outweigh their
potential flaws.
Creating a New Set of Political Norms
Among donors this is the least developed of the possible roles for civil society
within their programmes. Although it often features in donor rhetoric, converting this into
practise is problematic as norms are difficult to quantify. As Van Rooy describes, donors
often portray civil society to be a training ground for new political norms.

White

describes the role that civil society can play in the normative aspect of democratisation
stating that "civil society creates and sustains a new set of new democratic norms which
regulate the behaviour of the state and the character of the political relations between the
state and 'public sphere' of society and citizens."

Moving beyond the idea of civil

society regulating the norms regarding engagement between the state and its citizens,
Diamond suggests civil society can also modify traditional patron-client relationships at
the local level. This 'deepening' of democracy occurs as civil society empowers
individuals around common interests and challenges the "psychological and structural
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bonds of clientelism."

Civil society is seen as an agent not just for redefining norms at

the upper levels of state and citizen interaction but also in changing relations at the
grassroots level, addressing democratic deficits in both formal and informal institutions.
This normative function is one that every civil society actor contributes to and is
neglected by the typical, narrow focus on the activities of advocacy organisations. As
civil society expands across all sectors this role will become its most critical contribution
to the democratisation process.
Robert Putnam and his study regarding civic traditions in Italy is the most
important work regarding the link between civil society or 'civic community'

and

democracy. His study, which compared the institutional performance of Italy's twenty
regional governments, concluded that the magnitude of civic community was the primary
factor in the quality of democratic governance and overall performance.254 He further
concludes that the type of civil society organisation matters, as those that are horizontally
structured will serve to promote institutional success at the broader level. Conversely
those based on vertical relationships that mimic existing patron-client relations will do
little to promote the social conditions for democracy.

These conclusions indicate that it

is not just what civil society does but also how these organisations are structured that
affects its contribution to democracy promotion.
Through the ongoing Afrobarometer research project, Michael Bratton is
attempting to clarify the relative effect that formal and informal institutions have on
252
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assessments and views regarding democracy in Africa. An interesting pattern emerges
from Bratton's data that indicates informal institutions are actually positively related to
individual views regarding the 'extent of democracy'. A statistically significant, positive
correlation exists between both trust in the president, clientelism and the perceived extent
of democracy.

This relationship should be disturbing to donors interested in democracy

promotion as the illiberal and undemocratic features of governance they are attempting to
eradicate are actually being internally conceptualised as part of democracy.
The ability of civil society to create new democratic political norms features in
the rhetoric of donors and is largely accepted without disclaimer. The aggregate literature
indicates there are issues with this thinking. If structure matters then in order to eradicate
traditional neopatrimonial governance practices such as presidentialism and clientalism,
civil society must be free of these same practices. If the critical factor is not what you do
but how you do it, this has severe ramifications for donors focussed on narrow NGO
based definitions of civil society.

Civil Society Evaluations
The previous sections have reviewed the bulk of the literature concerned with
theoretical debates over how civil society is defined and its role in democratisation. The
final section will focus on more recent studies that provide specific, field-based
evaluations of the efficacy of civil society in the democratisation process. The Institute
for Development Studies (IDS) at Sussex University has done the most thorough work,
conducting a comparative study of Uganda, South Africa and Ghana.
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Julie Hearn's discussion paper provides the analytical baseline for the IDS study
and focuses on two main themes. First, she examines who the donors identify as civil
society and the implications of these definitions. Second, she evaluates what their
objectives are for civil society and overall development.257 Hearn concludes that although
donors work with a broad spectrum of group types they tend to be the "formal, urbanbased, professional, elite advocacy NGOs" rather than the existing rural-based
organisations that form the majority of civil society organisations.

This is extremely

similar to the criticisms put forward by Ottaway, although Hearn goes beyond her
concerns and suggests that this policy set is actually strengthening a new African elite,
aligned with neo-liberal political and economic ideology.259 Whereas most previous
theoretical criticism has focussed on the lack of accurate representation in the NGO
model, directly linking this policy with ulterior economic and societal agendas is unique.
The supporting research for this stance is pursued later in the article where Hearn
identifies and explores the two principal objectives of civil society assistance: building
democracy and economic reform. Focussing on the democratisation agenda, Hearn argues
that donor-funded organisations and programmes tend to be aligned with supporting and
developing formal political institutions, often with the narrow focus on elections. This is
closely aligned with what she describes as polyarchy,

a common procedural definition

closely associated with liberal democracy, rather than a more encompassing definition
based on social justice concepts.

Although this may be an accurate criticism of donor
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programming it is not clear whether this is a result of specific policy intent or more a
result of pragmatic restrictions on implementation that are difficult to quantify outside of
the formal institutional setting.
Shifting to economic reform, Hearn's argument is based on two roles for civil
society. The first argues that liberal democracy is believed by the donors to be a key
enabling environment for liberal economics.

The second, more critical argument is that

civil society is being brought into the process to provide legitimacy and build support for
potentially divisive reforms.

This argument is not well developed, relying mainly on

the existence of funding for liberal think tanks and organisations but providing little
evidence in terms of outcomes. The author also allows ideology to dominate, taking as a
given that reforms have been negative for Africa, ignoring the opposing literature that
argues much of the negative effects can be attributed to incomplete and often insincere
attempts at reform.264
Hearn provides a clear outline of the limitations of donor definitions and
objectives for civil society. Subsequent research in the IDS study from Friedman and
Robinson built on these themes and attempted to provide insight into the efficacy of the
donor policies as measured by civil society's ability "to influence government policy and
legislation and to widen the opportunities available to citizens to participate in public
affairs".265
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The authors' highlighted two critical issues in the donor policies: a lack of
consensus on the specific role of civil society in the democratisation process and little
knowledge about the efficacy of civil society in this process, despite general belief in its
unquestioned importance.266 The second of these issues formed the dominant portion of
the study and focussed on two distinct measures. First, they examined the internal
governance of the organisations, as much of the theory on civil society's efficacy relies
upon democratic norms existing within these organisations. From the survey work much
of the theoretical criticisms held true: NGOs were typically located in the capital with
weak ties to grassroots constituencies, were generally dominated by men and in rural
areas relied on existing patron-client networks.

More positively, of the organisations

thoroughly analysed, the majority had formal democratic governance structures as
exhibited through constitutions, periodic elections and open meetings that provide room
for member voice.

The major issue with this finding is the limited sample size, which

focussed on major aid recipients. External donors require these minimal democratic
standards be in place prior to funding and it is difficult to determine whether they have
any actual relevance. Additionally, it may focus democratic norms in a small portion of
the actual civil society community, further increasing the separation between the
grassroots and formal, donor-funded communities.
Regarding the overall influence of civil society in formal policy creation, the
study determined that there was little consistent engagement between civil society and the
policy process and even less overall impact on policy outcomes.269 Of importance, there
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did not appear to be a direct relationship between policy influence and long-term linkages
with government or foreign influence. However, those organisations that were most
effective tended to have a high level of internal democratic culture, including high levels
of internal participation.270 This indicates that the internal structure, generally portrayed
as a critical catalyst to less quantitative normative shifts, may be more directly related to
efficacy.
In summary, the utility of civil society as an agent in promoting democracy is not
as clear cut as the donor community may believe. Substantial issues emerge from the
definitional debates, as this determines who is included and excluded from analysis. The
majority of the literature and donor policy creates a narrow view of civil society as active
in the political process and generally based on a formal western NGO model. Although
this narrow definition is useful as an analytical and policy tool, it is insufficient to
properly evaluate the extent of civil society on the democratisation process. Organisations
that may not fit the ideal mould and may be acting in the development role rather than in
strict political terms do contribute to the overall effect of civil society on the
democratisation process.
This becomes clear when the role of civil society in democratisation is further
analysed. Many of the processes and measures are based largely on participation with
little correlation to actual democratic development. When efforts are made to quantify
results this is often limited to actual policy inputs. This is also insufficient as it does not
reflect the ability or utility of civil society to facilitate and consolidate democracy. The
most important role for civil society in this process is in its normative aspects, similar to
the model of civic community as suggested by Putnam. This essay will explore both of
270
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these weaknesses, expanding the inclusion of civil society beyond the strict advocacy
type organisations favoured by donors and evaluating the internal structure of civil
society organisations as a primary factor in contributing to the promotion of a democratic
political culture that is critical to democratic consolidation. The next chapter will provide
an historical overview of Sierra Leone political development to illustrate the type of
issues that are affecting its democratisation process.
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Chapter VI: Sierra Leone - A Political Journey
The theoretical chapters focussed on the evolution of development theory and
donor policy and on the meaning of democracy and specifically its understanding and
role within these policies. The subsequent chapter outlined the critical debates
surrounding conceptualisations of civil society and its utility as an agent in the
democratisation process. This chapter is the first of two regarding the case study of Sierra
Leone and the ability of civil society to contribute to specific donor policies regarding
democratisation and good governance. Rather than concentrating on strictly quantitative
indices of governance and their associated measures, obstacles to democratisation will be
put in the context of the historical political challenges that have been part of Sierra Leone
politics and society since its pre-colonial days. It is these obstacles that will be
illuminated in this chapter and form the background for the civil society based field
research of the next chapter.
Sierra Leone came to be synonymous with a brutal eleven-year civil war,
graphically symbolised by images of child soldiers and civilian amputations. The 2006
film, Blood Diamond, brought a stylised version of the conflict to a mass audience and
illustrated some of the brutality and corrupting influences of diamond wealth that were its
most salient characteristics. Other commentators such as Robert Kaplan described the
conflict as representing a "pre-modern formlessness" and representative of the future of
conflict, fought at the communal level and indistinguishable from criminal anarchy.271
What is missing from both these descriptions is an understanding of the causes of the
conflict, rooted in recurring themes of Sierra Leone politics: core versus periphery
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antagonism, chiefly control and patrimonial governance. The political issues that led to
civil war, the most intense form of state collapse, are the same issues that must be
overcome for Sierra Leone to continue its nascent transition to democracy. Recapping
these themes of Sierra Leone's political history will be split into three phases: Preprotectorate, which covers the period up to formal British control as a protectorate,
Colonial, from the declaration of the protectorate until independence and Independence to
present, including the 2007 elections.

Pre-protectorate
The pre-protectorate period will cover the period up to the formal declaration of
protectorate status for the hinterland in 1896. Massive changes occurred in the social and
political structure of Sierra Leone during this period, largely in response to contact with
European traders and the British government. The most critical aspects are the emergence
of two predominant tribes, the Mende and the Temne, rivalry between the core and
periphery and the evolution of the chiefdom and the role of the chief.
From what has been formally coalesced about Sierra Leone's pre-European
contact history, its earliest inhabitants lived in small, isolated communities rooted in a
kinship structure. Mountains and dense forests protected these communities from
invasion by the interior empires of Ghana, Mail and Songhai and increased the local
isolation.272 Political organisation was based on a lineage system, which might be
patrilineal or matrilineal and allowed kinsmen to "maintain solidarity for internal
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organisation and for dealing with the kinsmen of other lineages."

These kinship-based

'stateless societies'274 also included various forms of secret societies which provided
horizontal organisation that cut across lineage lines. The secret societies served various
functions politically that allowed for open deliberation free from lineage pressure and
allowed for collective decision making outside of other village institutions.

This

informal but structured baseline matches descriptions from early traders that described
the area as a series of small independent states, each with its own government. Some of
these governments were ruled by a king, but even these extremes were tempered by
empowered advisory councils.

The descriptions outline the existence of a limited,

guardianship-type, democratic governance structure with a parallel secret society system
providing a counterweight to the ruling elite. Undoubtedly there was variance among the
communities but the basic form of democratic government was clearly evident,
countering any claims of it being an alien form of governance.
Beginning in the 15th century, Portuguese traders began operating along the coast
of Sierra Leone, trading European manufactured goods for local products such as ivory
and bees-wax. Ultimately this trade expanded to include slaves, usually criminals from
within the community or outsiders captured in war.

77

Early contact was limited to coastal

trading, predominantly with the Temne and Bulom who acted as middle men with the
inland tribes. Although trade between the coastal and inland tribes already existed along
main waterways, this was intensified by the Europeans. The increase in trade allowed for
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an expansion of the chiefs' responsibilities, access to revenue and western institutions
including education.

Although contact was limited between the early European traders

and the indigenous population, altered trade patterns began to affect the role of the chief
and empowered specific tribes.
Three major migrations of people occurred during the pre-protectorate period that
had significant impacts on the current political situation. The first occurred in the mid970

sixteenth century when the coastal people were invaded by the 'Manes'.

The Manes

980

descended along either the Mao or Mano River

and progressed up the coast, invading

and conquering the lands of the Temne and Bulum, including the main trading location of
the Sierra Leone estuary. Ultimately they were stopped by the inland Susu tribe and
retreated, settling into and ruling the Temne and Bulum areas.281 Temne society was
altered by this interaction; larger political units were implemented, aligned under a king
and much beyond the small chiefdoms that had existed, commercial relations were
altered including a shift in trade patterns with Europeans away from the Sierra Leone
989

estuary into modern day Guinea and improved methods of warfare were introduced.
Over the course of about a century, the Manes and the Bulum were slowly assimilated
into the larger Temne society and much of the traditional practices regained prominence.
The kingdoms slowly reverted to smaller chiefdoms, however the ruling house shifted to
Mande-speaking or Fula descendants with "clear-cut patterns of rule based on
983

patricians."

Increased interactions with outside traders also led to the slow introduction

278

Christopher Fyfe, A History of Sierra Leone. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1963), 1-10
Fyfe. People's of the Windward Coast. 158
280
The Mano River forms the Eastern border with Liberia.
281
Kenneth C. Wylie. The Political Kingdoms of the Temne. (New York: Africana Publishing Company,
1977), 15
282
IBID, 25
283
IBID
279

94

of Islam into Temne culture. This is significant as it affected the role of the chief, with a
split of Temne country into Muslim and society chiefdoms. Within society based
chiefdoms, secret societies such as the Pom and Ragbenle maintained significant power
and allowed the sub-chiefs and society more independence within the chiefdoms. In
contrast, the Muslim chiefdoms were more vertically structured with authority largely
based on economic wealth and allegiances based on a common Islamic faith, allowing for
more arbitrary rule.284 The Mane invasion had significant short term impacts and created
lasting evolutions on Temne society. Overall it served to increase Temne influence as
surrounding cultures were assimilated and direct ties were made with inland tribes and
European traders.
The second major migration of people was unique in that it did not originate from
within the continent but was the result of emigration from the west in the wake of the
abolition of the slave trade. In 1772, a ruling by Lord Mansfield made slavery illegal on
British soil, emancipating thousands of slaves. On May 14 1787, roughly 400 of these
'Black Poor' arrived in Sierra Leone from England and negotiated a settlement site with
the local Temne chief in the current location of the State House in Freetown. The original
settlement soon came into conflict with a neighbouring ruler and the town was burnt
down and the settlers dispersed.

Seemingly undaunted, a group of 1 100, ex-slaves

from the United States arrived from Nova Scotia in 1792 and another 500 originally from
Jamaica via Nova Scotia arrived in 1800.

These three communities were the original
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inhabitants of Freetown and became known as the Creoles.

In January of 1808, Sierra

Leone, which included Freetown and surrounding area on the peninsula, became a Crown
Colony, ushering in formal rule over Sierra Leone but not the larger tribal areas. A fourth
and final group of settlers followed as Britain established Freetown as a 'point of
liberation' for slaves freed from the interior or captured by the British navy during its
coastal patrols.288
Creole culture was distinct from the interior and tended to reflect the 'civilising'
mission that was the original intent of the British masterminds. Increased availability of
education and capital allowed many to become active traders, although few ventured
beyond the peninsula. Governance was completely undemocratic and dominated by the
British, through a Governor and seven officials, all appointed by the British government.
An extremely modest democratising move was made in 1863 when the Council was
divided into an Executive and Legislative branch with one representative of the Sierra
Leone community allowed in the latter. This system remained unchanged until the
establishment of the protectorate and the amalgamation of the colony and the interior.
During this period, a distinct Creole culture emerged that would have important political
consequences throughout the colonial period and into independence.
The final major migration was the slow and steady 'mendenisation' of the south
of the country. This process occurred over the 18th and 19th centuries as the Mende slowly
expanded towards the coastal areas through two distinct patterns. The first was through
simple migration and settlement into coastal areas previously occupied by the Sherbo and
Vai people. Once sufficient numbers had moved into an area they elected a leader, who
287
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would represent them to the local chief, until the time when they became independent.
The second form of migration was through mercenary activity. Having gained a
reputation as fierce warriors, both the Sherbo and the Vai would utilise the Mende in
conflict with their neighbours. Mercenaries were entitled to a share of the spoils and
would often stay and posses the lands they had successfully conquered for their
employers.290
With the annexation of the coastal areas complete, the Mende settled into a fairly
stable form of governance. The war village, consisting of a central walled town with
surrounding open villages was the most basic unit. This war-town was governed by a
town chief, with the aid of village elders who would be responsible for security and
settling disputes among the citizens. 91 The next tier of organisation consisted of several
affiliated war villages and was ruled by a sub-chief, responsible for law and order,
settling disputes and representing them at chiefdom councils.292 Above this was the
'state', encapsulating all the various war towns within the personal control of a
centralised leader, headed by a king or paramount chief. By the 1880s there were roughly
nine Mende states, categorised by one author as either territorial, with stable territorial
limits or personal amorphous, reliant more on the king's personality for its bounds. In
both state forms the king was an elected position and was predominantly responsible for
external relations and settling disputes between chiefs, leaving the majority of the daily
administrative duties to the sub and town chiefs.
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This stable form of governance structure was dramatically changed toward its
current from by the increase of British penetration into the interior. Prior to policy
changes starting in the 1870s, British engagement with the interior had been limited to
trade and was primarily carried out through Creole middlemen. However, in response to
French advances in the north and economic decline in the colony, believed to be a result
of up-country conflict and smuggling, more formal direct links were created.294 British
policy focussed on the three pronged strategy of 'roads, policing and treaties', each with
specific impacts on the interior's governance and specifically on the role of the chief.
Roads were introduced to facilitate trade and allow for patrols by the Frontier Police.
This had the effect of re-orientating the flow of trade away from the rivers toward the
colony and allowed for the rapid deployment of police and other forces from the colony
to the interior, increasing central influence.295 Policing was initially introduced to
maintain security along the frontier road and keep peace between the various settlements
but quickly became another mechanism for linking the chiefs to the central government
and reducing their overall judicial autonomy.296
Despite the changes brought by roads and policing, the treaty rush had the most
lasting and dramatic impacts. The first consequence was a dramatic reduction in chiefly
autonomy in favour of direct British authority. Standard treaties contained four key
provisions: peace between the chiefs subjects and British subjects which included
Creoles, free access to the chiefs territories for all British subjects, with the Governor
being the final adjudicator regarding this type of dispute, the chief agreed not to enter into
war or acts of aggression that may affect the Colony's trade, and the chief would not cede
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any of their territory to another national government without crown approval.

These

conditions eliminated the sovereignty of the chiefs over their territorial domain and
dramatically reduced the ability of chiefs to wage war, a large part of Mende traditional
culture and chiefly prestige. The second consequence was the fragmentation of the
kingdoms and the creation of the office of Paramount Chief. The hierarchical system of
chiefly governance was eradicated by the treaty boom as chiefs of all levels signed
treaties with the British, marginalising some and empowering others under this
homogenous title. Ultimately, from the nine Mende kingdoms and the various sub-chiefs
there emerged a multitude of weakened Paramount Chiefs and fragmented political units.
In addition to the obvious changes in the governance structure this process served to
further reduce the autonomy of the chiefs as many owed their new found status more to
the British government than the people that they represented.298
The political history of the pre-protectorate period is critical as the core issues of
Sierra Leone governance emerged. Migration led to the rise of the Temne in the north and
the Mende in the south as the dominant tribes. The arrival of the Creoles established a
distinct African culture in the colony and established the roots of a core-periphery divide.
Finally, the increase in British influence began to have dramatic affects on the role of the
chief and the traditional governance patterns of the interior. All of these three themes
continued to develop in the colonial period and have impacted the country as it headed
into independence.

Colonial Period: 1896-1961
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On August 31, 1896, the British government proclaimed all the territory between
the French controlled north and the Liberian border a protectorate and brought in formal
colonial control.2

The colonial period would last until 1961 and consolidated dramatic

changes to the governance structure of the interior, the institution of the chief and
institutionalised political tension between the core and periphery, critical issues that still
trouble democracy in Sierra Leone.
The Early Days: 1896-1937
A series of ordinances in 1896 and 1897 established the initial colonial form of
governance in Sierra Leone. The Colony remained under the same system of governance
with the Governor maintaining strong, central control with the acquiescence of the
Executive and Legislative Councils. The Protectorate was divided into five Districts, each
headed by a District Commissioner, who shared powers with the Paramount Chiefs.
Chiefs were allowed to judge disputes that involved 'natives' and impose their own forms
of justice such as fines or imprisonment but not corporal punishment. More serious
crimes between 'natives' were handled through a combined Chief and Commissioner
court system while disputes between chiefs, or dealing with witchcraft and Secret
Societies were dealt with exclusively by the District Commissioner.300 This division of
the court system continued the process of weakening the role of the chief and brought
them under more intimate, colonial control. Another provision in the Protectorate
Ordinance that continued the marginalisation of the Chiefs allowed for District
Commissioners, with approval of the Governor, to depose of any chief deemed unfit and
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replace them through appointment.

Whereas previous measures had served to limit the

bounds of chiefly control and specifically limit judicial powers, this provision brought the
entire spectrum of the Chiefs actions into scrutiny. This period can be seen as the formal
transition of chiefly accountability away from the individuals under their jurisdiction
toward the central government.
Under Britain's style of colonialism, colonies were supposed to be self financing,
necessitating the imposition of a House Tax on the protectorate. This tax was vehemently
opposed by all sectors, the Creoles who were opposed to any direct taxation, traders who
felt it would undermine commerce, Northern Chiefs who felt it burdened them directly
and argued it was too severe for their impoverished people and Southern Chiefs who felt
it threatened their traditional societies.302 With the 'Hut Tax' serving as the final catalyst,
war broke out between the British and the protectorate, first in the Temne areas to the
north and then in Mendeland to the south and east.
The Temne revolt started on February 26, 1898, and was led by Bai Bureh, a
Temne chief with a reputation for a strong warrior past. Rather than a direct military
engagement, the Temne revolt was a coordinated guerrilla campaign, with targeted
attacks against administrative targets. The British responded severely, burning entire
villages and fields, out of proportion to the Temne attacks.303 In April, 1898, the revolt
spread to Mendeland where it took a much more indiscriminate turn. Rather than just the
administration, all aliens were targeted and killed, including Creole traders, European
missionaries, officials and their families. By January of 1899, the revolt had been
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suppressed and the British had regained control of the entire protectorate.

The failure

of the revolts was a critical event in the acceptance of British colonial control over the
protectorate. For the chiefs it was a final blow to potential forms of recourse to outside
control and illustrated to their subjects that the British were capable of stopping any
challenges to their authority. Creoles also suffered as many were vocally opposed to the
tax and were seen as agitators, beginning the decline in Creole activity in the protectorate.
Native Administration
A series of administrative reorganisations occurred throughout the early part of
the 20

century as borders and governance structures were redefined in response to

changing social, economic and administrative demands. Despite these frequent minor
changes it wasn't until 1937 and the introduction of Native Administration (N.A.) before
significant functional changes occurred. Native Administration was based on the model
from Nigeria and was intended to utilise existing chief structures to implement an
organised local government, similar to the current trend towards decentralisation in
development programming. Additional administrative responsibilities were granted to the
Chiefs including: the creation of Chiefdom treasuries for each administrative unit, tax
authority to each administrative unit and authorisation to enact by-laws and issue orders
regarding social services and development functions.305 Chiefs under the direction of the
District Commissioners were responsible for collecting local taxes and for maintaining
the budget of their administrative units, although policy still emanated from the
Governor.
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Initially Chiefs had the option of joining the NA system or retaining their existing
roles and were provided with salaries to entice their compliance.

Gradually chiefdoms

moved towards NA, with 2 out of 202 chiefdoms in 1936 versus 121 out of 212 in 1946
operating under this model.307 Essentially, NA focussed on reforming and 'modernising'
the role of the chief, an institution that had already undergone a dramatic transition. Much
of the traditional checks on chiefly control and accountability to their people and popular
legitimacy had been eroded and replaced by central, colonial control. Given this
metamorphosis it is not surprising that the attempt to then utilise the chiefs as the
dominant individual in transforming political administration would prove to be
problematic. This same tactic was attempted in the post-civil war period with similar
issues.
The period of NA had significant consequences for the political landscape of
Sierra Leone that would become acute in the drive towards independence and continue to
be salient factors in current politics. Firstly, it formalised the chiefdom as the most
critical political unit, creating a parochial political climate resistant to mass
mobilisation.30 The little unity that did develop beyond the chiefdom seems to have
manifested not in any large-scale nationalist movement but in rivalry between the colony
and the protectorate.30 A second critical consequence was the further evolution of the
institution of chief. The introduction of wages and taxation rights instituted another link
between the central government and the chief and also created an opportunity for
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monetary corruption at the local level.

As measures of authority and power moved

away from traditional forms to be more reliant on approval from the core and economic
advantage, current client-patron forms of governance began to become ingrained. The
experiment with N.A. served to institutionalise patron-client political relations between
the core and the periphery and created further separation between the chiefs and their
subjects.
Preparing for Independence
The post World War II period was a time of massive upheaval in the colonial
system due to weakened European power and more confident calls from the colonies for
independence. Although independence did not reach Sierra Leone until 1961 the
preparations for the transition began roughly fifteen years earlier. It was during this
timeframe when the dormant political issues of the role of the chief, core-periphery
conflict and Temne-Mende antagonism found space for expression.
The first major policy move by the British government was to create the
Protectorate Assembly (PA) in 1945 -1946 and was intended to give the protectorate
more political influence in Sierra Leone and also allow it to close the perceived political
and social deficit of the protectorate in relation to the colony in preparation for
independence.311 Initially the PA consisted of forty-two members, twenty-six of these
were reserved for paramount chiefs elected by the district councils and native
administrations and eleven for officials from government departments. Of the remaining
five, one was allotted to European business interests, one to Creole business interests, one
to missionaries and two for educated Protectorate Africans selected by Native
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Administrations, although this was later increased to six due to pressure from the newly
emerging educated elite.312 The creation of the PA was a monumental step toward
independence and once again placed the chiefs at the forefront of protectorate
governance.
Concurrent with the creation of the PA the British were introduced major
amendments to the 1924 constitution that also increased the political presence of the
Protectorate within the governance structure of Sierra Leone. Under the amendments, the
Legislative Council was expanded to twenty four members, eight official European
members and sixteen unofficial members, fourteen of which would be African. Of these
fourteen members, four would be selected by direct representation from the colony, nine
would be elected from and by the PA and one would be selected from the PA by the
Governor.313 As the PA was dominated directly and indirectly by the chiefs,
representation in the new government would also mirror that reality, creating extreme
displeasure in the colony.
Colony citizens recognised that this would lead to them being governed by the
Protectorate majority, people they largely considered inferior. Two proposals were put
forth by Creole representatives, the first requesting three additional Colony seats, which
would then give a Creole-European coalition a majority, and the second that English
literacy be a requirement of all Paramount Chiefs that stood for election to the Legislative
Council.314 The first demand was accepted by the PA with the agreement that three
additional seats would also be made available to PA representatives. However, the second
was rejected with minimal discussion by the PA, who commented this should be left to
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the voters to decide.315 Although rejected, this second demand was quite shrewd as it
attempted to play on existing divides within the P.A. between progressive chiefs,
educated elites and more conservative chiefs. However, rather than exacerbating existing
divisions in the Protectorate, the severe opposition from the Colony, combined with
pressure from the British government and the personal relationship between Dr. Milton
Margai, a leading figure among the Protectorate elite, and influential chiefs assisted in
uniting the PA. Critically this led to the formation of the Sierra Leone People's Party
(SLPP) in 1951, a political party based on an alliance between the Protectorate new elite
•11/

and the Paramount Chiefs.

The constitutional changes that started in 1947 and the

formation of the SLPP guaranteed the Chiefs an important role in not just local but also
national politics and also gave structure to the Colony-Protectorate divide. It was under
these conditions that Sierra Leone progressed toward independence.
The decade preceding independence involved a slow and steady transfer of power
from the colonial government to African leadership, without the antagonism between
colonial and local elites present in many decolonisation drives. African members of the
Executive council were granted Ministerial positions with policy-making authority in
1953 and Sir Milton Margai was named chief Minister. Some Ministerial positions such
as Finance, Justice and External Affairs remained under colonial control until the final
few years prior to independence but ultimately were transferred.317 The peaceful transfer
had a number of implications for the political development of Sierra Leone.
Rather than acting as a unifying element against the colonial powers, the SLPP
largely acted as apologists for colonial policy, leading to the creation of additional
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alliances and political parties, rather than what Rostow described as a unified 'reactive
nationalism'. Initial opposition came from the United Progressive People's Party (UPP)
which consisted of an odd alliance of Creole leadership with broad Protectorate support
largely due to displeasure with chiefly rule. As to be expected, due to the existing
antagonism between the Colony and Protectorate, the alliance was short lived and the
party split in 1959 due to an internal leadership struggle.318 The preceding year, a
momentous split had occurred in the SLPP, as Sir Milton's younger brother Albert left
•7 1 Q

the party to form the People's National Party (PNP).

The PNP attracted broad based

support, especially among the young intellectual elements of the country that were
uncomfortable with the tight relationship between the SLPP and the Chiefs and their
conservative policies.

Included in the PNP leadership was Siakka Stevens, who would

quickly establish himself on the national scene.
A condition of the British for independence was the convening of an all-party
conference in London to establish the rules for independence and gain party consensus on
these terms. Uniquely, rather than sending the various political factions to the conference,
the Sierra Leone contingent consisted of a single body, the United National Front (UNF),
which had arisen from the pre-independence conference in Freetown.

However, this

temporary alliance was not the result of prolonged debate and unity but rather a
pragmatic decision to expedite the decolonisation process. It was at the all-party
conference in London that Siakka Stevens rose to prominence with a grandstanding
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protest against the conclusions of the Constitutional Conference. Upon his return to
Sierra Leone, Stevens maintained his protests and after unsuccessfully challenging Albert
Margai for leadership of the PNP formed the All People's Congress (APC) in September
1960/ zz Taken from the APC's own historical account, the aim of the party was one of
"cross-community and cross-tribal unification in contrast to the sectionalism of the SLPP;
a posture of populism against the SLPP's elitism...to liberate people from the burdens
inflicted on them by chieftaincy and enable them to live comfortably without excessive
interference."323 The APC portrayed themselves as the everyman party in contrast to the
elite, Mende-dominated SLPP. This message and the disillusionment with the process of
decolonisation led to rapid support for the APC, mostly from Temne and northern tribes
with Creole support.324 With the rise of the APC, Sierra Leone now had two main
political parties each with regional and tribal support base.
At the eve of independence Sierra Leone was politically divided, under
circumstances that would prove disastrous and continue to afflict the current
democratisation process. The evolution of the chief under colonial rule eliminated
recourse by their subjects and created an integrated patron-client relationship with the
central government, initially with the colonial administration and subsequently with the
SLPP. Core-periphery relations were strained and often openly hostile as the Creole elite
struggled to prevent their privilege and ruling status from being overcome by the
Protectorate. Finally, the creation of the APC allowed a formal political outlet for tribal
rivalries against the Mende dominated SLPP.
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Independence
On April 16, 1961, Sierra Leone gained its independence with Sir Milton Margai
as its first Prime Minister. The potential for success seemed high as mineral wealth
provided substantial revenue, financial assistance from international sources was
available, transportation and social services continued to develop and manufacturing
began to emerge.325 Although the transition from colonial rule had been without serious
conflict between the colonial powers and the new African rulers, there were debilitating
internal issues affecting the stability of the new government. The political chasms that
existed at the eve of independence would come to the forefront and continue to evolve,
ultimately leading the country into a catastrophic civil war, challenging the existence of
the state.
SLPP Takes the Reigns: The Protectorate in Charge
In 1962, the first post-colonial elections were held with the SLPP winning,
although the APC in alliance with a Kono based party managed to take twenty of the
sixty-two parliamentary seats.

Prime Minister Margai led a period of internal detente,

appointing Creoles to important positions within the government and civil service and
establishing policy "marked with compromise and unaggressive ineffectiveness."327 This
atmosphere changed dramatically beginning in 1964 with the death of Sir Milton and the
ascendancy of his brother Albert to the position of Prime Minister. In contrast to Milton,
Albert relied less on compromise and more on force and intrigue.328 This brought him
into direct conflict with the Creole elite both within and outside the government and civil
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service, who accused his government of waste and corruption among other things. There
was also internal dissention within the SLPP as many influential older members retained
hard feelings from Albert's defection from the SLPP, as they saw it as the root of the
party's current disorganisation.329 It was under this tense atmosphere that parliamentary
elections were held on March 17, 1967, for ordinary members and March 21, 1967, for
chief members. The bitter election featured violence and tribal tension in the rural areas
and resulted in the APC, led by Siakka Stevens, being requested to form a government.
Before Stevens could begin his rule, Brigadier David Lansana, the Force Commander and
a tribesman of Margai declared martial law. Lansana was quickly deposed by three senior
officers who formed the National Reformation Council. The Council banned political
activities and ruled by coercion until a coup in April 1968 ended their reign and on April
16, 1968 installed Siakka Stevens as Prime Minister. The brief period of S.L.P.P. postindependence rule highlighted the fragility of democracy in Sierra Leone as unchecked
by colonial control, regional and tribal animosity led to its breakdown.
Siakka Stevens and the APC: State Withdrawal
Few outside of the APC party would describe the roughly twenty-four years of
APC rule as anything but a disaster. During this period Sierra Leone moved from a
tenuous multi-party democracy to one party rule, with Siakka Stevens as President
dominating the political scene. Fred Hayward summed up the standard description of the
Stevens era,
On one hand, we have witnessed the centralisation of state power, the
personalisation of authority, and the extension of state control into most
sectors of society. This process has been paralleled by a steady growth in
the size of the state, which has become the largest employer in the nation
329
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and which has become responsible for the country's economic health. On
the other hand, we have observed an overall weakening of state
institutions, the development of powerful autonomous political and
economic spheres of influence, and the fragmentation of political
structures that had guaranteed its hegemony and assured legitimacy in an
earlier era. State decline has been intensified by the failure in government
performance, escalating corruption and the incapacity of the state to
generate sufficient revenue to meet its rapidly expanding budgetary
requirements.331
Although the entirety of the Stevens' era is fascinating it is necessary to focus on the
period's most salient political legacies. With that in mind, the creation and then
strengthening of the role of president, the continuing cooption of the Chiefs by the central
government and the essential abandonment of the periphery will be the focus.
Office of the President
Disillusionment within the APC and the armed forces led to a series of coup
attempts culminating in March, 1971, and provided the catalyst for the consolidation of
state power. In April, 1971, the constitution was changed, establishing Sierra Leone as a
Republic with Siakka Stevens being elected by the Parliament as its first President.332
Also in response to these challenges Stevens enlisted military support from Guinea to
protect the state apparatus, replacing them with his own personal security force, the
Special Security Division (SSD) in 1973. The SSD was recruited from APC strongholds
and often made use of APC 'thugs' to intimidate voters and rival politicians.333 Elections
in 1973 were boycotted by the SLPP largely due to APC violence, resulting in eighty four
of the eighty five seats going to APC candidates, the majority of which ran unopposed.334
The consolidation of the one-party state culminated in 1978 after a dubious national
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referendum, in which an incredible 97.15% of the 2 215 646 voters voted yes to the
required constitutional reforms.

In ten years Stevens succeeded in formally ending

multiparty politics in Sierra Leone and created the basis of a strong executive President
with his own personal security apparatus.
Informally Stevens may have been even more effective in solidifying the
Presidency as the foremost political institution in Sierra Leone. Stevens built the
prototypical neopatrimonial governance machine with him at the centre of the network.
At the national political level, Stevens used patronage appointments in the civil service
and cabinet and parliamentary positions within government to reward allies.336 He created
an elaborate and extensive patron-client network throughout the country by being directly
accessible, without the need for Chiefs as intermediaries.337 Most interestingly, he
controlled the economy through "state control of import licences, access to foreign
currency, loan guarantees, and other state incentives, to reward those loyal to him."338
Increasingly, economic control was handled through a small Lebanese contingency,
which minimised local ownership and provided for more intimate and manageable
control and corruption by Stevens. William Reno provides an intriguing analysis of the
relationship between illicit economy and state control in Sierra Leone, describing the
process of the rise of informal economies and apparent formal state decline as the
creation of a 'Shadow State'.
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manipulation, Stevens created a strong executive office at the head of Sierra Leone's
government. This is a reality that remains a core issue in Sierra Leone's democratisation
process. Although Stevens was sure to expand his network to all reaches of society he
was acutely aware of the importance of the Chiefs in any system of control.
Cooption of the Chiefs
Minimising the autonomy of the Chiefs was a priority for the APC government as
they had been historically aligned with the SLPP. In an interview in early 1970, Stevens
discussed his plans for altering the tenure and autonomy of the chiefs, stating, "Since we
can't have a government for more than five years, it is hard for some people to
understand why we should have a chief for life...Now what we might do is have chiefs
for four years.. .If he is satisfactory, if he is fine for the people then he can stay in. If he is
not, then just like the national government he goes out. Now if we do that we will have a
very different kind of chief."340 Stevens ensured that chiefs would not remain in power
without the support of the central government, using profit and power as levers of control
and replacing uncooperative chiefs with APC appointees. Specifically, methods such as
controlling diamond licences were used as they represented access to limited forms of
local revenue.341
Stevens recognised the chiefs were critical agents in maintaining control in the
periphery and made concerted efforts to bring them into his patron-client networks. In
doing so, he continued the colonial process of undermining the legitimacy and
accountability of the chiefs to their subjects. The power of dismissal and appointment
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was a powerful tool of control and was aided by presidential decision making regarding
access to rent seeking opportunities in fields such as diamond mining.
Abandonment of the Periphery
The core-periphery nexus has been a central feature of the political development
of Sierra Leone and was originally divided along Creole versus Protectorate lines. This
began to change shape after independence as the Creole population lost its position of
advantage in government and the economy and became a minority within the overall
population of Sierra Leone. The formation of the APC split the former Protectorate along
tribal lines, with the SLPP becoming ensconced as the Mende party and the APC
representing the Temne and other northern tribes. Despite these changes, the coreperiphery divide did not disappear but transformed under Stevens as the periphery was
essentially abandoned by the central government, creating a deep chasm between
Freetown and the rest of the country.
In 1972, the District Councils (DC) were abolished, leaving rural governance
under the control of the chiefs, administered by the Minister of the Interior.342 The APC
argued this was done to reduce Government expenditure as they had become a drain on
the country's resources.343 A more reasonable explanation is that the DCs represented an
alternative venue for political expression and representation outside Stevens' reaches.
Reno suggests that it was done to squash the formation of programmes by grassroots
APC organisers.

Regardless of the exact motives, the move served to void the rural

periphery of any form of political pluralism. Chiefs, already seen as illegitimate and
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unaccountable, became the sole local representatives and political control shifted toward
the centre. Combined with the one-party state implemented by the APC, space for
political expression ceased to exist and the needs of the periphery became unheard in the
capital.
The abandonment of the periphery manifested itself most acutely in economic
stagnation and decline. Paul Richards notes that the "political economy of Sierra Leone is
dominated by two contrasts - between the capital Freetown and the more isolated rural
districts, and between the mining sector of the economy and the stagnant semisubsistence agricultural sector."345 Agricultural production was discouraged by state
policies for a number of reasons. Prices were kept low to appease urban residents, high
rates of tax were used to provide government revenue and state monopolies were used as
part of the overall neopatrimonial system.346 Agriculture, the primary economic resource
of the periphery, came to be a vital element of political control and elevated a small urban
elite at the expense of the rural majority.
The Stevens era introduced profound changes to the political structures of Sierra
Leone. The nascent multi-party democracy was reduced to a one-party state led by the
President's office and specifically Stevens. Chiefs became further ingrained in and
controlled by central party politics and became the sole representative of rural political
expression, effectively cutting the periphery from governance. Finally, the historical
core-periphery divide was transformed as the rural hinterland was neglected by a central
government more focused on maintaining its intricate neopatrimonial system of
governance rather than developing a nation.
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'Civil' War: 1991 - 2002
On March 23, 1991, the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) entered the Kailahun
District of Sierra Leone from Liberia.347 The rebel incursion started a devastating eleven
year civil war that led to the near collapse of the formal state structure. A summary of the
various factions and shifting alliances during the war is beyond the scope of this analysis.
Instead the focus will be on how the political circumstances of the time were related to
the conflict, the political aspect of the conflict and its combatants and the political
landscape that emerged in the immediate post-conflict period. This focus is imperative as
the civil war represents the most severe reaction to governmental neglect and should
serve as a reminder of the potential challenges and risks associated with democratisation
in Sierra Leone.
The International Crisis Group (ICG), an independent NGO that provides research
and reports on conflict resolution, has written extensively on the conflict. Their analysis
summarises the general sentiment in the literature, citing the following root causes: bad
government, unaccountable military, ethnic politics and the exclusion and militarisation
of youth.348 Slightly deviating from this dominant perspective, bad government will be
taken as the primary root cause and the other aspects discussed within this context.
As noted by the ICG, "Independence was preceded by lengthy colonial rule
which, although including a strain of authentic democratic tradition, was characterised by
patronage and authoritarian government, especially in rural areas."349 Under Stevens,
governance was dominated by neopatrimonial rule, the abandonment of the periphery and
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the cooption and further delegitimising of the chiefs. These characteristics borrow heavily
from the colonial period but became institutionalised under Stevens and created the
necessary political and social climate for the rebellion. This climate led directly to the
violence Richards describes as a reaction to "past corrupt patrimonial manipulation of
educational and employment opportunities" and a "manifestation of a wider social
movement of marginalised youth."350 Similar to Richards, Keen analysed the conflict as
one with diverse causes and interests and concluded,
The violence has not one but many meanings. The conflict in Sierra Leone
has seen the acquisition of wealth by the impoverished, the assertion of power
by the powerless, and a widespread eruption of anger on the part of diverse
groups who have felt somehow humiliated, exploited, betrayed or simply
forgotten. This study has stressed the erosion of the state and its already
fragile systems of economic and physical protection. At root, it is neglect and
systemic humiliation that have fed the abuses and humiliations of a brutal
war. Where you see little stake in the system, you may be tempted to destroy
it. Where others have abused their power over you, you may be tempted to
abuse those over whom you yourself have power. Many - adults and
especially children - were simply coerced into violence, though they often
subsequently acquired a desire to use it.351
Governance patterns created during the colonial period and institutionalised under
Stevens created the necessary social and political conditions for rebellion. Once
underway, the war would be dominated by gruesome violence but certain political
aspects existed under the apparent chaos.
The war period saw a number of regime changes as the various factions and
alliances sought to gain political control of the state. With the exception of the SLPP
under Ahmed Kabbah, which would form the first post conflict government, none had a
lasting impact on the politics of Sierra Leone. Despite this, there are two core aspects of
the conflict that merit further analysis: the political aspect of the RUF, and the 1996
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elections. Each of these were products of the political realities of the period and have
affected current politics.
Keen has provided a thorough analysis of the RUF as a political movement,
concluding that whatever limited political motivation may have existed was grossly
overshadowed by the contradicting brutality and mayhem of their actions.352 The 1995
RUF document, Footpaths to Democracy, is their primary philosophical document and
provides an erratic outline of their supposed political goals and grievances. Taken at face
value, it is a manifesto based on empowering the citizens of Sierra Leone politically and
economically and aimed directly at politicians who have used the state to enrich
themselves at the expense of the general citizenry.353 Critics describe it not as an overall
guiding theory but an ad hoc reaction to RUF experiences in the forest and guided by
"survivalist tactics to win support from the very public it terrorised."354 Regardless of the
political motives of the RUF, what they had to say is still relevant. Whether as an actual
manifesto of political grievances or an attempt at pandering, the themes of
disenfranchisement and anger aimed at the central government were and continue to be
salient characteristics of Sierra Leone politics.
The 1996 election is an important event as it was the first election to be held
under the new Constitution of 1991 that returned Sierra Leone to multi-party politics. The
victory of the SLPP, led by Ahmed Tejan Kabbah, was significant in that it represented a
rejection of the APC but it also highlighted the degree to which tribal affiliation had
become associated with party politics. Due to security and pragmatic concerns, the
352
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parliamentary election was based on proportional representation rather than single
member plurality reducing the personalisation of the election and the previous levels of
interparty violence.355 The campaigns were limited to the major urban centres and
featured little issue or policy-based differentiations between parties, with each seeking to
portray itself as the best suited to ending the rebellion and ushering in peace.
Results for both the Parliamentary and first round Presidential elections were
congruent and highlighted the regional and by proxy tribalism of the voting patterns. The
Mende south was dominated by the SLPP and Kabbah, receiving 88.15% and 88.06% of
the votes in their respective elections. The Northern and Eastern regions initially showed
splits among the voters due to multiple candidates with regional ties. The United National
Peoples Party (UNPP) and People's Democratic Party (PDP)357 garnered substantial
support in the North with 53.16% and 27.39% of the parliamentary votes followed by the
APC and SLPP with 10.36% and 5.59% respectively. Voting in the Eastern region was
split between the SLPP and the Democratic Centre Party (DCP)358 with 52.17% and
18.74% of the parliamentary votes. The Western region was the most contested of the
four with the SLPP, UNPP and PDP all gaining between 25% and 30% of the votes. The
Presidential run-off, contested by the SLPP candidate Kabbah and the UNPP candidate
Karefa-Smart, eliminated the diluting effects of the other parties and highlighted the
extreme levels of division. Kabbah increased his hold on the Mende south and KonoMende east with 91.75% and 89.58% of the votes. Similarly the majority of the Northern
355
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voters moved toward the UNPP, earning it 78.32% of the votes, while the West remained
largely divided between the two parties, representative of the heterogeneous make-up of
,

.

359

the region.
The 1996 election was the first multi-party election in Sierra Leone with any
degree of legitimacy since 1967. Despite this long gap and the theoretically unifying
force of the destructive rebellion, tribalisation at the party level was still a dominant force
in the political equation. The SLPP returned to dominance in the South and East, while
the UNPP, more of an anti-SLPP force due to the discredited APC, carried the day in the
largely Temne North.
Despite the optimism brought on by the elections and the subsequent Abidjan
Peace Accord, Kabbah and his government faced a daunting task as they inherited a
country still plagued by war and with little money to begin any sort of rebuilding
programme. The optimism was brought to a stunning end on 25 May, 1997 when a RUF
and military alliance overthrew the government in a bizarre coup, with Kabbah fleeing to
Guinea.360 The ruling junta, the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC), was led
by Major Johnny Paul Koroma, who argued that regional and tribal factionalism under
Kabbah had necessitated the action. He also claimed the government policy of utilising
the kamajors361 as soldiers in the war had grown to be a direct threat to the vitality of the
Results for the elections were taken from the article by Kandeh and checked against the values listed on
the Sierra Leone government website, www.sierra-leone.org/govt8.html. The results on the government
website confirm the total values but were not listed by region. Calculations based on the absolute votes
were conducted by the author.
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military.

The AFRC regime would be short-lived as Economic Community of West

African States Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) troops engaged in a series of bloody
battles with junta forces and restored Kabbah to power in March 1998.363 The subsequent
lull would not last long as the RUF mounted their largest assault on the capital,
'Operation No Living Thing', in January 1999. This brutal campaign resulted in
thousands of deaths, with all sides committing atrocities and perhaps due to its brutality
led to the signing of the Lome Peace Agreement later that year.364
Lome did for the RUF what eight years of war had failed to do, giving them a
place in government and direct control of the diamond areas as the RUF leader Foday
Sankoh was made head of a new mineral resources commission and given the title of
"ICC

Vice President.

The agreement also gave a blanket pardon to all members of the RUF,

AFRC, Sierra Leone Army and civil defense forces (CDF) for their actions since March
1991.

A disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration campaign was outlined in the

document, with the government requesting the existing UN mission to be the lead
organisation and calling for a phase out of ECOMOG forces.

However, for a variety of

reasons the Lome agreement quickly unravelled, culminating in the capture of roughly
500 UN troops by a faction of the RUF in May 2000.368 This event seemed to be the final
straw for the international community as the British intervened directly by the end of
May and the UN mission was expanded to over 20 000 troops over the course of the next
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two years.

This massive response finally brought an end to this confusing and

devastating civil war and started the slow building process that is still in its nascent
phases.
Reconstruction: 2002 Elections to 2007 Elections
The final historical section will provide a quick recap of the post war period,
including the 2007 presidential and parliamentary elections. This period has seen slow
yet steady economic progress and an historic electoral change of government as the APC
party returned to prominence. The current democratic status and the most important
challenges to democratisation in Sierra Leone will be discussed. This discussion will
return to the original three recurring themes in Sierra Leone's political history and will
also focus on the policies and programmes of DFID during this period.
On January 18, 2002, President Kabbah officially declared Sierra Leone's war
over. Four months later, on May 10 and 14 Presidential and Parliamentary elections were
held reaffirming Kabbah and the SLPP government. A district block system was
introduced to replace the previous proportional representative system which divided the
country into fourteen electoral districts, each sending eight representatives to
Parliament.

The elections were notable for two primary reasons, ethnic division despite

the size of the Kabbah victory and the re-emergence of the APC as an important player in
national politics. Although eleven parties registered for the elections, it was a two party
race between the SLPP, led by Kabbah, and the APC under the leadership of Earnest Bai
Koroma. Kabbah won the Presidential race in a decisive first ballot victory, gaining
69.77% of the total vote. His tally in the West, East and South was comparable to the
369
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1996 run-off with marginal (1-4%) gains made in each of the three areas. Surprisingly,
Kabbah was able to make slight inroads into the North increasing his share from 21.68%
to 31.9%, largely attributed to an agricultural micro-credit scheme that was extended to
thousands of farmers and business people in the area.

The APC emerged as the main

rival to the SLPP in the West and returned to majority in the North with 33.54% and
52.95% of the Presidential votes in these areas.372 Post-conflict elections occurred across
the country, reaffirming the SLPP as the governing party. These elections were seen as a
reward for the SLPP in ending the civil war and starting the process of reconstruction and
national reconciliation.
The British are Coming
The reconstruction effort in Sierra Leone has been supported by the donor
community with the United Kingdom being the largest bilateral donor and a significant
policy advisor. The 2004 Department for International Development (DFID) document,
Poverty Reduction Framework Arrangement Between the United Kingdom and Sierra
Leone outlined a ten-year development partnership for the period 2002-2012. The
document lists six core areas: resolving conflict, improving standards of governance and
combating corruption, reforming the security sector, reducing poverty, ensuring macroeconomic stability, and developing human resources.373 This is a broad list, however the
document prioritises improving governance and provides more focused programme
objectives and measures. Six areas are highlighted as part of the DFID governance
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strategy: anti-corruption strategy, strengthening financial management systems, civil
service reform, elected local government re-established, diamond industry strengthened,
and free and independent media introduced.374 The Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper
released in 2005 placed promoting good governance as the most critical pillar in the
strategy and echoed many of the priorities listed in the DFID agreement, such as
decentralisation and anti-corruption.375 Good governance was given a high priority in the
donor community, seen as a vital requirement for Sierra Leone economic development.
Much of the programme focus has been on rehabilitating and improving the capacity of
government institutions and has indirectly attempted to address some of the recurring
issues in Sierra Leone's political development.
Restoring the Paramount Chiefs to office was an early priority of the Kabbah
regime, allegedly because it would provide an indicator to refugees and internally
"inf.

displaced persons that security had improved enough to return to their homes.

In a

speech to Parliament in 2000, Kabbah emphasised decentralisation through elected
district councils, the restoration of Paramount Chiefs, and elections for vacant
chieftaincies as key policies in the governments aim to "enhance grass-roots participatory
governance."377 DFID supported the government's efforts through the Paramount Chief
Restoration Programme, although this appears to have been a pragmatic decision based
on a lack of clear alternatives rather than a desired policy approach.378 Chiefdom
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elections

proceeded in 2002 and 2003 with sixty-three vacant chieftaincies being filled.

Kabbah followed this series of elections with a brief tour speaking about the vital role of
the chief in governing the rural hinterland. In his speech, repeated at Bo, Makeni and Port
Loko, major urban centres outside Freetown, he rather nostalgically emphasised the
traditional role of the chief as defender of the people and vowed "to restore the past, and
where necessary modernise the governance structure of the chieftaincy to make it more
effective, relevant and democratic."

Fanthorpe has conducted considerable research

regarding post-war chieftaincy politics and indicates that many of the same pre-war
complaints such as outside control, exploitation of the people and limited legitimacy still
exist.381 These are critical issues for the government and donors to address as a lack of
local government capacity and grievances against the chiefs were important reasons for
the conflict and the recruitment of combatants. Reforming or replacing the institution of
the Paramount Chief remains an important challenge for continued democratisation.
A major move in the governance reform goals of the donor community and the
Sierra Leone government was the release of the Local Government Act of 2004 in March
of that year and subsequent local government elections in May. The Act established the
boundaries for the councils, consistency of the District Councils and provided for a
significant devolution of responsibilities. Of the nineteen local councils that were
established, thirteen were at the district level, five at the town level and the one remaining
in Freetown at the city level. Chiefs were given a presence in the councils ranging from a
379

Chiefdom elections are not conducted through universal suffrage with voting limited to Chiefdom
councilors. A review of the results indicated that most elections were limited to one or two family names,
indicating that ruling families still dominate the institution of the chief. Clearly there is little democracy
within the selection process.
380
Ahmed Tejan Kabbah. "Recognition of Paramount Chiefs" Bo, Makeni, Port Loko, Sierra Leone, 16-20
January, 2003. (Available at http://www.sierra-leone.orE/kabbahO 12603 .html) Viewed December 25, 2007
381
Fanthorpe, 40-45.

125

minimum of zero in Freetown, Western Rural and Bonthe Town to three in five of the
other councils.

As the minimum size of each council is twelve, this provision,

combined with the ineligibility of chiefs to run for elected positions, can be interpreted as
a direct attempt to limit the influence of chiefs at the local level. Overall reviews of the
decentralisation process are mixed, with some small-scale service delivery and local
taxation occurring, despite overall funding and capacity issues. An interesting
observation made by the Campaign For Good Governance, a Sierra Leone NGO, was that
many of the councillors did not reside in their wards and rarely attended meetings,
limiting their ability to act as effective representatives for their constituents.

Building

capable and legitimate local institutions without allowing them to be plagued by local
neopatrimonial characteristics is vital to the overall democratisation process. Beyond the
many logistical challenges, finding the appropriate balance between the chiefs and the
local councils will be pivotal in their ultimate success.
Corruption is a primary characteristic of neopatrimonial governance and a definite
hindrance to effective governance in Sierra Leone. Data from Transparency International
(TI) and the World Bank (WB) show that the perception of corruption has actually
increased in the post-war period. TI's Corruption Perception Index is a ten point scale
and measures perceptions of public sector corruption. Comparing data from 2002 - 2007
Sierra Leone has actually moved slightly backwards from a 2.2 in 2002, to a high of 2.4
in 2005 to 2.1 in 2007, with a score below three indicating the perception that corruption
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is rampant.

The WB's Worldwide Governance Indicators project measures government

performance utilising six indices, including control of corruption, defined as "measuring
the extent to which public power is exercised for private gain, including both petty and
grand forms of corruption, as well as 'capture' of the state by elites and private
interests."385 As in the TI index, Sierra Leone has backslid on this scale, dropping into the
bottom 10% globally and seeing its standard deviation from the mean drop from -0.78 in
2002 to -1.22 in 2007.386 Both these scales are based on perceptions and imperfect,
however recognising the depth of the issue DFID and the donor community at large have
been active in attempting to reduce corruption.
The Anti-Corruption Act was passed in 2000 and the Anti-Corruption
Commission (ACC) was established. The Commission was granted a broad mandate and
substantial powers including those of search, seizure and arrest, although prosecution was
to be handled by the Minister of Justice and the Attorney-General.387 DFID listed anticorruption first in its programme lines for improving governance and dedicated funding
for the ACC, two judges and a prosecutor for anti-corruption trials in the 2004
Framework Agreement with Sierra Leone, continuing previous funding.388 Perhaps
foreshadowing the limited space the ACC would be given to carry out this broad
mandate, both the commissioner and deputy commissioner are Presidential appointees.
The National Integrity Systems TI Country Study Report Sierra Leone 2004 indicated that
corruption was rampant throughout the public and private sector, with bribery, political
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clientalism and embezzlement almost being elevated to standard operating procedures,
with the ACC being described as under-funded, understaffed and hampered by political
interference and internal corruption.390 A scathing report from DFID in 2007 evaluated
the operation and results of the ACC against a series of previous recommendations. Of
these, none had been met and most had not seen any progress made toward achieving the
measures with the blame being squarely placed on the Commissioner. The report
ultimately recommended ending funding for the ACC and shifting its anti-corruption
work into existing programmes aimed at judicial and security reform, financial
management and decentralisation.391 Neopatrimonial governance remains a constant
characteristic of the governance structure of Sierra Leone. Despite donor efforts and
government rhetoric the issue appears to be endemic throughout both the public and
private sectors, creating a significant challenge to democratic consolidation.
2007 Elections
The 2007 elections were notable for being the first post-conflict elections since
the United Nations security mission ended and for seeing an electoral change of power as
the APC returned to national prominence. Civil society played a prominent role in the
election process, through mass peace campaigns in the run-up to the election and a
national observer presence on voting days.
The District Block system, pragmatically used in the 2002 Parliamentary election,
was replaced by a constituency-based system with the APC taking fifty-nine seats, the
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SLPP forty-three and the People's Movement for Democratic Change (PMDC) ten.392
The Presidential race was primarily contested between three men: Ernest Bai Koroma of
the APC, former Vice President Solomon Berewa of the SLPP, and Charles Margai of the
PMDC, although seven candidates received votes.

Margai's PMDC was a breakaway

faction of the SLPP, formed after he lost the party leadership contest in 2005 to
Berewa.394 As expected, this led to a split in the SLPP stronghold region of the Mende
south, with Margai receiving 41.26% of the vote in that region.395 What was unexpected
to many was Margai's endorsement of Koroma in the subsequent run-off election.

This

endorsement had two important effects. Many voters did follow their leader, with the
APC increasing its results in the South from 3.09% in 2002 to 28.03% in 2007. Equally
as important, voters in the south stayed away from the polls as turnout dropped from
557353 in the 2002 Presidential election, to 377722 in the 2007 Presidential first round
and 308149 in the run- off.397 These were major contributing factors in the eventual APC
Presidential victory and could have interesting implications for future political
campaigns.
The 2007 elections were notable as they resulted in a democratic, election-based
change of power with civil society playing a prominent role in the process. However, the
same regional and tribal voting patterns re-emerged as the unity of the immediate postwar period moved into the past. The movement by Margai to support the APC was seen
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as a potential bridge across the tribal divide but it will be interesting to see if there is any
real movement toward unity once the government begins its work in earnest.
This chapter has attempted to illustrate that the major challenges affecting the
consolidation of democracy in Sierra Leone have their roots in the pre-colonial phase of
Sierra Leone's political development. Three core issues have emerged that have
challenged the political development of Sierra Leone since its earliest formal conceptions
and continue to this day: national versus local power relations, tribal disputes, and elite
control and patrimonial governance. These issues were most severely manifested in the
brutal eleven year civil war that is so often associated with Sierra Leone. Post-conflict
donor and government programmes have attempted to address these historical challenges,
but the weakness of the local councils, the ethnic and regional split seen in the latest
national elections and the continuing neopatrimonial governance patterns and rampant
corruption clearly indicate that they still pose a significant threat to the consolidation of a
stable, liberal democracy. The final chapter will focus on the specific case study of the
environmental movement within Sierra Leone and evaluate the effectiveness of civil
society in contributing to the democratisation process and its ability to support donor
policies aimed at tackling the issues retarding its progress.
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Chapter VII: Case Study - Environmental Movement
Evaluating the efficacy of civil society in promoting democracy is complicated as
it is impossible to isolate the effect of civil society from the overall process. This chapter
will be based on a case study of organisations within the ENFORAC, a consortium of
environmental NGOs in Sierra Leone, with additional focus on the EFA. In contrast to
the majority of studies that have focused on advocacy organisations, none of these groups
are primarily organised for that purpose, although many do conduct advocacy campaigns
in their programmes. Typical studies have utilised the extent of policy influence as the
primary dependent variable and analysed the impact of a variety of organisational
characteristics on this measure. This type of analysis will be part of the evaluation criteria
but an expanded set of measures will be used based on White's four possible roles for
civil society and related to donor policies regarding democratic governance and the
historical issues hindering its consolidation in Sierra Leone.
The simplest test of the efficacy of civil society in the democratisation process is
to compare the macro level measures regarding the breadth of civil society and the level
of democracy in Sierra Leone. The Ministry of Development and Economic Planning
(MODEP) is the governmental organisation responsible for coordinating and monitoring
NGO activity. As part of the NGO Policy Regulation of 2004 all NGOs operating in
Sierra Leone are mandated to register with MODEP and with the Sierra Leone
Association of Non-Governmental Organisations (SLANGO), an umbrella organisation
created by the government.39

The regulation offers a standard civil society style

definition of NGO as "any independent, non-profit making, non-political and charitable
398
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organisation, with the primary objective of enhancing the social, cultural and economic
well-being of communities. In addition, the operations of an NGO shall not have a
religious, political or ethnic bias."399 Notably, the regulation makes a clear demarcation
between NGOs and community-based organisations (CBO) which are not eligible for
registration with MODEP.400 This distinction eliminates a large portion of the actual civil
society organisations in Sierra Leone, however the registry is still the best indicator of
civil society's breadth. According to available information, the number of registered
NGOs in Sierra Leone has risen from 47 in 2000 to 189 in 2005, an over 300%
increase.401 This increase is disproportionate to the increase in ODA, which rose from
US$ 246 million in 2000 to US$344 million in 2005, a 39.8% increase.402 In the post-war
period, the number of NGOs operating in Sierra Leone has risen dramatically and the
disproportionate rise compared to ODA indicates they have become a more significant
sector within the development community.
There are numerous indices available that are used to measure democracy at the
national level, with Freedom House rankings being the most commonly referenced. The
Freedom House ranking is split into two categories, political rights and civil liberties. The
political rights score is based on questions that measure the electoral process, political
pluralism and participation, and functioning of government with electoral freedom
consisting of freedom of expression and belief, associational and organisational rights,
rule of law, and personal autonomy and individual rights.403 Sierra Leone scored a three
399
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in political rights and a five in civil liberties in 1999, and a four in political rights and a
three in civil liberties for 2006, values that categorise it as partially free. According to
this data, Sierra Leone has made progress in civil liberties but has regressed in political
rights, with its measure of the functioning of government being the primary driver with a
score of four on the twelve point scale.404 A 2006 Freedom House Report, entitled
Countries at the Crossroads, provided more in-depth analysis of the situation, suggesting
that general government corruption and weak institutional capacity was at the root,
recommending a focus on local government as the remedy although recognising the
difficult political negotiations that would be required with the chiefs for this to be
effective.405
However, this data is inconclusive as a judgement of civil society's efficacy in the
democratising process. Some minor improvement has been made in civil liberties which
may reflect the donor work with the various media outlets or may merely be a reflection
of a country transitioning from civil war. However, the overall government performance
has degraded and corruption still appears rampant, indicating that progress toward good
governance has stalled. The recommendations of increased localisation match the donor
decentralisation policies but the chiefs are cited as a challenge to this process. This shows
a remarkable consistency with the historical review as the chiefs once again appear as the
primary institution challenging governance reform.
The remainder of the analysis will be centred on the ENFORAC and EFA case
study and evaluated based on White's four possible roles for civil society in
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democratisation. Additional macro level data is drawn from The World Alliance for Civic
Participation (CIVICUS)406 report that conducted a thorough evaluation of the state of
civil society within Sierra Leone.
Civil Society as a Balancing Agent
In theoretical terms, this concept is tied to the idea of a strong and vibrant civil
society as a counterweight to the state. It is not defined by any specific actions but merely
its presence as an overarching institution able to ensure that the state apparatus is
controlled or at least checked by society. Donor policy has focused on two sets of ideas:
ensuring that there is space for civil society to operate and building the capacity of civil
society to allow for it to serve this purpose. To evaluate these efforts, the following
criteria will be evaluated: the overall vitality of civil society, and the overall impact on
policy.
Vitality of civil society
Capacity building is an often heard buzzword in development circles and is
frequently the primary goal of donor engagement. The overall strength of civil society is
more than just the number of organisations but also their internal capacity and available
resources, both of which relate directly to their ability to conduct effective programme
activities.
The CIVICUS report provides a more in-depth picture of the actual magnitude of
civil society than the registration data. According to the publication, 73% of individual

406 Q V I C U S is an international alliance of civil society members that works to strengthen citizen action
and civil society throughout the world. Civil Society Index (CSI) is a participatory needs assessment and
action planning tool for civil society with the two primary goals of the CSI are: to enhance the strength and
sustainability of civil society, and to strengthen civil society's contribution to positive social change. The
Sierra Leone report was compiled by the Campaign for Good Governance in collaboration with Christian
Aid-Sierra Leone.
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respondents were members of at least one civil society organisation, with 48% being
members of two or more. Cooperatives and farmer/fisherman associations, with 24% and
16% respectively, were the most common types of organisations. On the opposite end of
the spectrum only 2% listed NGOs and 1% environmental groups as the type of
organisation that they were members.407 This data indicates that civil society activity is
widespread in Sierra Leone but that formal NGOs or the environmental movement are
not an important feature of overall national membership. This aligns with typical
criticism that donor funded organisations only represent a small sub-section of the overall
civil society community.
The amount and type of funding is critical to the ability of civil society to conduct
programmes and direct their agendas. The CIVICUS data indicates 77% of stakeholders
felt that funding for civil society was inadequate.408 ENFORAC relies on membership
dues for its daily operations, with project funding coming from the international donor
community. Collecting dues from members had been problematic, with many
organisations either behind or having never paid their dues.409 As a result, total available
funding was US$1468410 according to a recent interim income statement and the limited
and sporadic dues-based revenue stream is not sufficient for active programming.
International donor support has been available from sources such as the IUCN, UNDP
and the German Technical Cooperation (GTZ), however it is earmarked for specific
projects without direct budget support and limited administrative allowances. The most
recently awarded project funding from the UNDP will disperse US$320 000 over a one
407
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year period and be split among the eleven participating organisations.411 ENFORACs
ability to act as an effective umbrella organisation is hindered by a lack of accessible
funding. Donors frequently mention the need for collective action to create a more
effective balancing voice but their programme-specific funding limits the ability for this
function to develop.
EFA's funding follows the same pattern as ENFORACs, with the vast majority
of funds coming from three international donors, Irish Aid, IUCN and UNHCR and being
allotted for specific project purposes. Financial data from 2006 shows a total income for
the Sierra Leone office of US$479 285 with US$467 219 or 97.5% of this coming
through donor grants.412 Typical budget lines include a 5% value for administration and a
3% value for unforeseen costs, however the bulk of this funding must be allocated and
accounted for through direct project purchases.413 Logistical support has also been
provided, such as vehicles and fuel from the UNHCR but these are intended solely for
project implementation and fuel is monitored through a monthly voucher system.414 This
type of funding ends when the project is completed without leaving any long-term
resources. Additional resources such as generators and fuel for electricity, computers and
the internet are more problematic unless they can be specifically justified as a project
imperative. Without a substantial source of private funding EFA is limited to primarily
project related work which requires the direct approval of international donors and
stringent reporting procedures.
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The utilisation of project based funding by donors is largely a pragmatic response
to minimise waste and corruption, however this funding model does little to facilitate the
growth of a true opposition voice from civil society. Project implementation becomes
necessary for groups to survive and dominates organisations' limited resources and staff.
Maintaining umbrella organisations, deemed critical as a collective voice by donors, is
problematic as project implementation must balance the needs, wants and capabilities of
its member organisations. The ability of groups to form their own ideological stance is
also tempered as projects, even if they are advocacy based, must meet donor's priorities
to receive funding. Although civil society is widespread in Sierra Leone and funding is
available to the various environmental groups, current methods of disbursement greatly
hinder its ability to act as an active and vital balancing agent to the state.
Policy Impact
It is critical to note that the evaluation of policy impact is strictly a magnitude and
ignores the democratic nature of this impact. Although the process is important for the
representative aspect of democratisation, that will be addressed in a later evaluation
criteria. This is not just a pragmatic separation but is indicative of previous academic
evaluations and consistent with donor policies.
The two primary legacy environmental policies are the National Environmental
Policy (NEP) of 1994 and the National Environment Protection Act (NEPA) of 2000.415
The NEP was created during the National Provisional Ruling Council (NPRC) period and
states its overarching goal "is to achieve sustainable development in Sierra Leone through

NaCEF Website, www.nacef-sl.org (Viewed January 5, 2008)
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sound environmental management."

This echoed the sustainable development models

favoured by donors such as the UN and later DFID which established sustainable
development as a core value in its programming during the 1990s. The NEP also
established a number of sectors each with their own general policies, many of which
would establish their own legislation as the policy framework matured. Public
participation and gender issues were also included and justified as necessary in the
relationship between development and the environment.

17

The NEP A built upon the

NEP, creating an administration with a National Environmental Protection Board and a
Department of the Environment which would be established within an existing Ministry.
It also created a formal environmental impact assessment system and licensing
procedure.418 The responsibility for environmental issues would ultimately reside in the
Ministry of Lands, Country Planning and the Environment although forestry-related
issues fell under the administration of the Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Food
Security.
To rectify the conflicting agendas that often occurred between the two
organisations and create a single entity for environmental issues, the National
Commission on the Environment and Forestry (NaCEF) was created on 20 July 2005.419
It became responsible for project implementation, monitoring and priority setting with
respect to the environment and forestry and reports directly to the President's office. The
Commission is split into two divisions, forestry and the environment each with distinct
416
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responsibilities. Both were Departments in Ministries prior to this amalgamation and
reconciling their administrative structures was noted as a challenge.420
ENFORAC and more specifically EFA and the Conservation Society of Sierra
Leone (CSSL), are working partners with NaCEF, with frequent consultation between the
government and civil society representatives.421 At the policy level, ENFORAC was
consulted on the creation of the Strategic Action Plan, suggesting significant
administrative changes and attempting to strengthen the overall document. The most
important recommendations involved the elimination of separate forestry

and

environmental divisions, a more inclusive and defined role for civil society and a shift
towards a more conservation based approach to resource management.

Comparing the

draft and published versions of the document, the majority of recommendations were not
included and critically civil society is not mentioned in the document other than in a tree
planting capacity.423 The document establishes a neo-liberal model of sustainable
development that views nature as a resource for economic growth in contrast to the
conservation approach favoured by many in the international and domestic environmental
movement.
The Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP) is the lead document for Sierra
Leone's development policy and it is important to evaluate the level of priority given to
the environment and civil society's contribution. PRSPs are by definition avenues for
civil society input as they "are prepared by governments through a participatory process
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involving civil society and development partners, including the World Bank and the
International Monetary Fund (IMF)."424 The Interim PRSP released in June 2001 was a
reconstruction plan divided into Transitional and Medium term phases. Given the extent
of the damage from the civil war, issues such as security, the provision of basic services
and re-launching the economy were prioritised.425 Environmental concerns were limited
to the impacts of the mining industry and not addressed even as part of the economic
recovery strategy.42 A World Bank report from 2004 evaluated a cross section of PRSPs
for environmental mainstreaming, using four main headings: diagnosis of environmental
issues, analysis of poverty-environment links, environmentally relevant actions, and the
extent to which participation and consultation processes have allowed environmental
concerns to be heard.427 Of the 53 full and interim PRSPs reviewed, Sierra Leone finished
49th with a score of 0.6 out of 3.0, with zero representing no mention and one indicating
mentioned but not elaborated.428 Overall, the Interim PRSP lacked environmental
concerns and was created without meaningful engagement with civil society. This lack of
inclusion and consultation can be largely attributed to the reconstruction focus and the
2005 full PRSP is a more accurate judgement of policy impact.
The 2005 PRSP involved extensive consultation with civil society and the general
population during its creation. Methods such as focus group discussions and participatory
poverty assessments were utilised to gain a grassroots perspective and "collect
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information on poverty by asking the poor themselves about their experiences of
poverty."429 Civil society representatives were part of this process but not the focal point,
as it was intended to be a representative process. Another participatory technique utilised
was civic engagement which was designed to promote learning about the PRSP process
and gather feedback. This programme was conducted by civil society agents and targeted
many local civil society actors for training. °
The environment was one of five sector reviews conducted in support of the
PRSP. This review was a sprawling document that attempted to portray the environment
as a cross-cutting issue, linking it to all aspects of development. Despite the lack of
coherence, the document listed five significant issues: weak institutional framework and
lack of logistical support, land degradation and deforestation, urban degeneration due to
poor housing facilities, poor coverage of water and sanitation as well as waste
management for the poor, loss of biodiversity, and pollution.

Civil society engagement

is not indicated, however three ENFORAC members are highlighted in the document and
CSSL reported being active consultants during the PRSP process.

However, despite the

participatory process and status given to the environment through the sector review,
environmental issues remained largely outside of the final PRSP document. Mention was
given to the specific targets within the Millennium Development Goals (MDG), however
they were merely mentioned in a section displaying the links between the PRSP and the
MDGs with little concrete policy to support this claim.

The small section dedicated to
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the environment gave a cursory acknowledgement of the sector review stating some of
the core issues from the report but did not offer any sort of strategy or funding to address
these issues.434 Although improved from the Interim PRSP, the environment was not
mainstreamed in the full PRSP process.
The ability of civil society to act as a balancing agent to the state regarding
environmental issues is weak. Although numerous NGOs exist, the organisations within
the movement are reliant on project funding for their survival and have limited additional
resources to effectively organise and conduct campaigns. Larger groups within the sector
such as EFA and CSSL have close government ties and independently or through
ENFORAC have become part of the consultative process. However, this has not
translated into policy as NaCEF has followed its own vision and the environment has
remained outside of major development policy. This situation will be further complicated
if environmental management reverts to its previously divided structure.

Increasing State Accountability
This concept is a specific function of a strong civil society and is a
straightforward criteria to evaluate. Seen in theory as largely the domain of human rights,
lawyers and media organisations, environmental groups do have a role in providing
sector specific expertise. To evaluate this concept, both the overall efforts of civil society
and the sector specific work are important as they serve complimentary purposes.
Returning to the CIVICUS report, both the opportunity and the success of civil
society in challenging the state are assessed. The data indicates that civil society actors
feel that there is little interference from government, with 41.4% of Regional Stakeholder
434
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Consultations (RSC) respondents claiming that the state rarely intervenes in their
activities, compared to 16.1% citing frequent government intervention.435 Focussing on
advocacy campaigns or actions that criticise the government, 89.3% of respondents stated
that the government imposes either minimal, defined restrictions or no restrictions at all
on their activities.436 Civil society is less enthusiastic about the efficacy of its monitoring
activities despite the apparent opportunity. Only 48.3% of respondents answered that
civil society has been active in this area and 91.8% of respondents answered these efforts
have been minimal or unsuccessful in holding the government accountable.

This data

indicates the space exists for civil society to investigate and challenge the state regarding
its activities, however this has not translated into success. This could be a manifestation
of issues related to the project funding model of donors, but is also a reflection of the
brazen nature of the state as illustrated by its actions that rendered the ACC ineffectual.
Accountability in the environmental sector is critical to Sierra Leone's
development and is reliant on strong government policy and action. The role of conflict
diamonds in funding the civil war is well established and highlights the potential
repercussions of illicit trade in the mineral sector. At the policy level Sierra Leone is a
member of the Kimberley Process, an initiative aimed at stemming the flow of illicit
diamonds and has national regulations such as the Core Minerals Act and the Sierra
Rutile Agreement that establish industry standards aimed at increasing transparency and
minimising environmental degradation.
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ENFORAC has hosted a national conference on sustainable environmental
management and a regional conference on biodiversity with government involvement.
However, these activities were intended as sensitisation events and the group has been
inactive in direct government or industry monitoring campaigns.439 Some campaigning
has been done regarding the Aberdeen Creek Estuary, a wetland area located near
Freetown, but without sustained efforts.440 ENFORAC has recently begun a State of The
Environment multimedia project that aims to dramatically raise awareness of domestic
environmental issues. Although in the early phases it is planned as a sustained initiative
and has the potential to increase the visibility of environmental issues and affect state
policy.441
EFA has through partnerships started monitoring campaigns at the Sierra Rutile
location and in the diamond industry. The Sierra Rutile Act outlines the overall
interaction of the company and the government regarding their mining operations and has
specific clauses related to the environment, such as controls on noxious and poisonous
discharge, limits on tree cutting and a commitment to contribute to an agriculture
development fund.442 A specific section is dedicated to the rehabilitation and reclamation
of mined out lands, mandating the company to submit a "detailed programme for the
progressive reclamation and rehabilitation of lands disturbed by mining and for the
minimisation of the effects of such mining on adjoining land/water areas."443 Monitoring
the environmental aspects of the agreement is being done through a project entitled Novel
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and Practical Conservation Strategies Following Rutile Mining in Sierra Leone. This
project is funded by the Darwin Initiative and led by the UK based Centre for Ecology
and Hydrology but involves representatives from EFA, Njala University, the Community
Advocacy and Development Movement (CADEM),444 Sierra Rutile Limited, Fourah Bay
College and local community representatives.445 In 2005 and 2006 the various groups
conducted a complete social, environmental and economic analysis of the impact of rutile
mining. The subsequent report concluded that previous company attempts had failed to
create ecologically healthy environments, soil quality is low and that lakes caused by the
mining process, while meeting standards for potable water were occupying land that
could be used for farming or forest cover.446 This report does not illustrate egregious
violations of the Sierra Rutile Act but this type of data and investigation is required for
effective monitoring to occur.
EFA also works with Global Witness in their in-country progammes, focussed on
implementing the Kimberly Process. In 2006 Global Witness led a three day workshop
intended to "identify ways in which all stakeholders can work to improve monitoring in
the artisanal mining sector in Kono district, as well as to develop a better understanding
of what effective monitoring is and how it can be achieved."447 Attendees included
national government officials, district and local councils, Paramount chiefs, union
representatives and local CBO representatives but none of the major Freetown based
environmental NGOs were present. A 2007 visit by Global Witness representatives to
former conflict zones indicated the potential issues as they "found evidence of a
444
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persisting pattern of youth marginalisation and tension linked to enduring corruption and
mismanagement of the mineral sector."448 State and private sector corruption was a major
facet of the civil war and highlights the need for robust monitoring activity as the
potential repercussions are severe.
The limited environmental monitoring campaigns that exist in Sierra Leone are
largely led and conducted by international non-governmental organisations (INGO).
Although a partnership model is being utilised in the Sierra Rutile case the critical
programme and research design is being handled by the INGO partner. In the Global
Witness case, EFA provides predominantly logistical support to the organisation and has
limited direct involvement beyond the Director level. This type of arrangement limits any
knowledge transfer that could allow local groups to develop their own campaigns.
Combine this with the funding issues that have been discussed and the ability of civil
society to act as an effective agent in improving state accountability is severely limited.
Another issue that would require further evaluation is the role and capabilities of
the news media to act as an effective tool in publicising monitoring activities. Although
the Standard Times

publishes a regular environmental column, issues affecting the

environment receive little coverage. Additionally, papers are a limited medium for
reaching a mass audience as they have little penetration outside Freetown and the low
level of national literacy hinders its overall efficacy. Radio programming is widespread
and a potential ally but also provides little coverage to environmental issues. Monitoring,
reporting and subsequently disseminating this information to a mass audience is critical
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for civil society to effectively hold the state and private sector accountable. Although
local groups are working in partnership to maximise their impact they face many
challenges to become effective in this role.

Communicating the Interests and Demands of the Citizenry
Carothers referred to civil society as the 'transmission belt', shuttling the interests
and demands of the general citizen to the government.450 Pluralism plays a critical role in
this function, as it allows a variety of actors to be available for citizen expression,
facilitating both an increase in citizen voice and the ability of civil society to become
more specialised and therefore more adept at meeting specific needs of society. Donor
policy has taken a more specific view and focussed on groups that have been typically
underrepresented in government circles such as women and the rural poor. This criterion
is complimentary to the magnitude of policy influence as it is attempting to deepen the
democratic structure to ensure that policy inputs reflect the views of those that have been
previously marginalised. To evaluate this it is necessary to look at the breadth of civil
society and how effectively they have incorporated these disenfranchised groups.
The CIVICUS data is useful to understand the efficacy of civil society in this vital
role. Recalling the previously referenced data, 73% of respondents were members of at
least one civil society organisation, while only 2% listed NGOs and 1% environmental
groups as the type of organisation to which they belonged. This data illustrates two
critical aspects of the representative capacity of civil society with regards to the
environment. Clearly the environment is underrepresented nationally in civil society
participation as it only represents a small section of overall group membership. This
450
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immediately limits the overall capacity of civil society to act as a medium for conveying
citizen demands regarding environmental issues. The issue is exacerbated by the type of
organisation that exists within the environmental movement. All of the ENFORAC
members are located in Freetown or its immediate vicinity and only CSSL currently has a
functioning field office in the provinces, located in Kenema for their Gola Forest project.
Programming is more widespread with project work being conducted in all provinces and
districts, although it is difficult to assess whether this represents a response to a local
movement or is just the result of centralised programming.451 All of the respondents to
the organisational survey either agreed or strongly agreed that it was important to engage
local citizens in programme design and implementation.452 This is typical of the
participatory methodology that is required by international donors for funding and often
acts more to facilitate acceptance by local community members of pre-designed projects
than actual planning input.
Overall, the environmental movement in Sierra Leone is a small portion of civil
society and dominated by NGOs, focussed in and around Freetown. This combination
severely limits its ability to act as an effective medium for conveying citizen demands
and issues as argued by many of the academic critiques of current civil society models.
The issue is exacerbated by the requirement for specialised knowledge that exists within
the environmental field when dealing with donor partners as this further serves to narrow
the ability for citizen participation.
An interesting companion to the limitations created by the requirement for
specialised knowledge is the educational campaigns that civil society conducts. EFA has
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created a workbook entitled Our Environment: Taking Care of Our Future and conducts
training for teachers on how to integrate environmental teaching into the curriculum.453
Another ENFORAC member, Tacugama Chimpanzee Sanctuary, also conducts a school
based educational programme that uses volunteers to "present workshops on habitat
conservation and environmental awareness."454 The Union of Environmental Journalists
conducts a multifaceted educational programme that includes a weekly television
programme, which, although having a limited audience, reaches an influential portion of
the population.455 One study that attempted to measure the overall efficacy of its
campaign work was the Western Area RARE Pride Campaign. The 'Pride' campaign was
a programme designed to increase overall awareness of the importance of conservation
for the Western Area Peninsular Forest Reserve45 and used the Rock Fowl or Picathartes
gymnocephalus as its flagship species.457 Data from the study indicates that knowledge
regarding the threats to the reserve increased and actual levels of harmful behaviour such
as farming inside the reserve decreased, indicating that sustained campaigns can have
positive effects.458
Overall, each of the ENFORAC members have educational and awareness
campaigns that seek to educate citizens regarding environmental issues. The ability of
individuals to participate in the democratic process is unquestionably affected by their
knowledge level, a requirement Dahl referred to as 'enlightened understanding'.
453
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Disseminating this knowledge is an area in which civil society has been active although it
is difficult to ascertain whether these campaigns have led to increased public demands for
environmental safeguards within the democratic process.
A specific focus of donor policy in this area is to empower marginalised groups,
with a particular focus on women. The CIVICUS data indicates the results at the national
level are mixed. RSC data shows a high level of groups and programming aimed at
women's issues, many of which work in governance related activities. Of the
respondents, 50.7% felt that civil society had performed a significant role in promoting
gender equality, while 40% felt that it had been successful in empowering women to
make choices.459 However, civil society has been less successful at integrating gender
equality within its own organisations. Of RSC respondents 60.3% held that women are
somewhat under represented while 28.8% felt they were severely under represented.
Overall, civil society programming does incorporate women-specific projects however
civil society organisations remain the primary domain of males.
The environmental movement mimics the overall trend regarding programming
and has similar issues with internal gender inequality. Many of the groups conduct
programmes aimed at women with eco-stove production being a staple of this type of
work. At the organisational level, of the groups that responded, women represented
17.6% of total employees and 33.5% of total members. Of the female employees, only
36.8% are involved in non-administrative roles, further highlighting the lack of
participation at the programme and executive level.461 EFA serves as an excellent
example of this under representation as only three of thirty-three employees are
459
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female.

Of these three, one is responsible for administration and personnel with the

other active in the programme work with Tiwai Island and its administrative body, Tiwai
Island Administrative Committee (TIAC). The notion of gender equality is a documented
goal of ENFORAC,463 however the reality falls far short of the professed intent.
Civil society's ability to act as a 'transmission belt' for environmental concerns is
limited. The movement itself represents a small portion of the overall civil society
community and is dominated by NGOs based in the Freetown region. This limits its
overall representative capacity and creates a type of guardianship situation. Educational
campaigns that are intended to increase local knowledge and spur behavioural change
have been largely ineffective and have not yet increased citizen demands regarding
environmental issues. Finally, the donor focus on women's empowerment has been
largely unsuccessful in civil society in general and the environmental movement in
particular as women remain underrepresented as employees and members and virtually
non-existent at the executive level. This is particularly disconcerting as many of the
environmental issues in Sierra Leone disproportionately involve and affect women.

Creating a New Set of Political Norms
Although there are large institutional issues in Sierra Leone's democratisation
process, this essay has argued that the fundamental issues are rooted in historical
developments that have become dominant features of the power structures in society. As
such, even if institutional reform was implemented it would have limited reach and
longevity, as the same persistent issues of chiefly control, patrimonial governance and
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core-periphery antagonism would remain. Therefore it is imperative that civil society
create new political norms that make historical464 modes of governance unacceptable and
obsolete. Diamond argued that civil society does have the ability to alter relationships,
not just between the state and society but also local patron-client relations. Putnam in his
work displayed that how organisations are structured is a critical factor in their ability to
modify the existing hierarchical relations. Consolidating these ideas, it is apparent that for
civil society to create new norms of democratic governance, they must be democratic in
structure themselves. This requirement is particularly critical in the Sierra Leone context
as the specific issues hindering its democratic consolidation are more closely linked to
societal norms than institutional malaise.
To evaluate the internal structure of the organisations a democracy audit was
conducted based on DahPs five features of a democratic process: effective participation
which provides each citizen with the opportunity for expressing their preferences for
outcomes in binding decision making, voting equality at the decisive stage among and
between the entire citizenry, enlightened understanding which allows each citizen to have
equal and adequate opportunity to evaluate the choice that would best serve their
interests, control of the agenda regarding what matters are to be decided through the
democratic process and a demos inclusive of the total adult population subject to the
binding decisions of the association. This audit focuses on EFA but includes ENFORAC
and other member groups. Two sets of questionnaires were used to evaluate the
individual groups and the ENFORAC forum. For the group evaluations, individual
employees and members were asked to respond, whereas the ENFORAC evaluation was
464
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completed by member group representatives. A total of thirty-seven individuals and five
organisations responded to the survey.

Effective participation
Effective participation is related to influence and opportunity for expression over
items on the agenda during the process of binding decision making. The intent is to
ensure that those affected by decisions have the ability to add items to the agenda and
openly express their preferences regarding the outcome.465
The answers to these questions were somewhat contradictory as respondents felt
that there was opportunity for open expression regarding critical decision making while
also stating much more should be done to promote open and inclusive participation.
Regarding the ability to express preferences, the individual score was 3.38466 and the
ENFORAC rating was 4.0 with scores of 1.91 and 1.67 regarding whether more should
be done to promote participation.

7

These values are difficult to interpret although it may indicate that people feel
they have the opportunity to be heard but that their opinions or concerns are not acted
upon. This would indicate an overly strong executive which would align with the
business formal NGO structure typical of the civil society actors in the environmental
movement. With this type of model, typical vertical structures found in Sierra Leone
government from the chiefs to the central institutions would actually be replicated and
not challenged through a more horizontal structure.
Voting equality at the decisive stage among and between the entire citizenry

465
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The criterion of voting equality, one person-one vote, is the one most closely
associated with a democratic process and specifically with narrow definitions of electoral
democracy often touted by donors. In its simplest form, it means that at the decisive stage
each individual has the opportunity to express a choice that will be given equal weight to
those of other individuals.
This set of questions received the strongest and most polarised responses with
many additional comments being provided. When evaluating whether their organisation's
voting system was fair, individuals were either in favour or in direct opposition to current
voting practices with an average score of 2.35, with sixteen of the respondents indicating
that there was no voting system within the organisation.469 Individual respondents also
indicated that they felt an equal voting system would improve the overall efficacy of the
organisation with an average score of 3.95. Interestingly, of the seventeen individuals
who either agreed or strongly agreed with the existing voting, fifteen of those felt that a
shift to an equal voting system would improve the organisation.470 This data indicates that
decision making is consolidated in a select section of the organisation. Although it is not
possible to confirm from the data, it can be assumed that those who have a say in the final
decision making process concur with the current system while those on the outside are
opposed. This data supports the data from the first set of questions, indicating that
organisations are based on strong central control rather than more inclusive forms of
democracy.
The ENFORAC results revealed an opposite pattern as organisations approved of
the current voting system and did not feel a single vote per member system would
468
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improve the organisation's operations. The current ENFORAC constitution entrenches
voting inequality based on the amount of monthly contributions made to the organisation.
This sliding scale has four categories of members, ranging from non-voting to those with
three votes.471 Despite this formal inequality, only one of the respondents was neutral
with the remainder agreeing or strongly agreeing with the current system, for an average
score of 4.17. Correspondingly, one of the groups strongly approved and one approved of
479

a change in the system and the remainder where either neutral or disagreed.
Although finite interpretations of this data cannot be made, it is important to
highlight that voting inequality is formally ingrained into the structure of the forum. This
is clearly not conducive to forming more inclusive democratic norm and is more aligned
with ideas of guardianship.
Enlightened understanding
The concept of enlightened understanding is based on the premise that individuals
ATX

must be informed to effectively make decisions that best serve their interests.

It is an

essential building block for voting equality and effective participation as without this
access to knowledge these first two criteria cannot be truly met.
This has been an issue within many emerging democracies in direct and indirect
ways. State monopoly over media and other basic channels of information has been
largely utilised as a direct tool by governments to limit access to information. Indirectly,
low levels of education and corresponding high levels of illiteracy have created large
obstacles to access to information and leave the democratic process susceptible to
manipulation.
471
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The majority of individual respondents felt that their organisation provided
adequate access to information, with twenty five of thirty seven respondents agreeing or
strongly agreeing that their organisation provided sufficient information to evaluate
decisions.474 ENFORAC evaluations were less positive, with three agreeing, one
disagreeing and one strongly disagreeing.475 A commonality between the individual and
group respondents was the manner of information gathering. Both sets of respondents
received the bulk of their information from group meetings, indicating that most
information sharing is done in an open and democratic nature. Thirty-two of the
individual respondents indicated group meetings as their primary source of information
with four others indicating individual meetings and one respondent the website.476 Four
of the five group replies indicated group meetings as their primary source of information
with the other replying through individual meetings.477 This data indicates the
organisations are effectively disseminating information to their members and employees
in an open and democratic manner.
A second measure is the ability of group members and employees to effectively
utilise this information in their decision making processes. Sierra Leone has a reported
adult literacy rate of 34.6% and a gross enrolment rate of 44.6% which is a severe
limiting factor in its transition to democracy.

Of the survey respondents, thirty four

were able to read English, thirty-three of the respondents had completed primary school
and thirteen had attended university.479 This data indicates that the group members and
474
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employees will have the capacity to utilise the information they receive in their decision
making process, which has the potential to create a more democratic structure within the
organisations.
Control of the agenda
This concept is closely linked to the first which looked at the ability of individuals
to question and comment regarding items on the agenda. Control of the agenda refers
directly to the ability of the individual to determine what will be on the agenda as an item
to be evaluated through the democratic process.480
Both individual and group respondents indicated that there was adequate
opportunity to introduce items to the agenda, with average scores of 3.97 and 4.2. When
asked if other individuals or groups had the same level of opportunity there was little
change in the answer with scores of 4.0 and 3.67.481 The high score in this category is
related to the group meeting format of the organisations which encourages open dialogue.
Items are brought forth at the start of the meeting for discussion and any of the members
or employees are given a chance to introduce items.
When combined with previous data, this data helps to highlight the gap in the
democratic process. Individuals feel they can introduce items to the agenda and that they
do have the ability to voice their opinions. The gap occurs between this and the final
decision making process which becomes more closed and concentrated, leaving many to
feel unheard and outside the overall process.
An inclusive demos

Dahl, 113
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The final criterion relates to who has the ultimate control over the decision
making process. For this criterion to be satisfied, all those affected by the binding
decisions of the organisation must be included.
This was the most problematic of the five criteria, as seventeen of the respondents
agreed or strongly agreed that their group made binding decisions that directly affected
them without their inclusion. Furthermore, thirty four of the respondents agreed or
strongly agreed that their organisation needed to do more to promote inclusive
participation in daily activities. The average scores of 2.69 and 1.89 were the lowest
aggregates of any of the categories and indicate there is a high feeling of exclusion from
the final decision making process. These sentiments were paralleled in the ENFORAC
data with 2.8 and 1.33, also being the lowest of the aggregates.
This final set of data supports the previous responses and focuses on the primary
democratic weakness within the organisations. Both at the individual and group level
respondents felt they were left out of the general decision making process.
The overall data provides insights into the democratic structure of the various
civil society organisations. High scores were recorded in categories related to the ability
of members and employees to introduce items to the agenda and the availability of
information. This frequent group meetings act as a forum for all members and employees
to bring items up for discussion and serve as effective information sharing venues. The
major weakness in the democratic process occurs in the decision making stage as many of
the members and employees feel they are left out of the process, even on critical
decisions that directly affect them. The formal inequality built into the ENFORAC
constitution and the lack of a voting system in the organisations is problematic for any
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sort of democracy building to occur. It is unclear whether this gap between participation
and final voting is representative of the overall societal structure or is more a result of the
formal NGO model that the majority of the organisations follow but must be closed for
civil society to effectively act as a catalyst for democratic growth.
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Conclusion
Democracy promotion has become elevated to more than just a donor programme
objective but a perceived starting point for economic development and security policy. In
parallel, the notion of using civil society as a core agent in promoting democracy has
become an accepted facet of donor policy. Civil society is often seen as a safe haven of
operations, outside the perceived corrupt and lethargic state apparatus and vital for
creating the necessary conditions for democratic transition. Despite the overwhelming
donor acceptance of the necessity of democracy promotion and the utility of civil society
in this project, there are numerous potential pitfalls. This essay has utilised a case study
example of the environmental civil society community in Sierra Leone to analyse the role
of civil society in democratic transition and in doing so highlight some of the issues with
the concept.
The initialsext section of the essay dealt with the two overarching theoretical
themes of development and democracy. Both are massive fields and only selected aspects
were discussed to provide a background for the case study analysis and to provide context
to current donor policies and programming.
Development theory was recapped from its modern conception at the end of
World War II to illustrate the evolution of both theory and practice. Multinational
institutions such as the United Nations and World Bank have been leaders in theory and
policy, often driving the overall development agenda. Specific focus was given to USA
policies to illustrate the emergence of democracy building within the development
framework and the elevation of development to the high politics of national security. UK
policy was reviewedj as they are the primary bilateral donor to Sierra Leone and have
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taken a similar shift toward democracy promotion in their development theory and
practice.
Emerging from this recap were a number of critical issues affecting the role of
civil society in overall development policy. Narrow, economic based definitions, such as
those supported by the World Bank, essentially eliminate people from development. This
leaves civil society with an extremely limited role in the process. In its benign form this
has meant civil society appears in a consultative roll during project design, but with little
real overall input to the final direction. More critical analysis, has argued that civil
society is being used to justify the overall neoliberal agenda and allow damaging changes
to be accepted by society at large. The concept of democracy promotion as a core facet of
development, favoured by many of the large bilateral donors, also presents issues for civil
society. Within this concept, democracy has been elevated from a by-product of
economic advancement, to a parallel activity, and finally to a direct measure of
development. Civil society has also gained prominence as a vital actor in the
democratisation process and programming of bilateral donors. This relationship is
problematic as the pragmatism of donor programming severely restricts the scope of civil
society engagement. Additionally, there is an undefined relationship in donor policies
regarding the direct link between civil society and democracy.
The chapter on democracy theory traced the concepts from its Athenian roots to
current donor understandings, often contained in the overall idea of good governance.
Historical democracy theory highlighted core societal aspects, such as liberty nad
majority rule, without stressing specific institutions. Within this conceptdonor policy,
democracy has often been reduced to minimalist definitions., hovering between strictly
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electoral democracy and western, liberal models more commonly linked with Robert
Dahl's definition of polyarchy. This is largely as-a pragmatic shift to allow for more
simplistic programming and targets institutional reform rather than tackling more abstract
societal and normative aspects of democracy promotion. This creates an immediate
compatibility issue as the type of role civil society is theoretically suited to perform in
democratisation is limited when strictly institutional reform is targeted. It also serves to
impose a specific version of democracy, based on pre-determined institutions rather than
a domestic reality. This can create a hollow democracy, void of any meaning to the
domestic constituency and with little strength when challenged. There is also the
potential for the formation of pseudo democracies, governments that have the external
appearance of functional democracies and are accepted by the outside world, but lack any
true domestic democratic structure.
The following chapter literature review focussed on the substantial critiques that
have come from within the academic world, encapsulating both definitional and
operational debates. Many of the definitional debates surrounded the very nature of civil
society in the developing world context, as the typical western definitions created areas of
inclusion and separation that do not exist in reality. The DFID definition was the most
broad as it included a wide variety of organisations and also broached the vague concept
of civil society as a social space. Despite this broad definition,, typical critiques have
argued that programming has minimised civil society to a small group of organisations
based on the NGO model and located in the capital. This reduction has minimised the
efficacy of civil society to represent the masses, one of its primary roles in the
democratisation process. The USAID focus on advocacy organisations is more

162

problematic as it can further serve to reduce civil society to a mere handful of individuals
who speak for the vast civil society community.
The concept of the sphere of civil society as distinct from the family, state and the
market was also heavily critiqued. This notion of a separate sphere is argued to be
extremely critical in the African case, as many organisations are based on family, kinship
or tribal lines. In addition to the reducing affect these distinctions can have, it is also
possible that empowering certain sections of civil society may actually increase societal
gaps as power imbalances can be exacerbated.
The discussion regarding operational debates was divided into a generic section
based on theoretical roles for civil society and a second section focused on more
focussed, case-study reviews of the concept. Gordon White's four potential roles for civil
society in democratisation were introduced and used as a framework for a general review
of the concept. Three of these roles are interrelated and linked to the direct relationship
between the state and society while the fourth is concerned with the more abstract
concept of norm creation.
The role of civil society as a balancing agent is accepted by donors as critical but
has been particularly critiqued throughout the literature. At the general level this
enthusiasm is confusing as it represents a reversal of earlier development theory and
policy. Theoretical frameworks such as modernisation theory portrayed the nationbuilding and development mission as one that needed to overcome a stagnant, traditional
society, vet now it is this same society being asked to overcome a weak state. One of the
methods donors use to promote civil society in this role is by funding their programming
and general operations. However, current funding practices, that are largely short-term
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and linked directly to projects, serve to limit the overall ability of civil society to act as an.
independent entity. Organisations are forced to chase donor funds, which severely
hinders their ability to conduct long-term programmes and campaigns, limiting their
overall efficacy. There is also the potential that this funding model forces civil society
organisations to adjust their agendas to a Western model, which has the potential to
actually shrink the overall policy debate.
On a more abstract level the ability of civil society to create new democratic
political norms is unique, as it strays from the practical aspects of the relationship
between the state and society. Proponents from academia, such as Larry Diamond, have
argued that civil society has the ability to not just modify political norms at the formal
government level but also address the local, patron-client relationships that are built into
societal structures. This is extremely relevant to the Sierra Leone situation where many of
the challenges to democratisation exist in the societal framework of the country. Robert
Putnam contributed to the understanding of this role for civil society, suggesting that if
the organisation is more horizontally structured, it will be more effective in creating
democratic institutions and norms. In the Sierra Leone example it is critical that
democratic norms exist within civil society, for them to act as effective mediums for
normative shifts.
More recent academic work was reviewed that has provided case-study analysis
of the actual efficacy of these programmes. The general conclusion indicated that there
has not been a discernable relationship between civil society programmes and state level
democratisation. Two critical issues were highlighted: a lack of donor consensus on the
role of civil society in the democratisation process and little understanding about its
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actual efficacy. In addition to echoing many of the theoretical criticisms of civil society's
role the author also argued that the extent of internal democracy was positively linked to
its efficacy in influencing policy. This is important as it indicates that internal democracy
is not just important from a normative perspective but is also directly linked to
performance.
The final section of the essay covered the specific case study of Sierra Leone with
an additional focus on the environmental civil society community. This was split into two
sections with the first looking at the political history of Sierra Leone and the second
focussing on the contribution of civil society actors in the environmental movement to
the overall democratisation process.
The historical review was used to highlight the primary recurring themes affecting
Sierra Leone's political development. The review was split into three time periods to
illustrate how these themes developed and highlight some of the major events and
policies. It was argued that three major issues have developed: national versus local
power relations, tribal disputes, and elite control and patrimonial governance. The nature
of these issues lies largely in societal structures and political norms which have evolved
over time and more rapidly since the first contact with Europeans. This creates
compatibility issues with typical donor policies and programmes which focus on
governmental institutions rather than addressing the societal aspects of democratisation.
In the Sierra Leone example this is leading to the growth of a facade of overall
governance, without the required societal support mechanisms. Recent election results
indicate that many of the recurring issues have resurfaced, as the war moves into the
historical background. This also creates specific issues and roles for civil society in the
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democratisation process. With the donor focus on institutions, much of the task of
modifying political norms along democratic lines is left to civil society.
The final section of the essay focussed on the case study analysis from the
environmental movement in Sierra Leone, focussing on the national forum, ENFORAC
and EFA, one of the largest NGOs in the overall community. Gordon White's four
potential roles for civil society was used as a theoretical framework for the analysis and
Robert DahPs five criteria for a democratic process was used to evaluate the specific
function of civil society as an actor in norm creation.
It was found that civil society had not been effective in affecting policy, although
it had access to government and considerable societal space to conduct its operations.
Similarly it has had limited success in holding the state accountable for adhering to
existing policies. Much of this was attributed to current donor funding practices which
severely restrict the autonomy of civil society actors. Funding is typically limited to
direct project implementation and administrative overhead with little provided for
discretionary spending. Although often justified as a pragmatic response to avoid
corruption and waste it severely limits the ability of organisations to conduct sustained,
long term campaigns necessary to affect true change. This also affects which issues are
pursued as often donor agendas establish the priorities, with civil society left to chase
funding.482
Civil society's effectiveness in acting as a medium to improve state and citizen
communication was also mixed. The actors adhered to typical critiques of civil society in
that they were located in the urban centres, in this case the capital Freetown, and had
482
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more salient and controllable issues in Sierra Leone.
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limited representative capacity for the majority of citizens. This issue was exacerbated by
the limited scope of environmental NGOs within the overall civil society community as
environmental groups and NGOs were both extremely small portions of national
participation levels. Civil society organisations within the environmental movement also
did poorly at providing voice to typically marginalised groups. Women's empowerment
is a core facet of donor programming, yet NGOs in the sector were typically populated
and controlled by men.
The final criteria that was evaluated was the ability of civil society to create a new
set of political norms aligned with democratic standards. Dahl's five criteria for a
democratic process were used for this evaluation. This is extremely vital in the Sierra
Leone example as it was argued that the core issues hindering its democratic
consolidation are rooted in societal structures. Overall the organisations had mixed results
in this capacity. Employees and members were given ample opportunity to raise issues
and express preferences, however the process broke down at the decision making stage.
This is largely based on the formal NGO structure of the civil society actors which serves
to consolidate decisions making with upper management, aligning it with executive
political control. This is problematic as the vertical structure of civil society mimics the
issues with existing governance structures and dramatically limits its ability to act as a
location for reform.
Despite the predictions of the slow and steady procession of democracy and the
efforts of donors to fulfil this prophecy there are still sever hurdles in many transitional
countries. The ability of civil society to facilitate this transition, although generally
accepted in donor rhetoric, is also problematic. Donor definitions of democracy will have
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to be expanded and programming developed to address societal and normative issues for
sustained progress to be made. Additionally funding models will have to be adopted that
allow for local actors to develop their own programming in response to domestic
concerns rather than external priorities. Within civil society, democratic norms will have
to become part of daily operations and overall governance structures for it to achieve its
full potential in this critical role.
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Appendix A: Organisation Questionnaire
Section I - Organisational Information
1) Organisation code. (Do not answer, this is assigned to ensure the results are
confidential)

2) What year was your organisation formed?

3) What operational structure best describes your organisation? (
• Business Orientated Non-Governmental Organisation - Primarily paid
staff/ Public benefit / Limited or no members / Primarily donor funded
• Voluntary Non-Governmental Organisation - Primarily voluntary staff/
Public benefit / Limited or no members / Primarily donor funded
• Indigenous Peoples' Organisation - Mixed or primarily voluntary staff /
Public benefit / Organised along ethnic, language or territorial lines / Can operate
locally, nationally or globally / Mixed funding
• Peoples' Organisations or Mass Organisations - Primarily voluntary
staff / Mutual(member) benefit / Group of CBOs or peoples'(ie women, farmers)
association / Expanded geography beyond the community / Primarily member
funded
• Community Based Organisation - Primarily voluntary staff/
Mutual(member) benefit / Limited geography / Primarily member funded

4) What
•
•
•
•
•

is your organisations primary source of funding?
Foreign donor - Private
Foreign donor - Government
Domestic government
Domestic donor
Members

5) How many people are part of your organisation?
Active Members
Employees
Volunteers

6) How many women are part of your organisation?
Active Members
Employees
Volunteers
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7) How many women are part of your organisation - excluding
secretarial and support staff?
Active Members
Employees
Volunteers
8) What is the primary focus of operation for your organisation? (check
only one)
• Advocacy (i.e. addressing government, creating policy, monitoring)
• Large Scale Programme management (i.e. managing nature
reserves, large rehabilitation projects)
• Educational or training (includes research, workshops, etc)
• Small Scale Programme implementation (i.e. treeplanting)
• Providing basic services (i.e. installing wells, building latrines, etc)
9) What other areas of operation are you involved? (check all that apply)
• Advocacy (i.e. addressing government, creating policy, monitoring)
• Large Scale Programme management (i.e. managing nature
reserves, large rehabilitation projects)
• Educational or training (includes research, workshops, etc)
• Small Scale Programme implementation (i.e. treeplanting, beach
clean-up)
• Providing basic services (i.e. installing wells, building latrines, etc)

Section I I : Democracy Audit
10) How many times has your organisation met with National
government officials in the previous year regarding environmental
issues?
• 4 or more

• 3
• 2

• 1
• 0
If more than four please estimate the total number:
11) How many times has your organisation met with District
government officials in the previous year regarding environmental
issues?
• 4 or more

• 3
• 2

• 1
• 0
If more than four please estimate the total number:
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12) How many times has your organisation met with Paramount Chiefs
in the previous year regarding environmental issues?
• 8 or more

•

6-7

•
•

4-5
2-3

•

0-1
If more than eight please estimate the total number:

13) Which level of government does your organisation think is most
important to work with regarding environmental issues?
• International Governmental Organisations (i.e. U.N., World Bank)
• International Non-governmental Organisations (i.e. IUCN, WWF,
Greenpeace)
• National government
• District government
• Paramount Chiefs
• None of the above
14) How effective has your organisation been in contributing to
National Environmental Policy?
• Formal policy creation (i.e. wrote or provided direct research on
major policy such as PSRP or NEP)
• Large consultative role (i.e. consulted on major policy such as
PRSP, NEP)
D Minimal consultative role (i.e. sent letters or had numerous
meeting)
• Minimal contribution (i.e. contributed to another organisations
efforts)
• No contribution (i.e. no impact whatsoever)

15) Does your organisation think it should be involved in policy
creation and advocacy?
• Strongly agree

•

Agree

•
•
•

Neutral
Disagree
Strongly disagree
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16)

Would you like your organisation / ENFORAC to become more
active in policy creation and advocacy?
• Strongly agree
• Agree
• Neutral
• Disagree
• Strongly disagree

17) How many times has you organisation been involved in monitoring
activities in the previous year? (ie evaluating and reporting on government or
industry policy)

•

4 or more

• 3
• 2

• 1
• 0
18)Would you like your organisation / ENFORAC to become more active
in monitoring activities?
• Strongly agree
• Agree
• Neutral
• Disagree
• Strongly disagree

19) Does your organisation have its financial records maintained by a
certified accountant? (If yes please skip question 16, if no please answer question
16)

•
•

Yes
No

20) Does your organisation have its financial records maintained by a
university/college trained accountant?
• Yes
• No
21) Does your organisation have financial records that are open to
internal audit?
• Yes
• No
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22) How often does your organisation have external audits of its
financial records?
• Bi-annually (twice per year)
D Annually
• Semi-annually (Less frequently than once per year)
• Upon request (ie. by donors)
• Never
23) Does your organisation have a formal policy regarding conflict of
interest? (Do potential financial or other interests need to be declared when making
project decisions that may create benefit)
• Yes
• No
24) Does your organisation have a formal policy regarding nepotism?
(Hiring family members)
• Yes
• No
• Not applicable (no paid staff)
25) What does your organisation think is the most critical, general
environmental issue in Sierra Leone? (please pick 1)
• Protecting and conserving biodiversity
• Conservation of living things (ie forests and aquatic life)
• Desertification
• Hazardous waste and toxic chemicals
• Ocean pollution - protecting the commons
• Atmospheric pollution (includes but not exclusive to Climate
Change)
• Other
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26) What does your organisation think are the most critical, specific
environmental issues in Sierra Leone? (please pick 5)
• Protecting wildlife from extinction
• Reducing the trade in animals (i.e. Bush meat or poaching)
•

Biopiracy (theft of indigenous plant knowledge for medicine without
compensation)

•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
D
•
•

Biotechnology and genetic engineering
Protecting ocean wildlife and the ocean resource
Deforestation
Access to safe water
Access to sanitation
Land degradation
Erosion from road construction and urbanisation
Urban degradation and pollution
Number of people living in slums
Mined out lands
Pesticide and fertilizer usage
Ocean based waste disposal
Ocean based habitat destruction
Interior air pollution
Air pollution (ie NOx and S0 2 )
Ozone depletion (CFC usage)
High carbon energy use (i.e. carbon based fuels)
Climate change
Other

27) For what issues does your organisation have programmes? (tick all
that apply)
• Protecting wildlife from extinction
• Reducing the trade in animals (i.e. Bush meat or poaching)
• Biopiracy (theft of indigenous plant knowledge for medicine without
compensation)
• Biotechnology and genetic engineering
• Protecting ocean wildlife and the ocean resource
• Deforestation
• Access to safe water
• Access to sanitation
• Land degradation
• Erosion from road construction and urbanisation
• Urban degradation and pollution
• Number of people living in slums
• Mined out lands
• Pesticide and fertilizer usage
• Ocean based waste disposal
• Ocean based habitat destruction
• Interior air pollution
• Air pollution (ie NOx and S0 2 )
• Ozone depletion (CFC usage)
• High carbon energy use (i.e. carbon based fuels)
• Climate change

• Other

28) Does your organisation think it is important to engage local
citizens in your policy and programme design?
• Strongly agree
• Agree
• Neutral
• Disagree
• Strongly disagree
If applicable please provide a brief example of how your organisation engages
local citizens in your policy and programme design :
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29) In which Provinces does your organisation have projects?
• Western Area Province
• Eastern Province
• Southern Province
• Northern Province
30) In which Districts does your organisation have projects?
• Western Urban
• Western Rural
• Kailahiun District
• Kenema District
• Kono Disctrict
• Bo District
• Bonthe District
• Moyamba District
• Pujehun District
• Bombali District
• Kambia District
• Koinadugu District
• Port Loko District
• Tonkolili District

31) Please list all the Chiefdoms that your organisation has projects?
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Section III: ENFORAC Evaluation
32) Does your organisation think ENFORAC provides each group an
opportunity for expressing their preferences on critical decision
making?
• Strongly agree
• Agree
• Neutral
• Disagree
• Strongly Disagree

33) Does your organisation think ENFORAC should do more to
promote open and inclusive participation regarding critical decision
making?
• Strongly agree
• Agree
• Neutral
• Disagree
• Strongly disagree

34) Does your organisation think the current ENFORAC voting system
is fair?
• Strongly agree
• Agree
• Neutral
• Disagree
• Strongly disagree
35) Does your organisation think a single vote per organisation system
would improve the effectiveness of ENFORAC?
• Strongly agree
• Agree
• Neutral
• Disagree
• Strongly disagree
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36) Does your organisation think that each group is provided with
sufficient information to evaluate decisions that are voted on by
ENFORAC members?
• Strongly agree
• Agree
• Neutral
• Disagree
• Strongly disagree
37) How does your organisation gain access to information regarding
decisions that are to be voted on by ENFORAC members?
• Group meetings
• Individual meetings
• Website
• Secondary source
• Individual research
38) Does your organisation think it has enough opportunity to
introduce items to the ENFORAC agenda?
• Strongly agree
• Agree
D Neutral
• Disagree
• Strongly disagree
39) Does your organisation think that other groups have enough
opportunity to introduce items to the ENFORAC agenda?
• Strongly agree
• Agree
• Neutral
• Disagree
• Strongly disagree
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40) Does your organisation think there are decisions made regarding
ENFORAC without inclusive discussion? (i.e. not all members are aware or
consulted)
• Strongly agree
• Agree
• Neutral
• Disagree
• Strongly disagree
41) Does your organisation think that ENFORAC should do more to
promote inclusive participation in the daily operations of ENFORAC?
• Strongly agree
• Agree
• Neutral
• Disagree
• Strongly disagree

42) Please write any additional comments on any of the questions
above, (please note the question number next to the comment)

43) Please write any additional comments your organisation feels are
applicable regarding the democratic structure of ENFORAC.

190

Appendix B: Individual Citizen Questionnaire
Section I : General Information
1) Organisation code (Do not answer, this is assigned to ensure the results are
confidential)

2) Where are you currently living? (write the name of the Chiefdom,
District and Province)

3) Where were you born? (write the name of the Chiefdom, District and
Province)

4) What tribe are you? (tick the one that is most applicable)

• Mende
• Temne
• Limba
• Kuranko
• Kono
• Fula
• Creole (Krio)
• Sherbo
• Kisi
• Susu
• Loko
• Mandingo
• Other
5) What
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

languages do you speak? (tick all that apply)
English
Krio
Mende
Temne
Limba
Kuranko
Kono
Fula
Sherbo
Kisi
Susu
Loko
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• Mandingo
• French
• Other
6) What languages do you read? (tick all that apply)
• English
• Krio
• Mende
• Temne
• Limba
• Mandingo
• Loko
• French
• None
• Other
7) Gender
• Female

•

Male

8) How old are you?
• 55 and above
• 40-54

•
•
•
•

30-39
25-29
20-24
15-19

9) Do you practice any of the following religions? (tick ONE of the
following boxes)
• Islam
• Christianity
• None
• Other

10)What is your main occupation? (tick one of the following boxes)
Farming
Fishing
Trading
Housewife
Traditional healer
Association / group leader
Government worker
NGO worker
Cookery
Other

•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

11) What is the highest level of schooling you have attended? (tick ONE
of the following boxes)
• Post-graduate University / College
• Undergraduate University / College
• Teacher Training College
• Technical/Vocational Institute
• Senior Secondary School
• Technical / Vocational Centre
• Junior Secondary School
• Primary School
• Pre-primary School
• None
12) Are you a participant in any kind of clubs or associations? (includes
Women's Associations, political parties, church groups, etc)

• Yes
• No
13) Who do you rely on for giving the most reliable information? (tick
ONE of the following boxes)
• Teachers
• Religious leaders
• Traditional leaders
• Government workers
• Community associations / clubs
• NGO workers
• Media (radio, newspapers etc)
• Friends
• Other
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14) What do you feel is the most critical, general environmental
issue in Sierra Leone?
• Protecting and conserving biodiversity
• Conservation of living things (ie forests and aquatic life)
• Desertification
• Hazardous waste and toxic chemicals
• Ocean pollution - protecting the commons
D Atmospheric pollution (includes but not exclusive to Climate
Change)
• Other

15) What other specific issues do you feel are important
environmental issues in Sierra Leone? (please pick a MAXIMUM of
FIVE)
• Protecting wildlife from extinction
• Reducing the trade in animals (i.e. Bush meat or poaching)
D Biopiracy (theft of indigenous plant knowledge for medicine without
compensation)
• Biotechnology and genetic engineering
• Protecting ocean wildlife and the ocean resource
• Deforestation
• Access to safe water
• Access to sanitation
• Land degradation
• Erosion from road construction and urbanisation
• Urban degradation and pollution
• Number of people living in slums
• Mined out lands
• Pesticide and fertilizer usage
• Ocean based waste disposal
• Ocean based habitat destruction
• Interior air pollution
• Air pollution (ie NOx and S0 2 )
• Ozone depletion (CFC usage)
• High carbon energy use (i.e. carbon based fuels)
• Climate change

•

Other

Section I I : Democracy Audit
16) Do you think your organisation provides each member /
employee opportunity for expressing their preferences on
decision making?
• Strongly agree

• Agree
•
•
•

Neutral
Disagree
Strongly disagree

17) Do you think your organisation should do more to promote
open and inclusive participation regarding critical decision making?
• Strongly agree
• Agree
• Neutral
• Disagree
• Strongly disagree
18) Do you think your organisation's voting system is fair?
• Strongly agree
D Agree
• Neutral
• Disagree
D Strongly disagree
• Not applicable (i.e. issues are not voted on)
19) Do you think a single voting system (one per member /
employee) for your organisation would improve its effectiveness?
• Strongly agree
• Agree
• Neutral
• Disagree
• Strongly disagree
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20) Do you think your organisation provides each member/
employee with sufficient information to evaluate decisions that are
voted on?
• Strongly agree

• Agree
•
•
•

Neutral
Disagree
Strongly disagree

21) How do you gain access to information regarding decisions that
are made by your organisation?
• Group meetings
• Individual meetings
• Website
• Secondary source
• Private research
22) Do you think your organisation provides you with enough
opportunity to introduce items to the agenda?
• Strongly agree
• Agree
• Neutral
• Disagree
• Strongly disagree

23) Do you think your organisation provides other members /
employees enough opportunity to introduce items to the agenda?
• Strongly agree
• Agree
• Neutral
• Disagree
• Strongly disagree

24) Do you think your organisation makes decisions that directly
affect you without inclusive discussion? (i.e. not all members are aware or
consulted)
• Strongly agree
• Agree
• Neutral
• Disagree
• Strongly disagree

25) Do you think your organisation should do more to promote
inclusive participation in its daily operations?
• Strongly agree
• Agree
• Neutral
• Disagree
• Strongly disagree
26) Please write any additional comments on any of the questions
above, (please note the question number next to the comment)

27) Please write any additional comments you feel are applicable
regarding the democratic structure of your organisation.
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